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INTRODUCTION 
The public debate surrounding the Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden 
leaks involves a “name game”: Are they traitors, spies, or whistleblowers? 
Each of these labels carries “connotations of righteousness and wrongdoing.”1 
To the executive branch, however, these labels are irrelevant.2 It regards all 
unauthorized disclosures of national security information the same way – 
regardless of why or to whom the leaks are made – because all leaks expose 
government secrets and undermine the executive’s ability to control the 
dissemination of information to the public.3 
Historically the executive branch has seldom pursued criminal leak 
prosecutions.4 Consequently, until the recent uptick in leak prosecutions, it was 
easy to argue that the First Amendment offered no protection to government 
 
1 Katy Steinmetz, The Edward Snowden Name Game: Whistle-Blower, Traitor, Leaker, 
TIME (July 10, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/07/10/the-edward-snowden-name-
game-whistle-blower-traitor-leaker, archived at http://perma.cc/9S98-EZV3. 
2 See JAMES C. GOODALE, FIGHTING FOR THE PRESS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PENTAGON 
PAPERS AND OTHER BATTLES 207 (2013) (“Obama apparently cannot distinguish between 
communicating information to the enemy and communicating information to the press. The 
former is espionage, the latter is not.”); DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET 
AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 19 (2011) (“The deep layers of 
secrecy were to keep terrorists, foreign spies, and reporters away. We [reporters] were in 
terrible company and often treated accordingly . . . .”); Marisa Taylor & Jonathan Landay, 
Obama’s Crackdown Views Leaks as Aiding Enemies of the U.S., MCCLATCHY (June 20, 
2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/06/20/194513/obamas-crackdown-views-leaks-
as.html#.UkSv9dKsgyo#storylink=cpy, archived at http://perma.cc/K7FH-EDND 
(observing that a Department of Defense document stated “[h]ammer this fact home . . . 
leaking is tantamount to aiding the enemies of the United States”). 
3 See, e.g., Robert S. Litt, Gen. Counsel for the Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Servs., 
Remarks at the 23rd Annual Review of the Field of National Security Law (Oct. 23, 2013) 
(transcript archived at http://perma.cc/6P8V-39XQ) (“What the Washington Post reports, al 
Qaeda knows.”). Although the focus of this Article is on the First Amendment rights of 
government insiders, the press has also been the subject of treason accusations after 
publishing leaked national security information. I have addressed the First Amendment 
rights of the press at length in a previous article. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, 
Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233 
(2008). 
4 See William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 
57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1467 (2008) (“The tacit understanding in Washington is that leaks 
are seldom subject to criminal action.”); Jonathon C. Medow, The First Amendment and the 
Secrecy State: Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 775, 832 (1982) (“[P]rosecution is 
only a possibility, and a remote one at that.”). 
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insiders – including present and former government employees and 
independent contractors5 – who reveal national security information without 
authorization. Indeed, many scholars defending the right of the press to publish 
secrets simultaneously argue that the First Amendment imposes virtually no 
limit on the government’s ability to punish leakers.6 This is not surprising, 
given that arguments that the press has virtual immunity to disseminate 
national security information are likely to be more palatable if the government 
has unbridled power to stop the flow of information at its source. It is also easy 
to make this distinction between government insiders and outsiders when 
prosecutions against both are more hypothetical than real. 
Times have changed. The Obama Administration has undertaken more leak 
prosecutions than all prior Administrations combined.7 The wisdom of some of 
these leak prosecutions, such as the prosecutions of Bradley Manning and 
 
5 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 668 (1996) (holding that the First 
Amendment framework for government employees applies to independent contractors). 
6 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 281-82 
(1989) (arguing that the government has the power to impose criminal sanctions against 
government employees who disclose information obtained on the job); Rodney A. Smolla, 
Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1099, 1167 (2002) (stating that the First Amendment does not limit the government’s 
ability to stop leaks); Geoffrey R. Stone, WikiLeaks, the Proposed SHIELD Act, and the First 
Amendment, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 105, 111-13 (2011) (claiming that the government 
can punish employees as long as unauthorized disclosure of classified information is 
“potentially damaging” to the United States); Eugene Volokh, Leakers, Recipients, and 
Conspirators, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 21, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://www.volokh.com/ 
2013/05/21/leakers-recipients-and-conspirators, archived at http://perma.cc/9JX7-LKG5 (“I 
think it’s pretty clear that it’s constitutional to outlaw leaks of government information by 
those who have promised to keep it secret.”). But see Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech and 
National Security, 84 IND. L.J. 939, 961 (2009) (proposing a new standard for disclosures, 
namely that disclosure of information should only be prohibited when the “potential harm to 
the national security outweighs the value of the disclosure to public discourse”). A handful 
of commentators have argued that both leakers and third parties who receive or distribute 
leaked information are entitled to little or no First Amendment protection. See, e.g., 
GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE MEDIA, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 81 (2010) (“In his Commentaries, Joseph Story . . . bluntly stated that the idea 
that the First Amendment ‘was intended to secure to every citizen an absolute right to speak, 
or write, or print, whatever he might please, without any responsibility, public or private . . . 
is a supposition too wild to be indulged by any rational man.’” (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 2 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 667 (1858))). At least one 
scholar has argued that leakers and the third parties that publish those leaks should be 
subject to the same standard. Alan M. Katz, Comment, Government Information Leaks and 
the First Amendment, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 108, 130-32, 141-42 (1976) (arguing that leakers 
should not be punished until the government can demonstrate reckless disregard for the 
harm to the government and lack of value for a self-governing public). 
7 Scott Shane & Charlie Savage, Administration Took Accidental Path to Setting Record 
for Leak Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2012, at A14. 
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Thomas Drake, is questionable at best, and demonstrates a disturbing level of 
prosecutorial overzealousness.8 The dramatic crackdown on leakers has created 
a chilling effect on potential sources of national information for the press and, 
in turn, the public. In addition, the increase in leak prosecutions threatens the 
work of the press directly. If the government continues to prosecute leaks, it 
may more frequently issue subpoenas to reporters, as it has done in the Jeffrey 
Sterling prosecution,9 or seek information about reporters’ communications 
from third parties, as it did when it obtained the personal and professional 
phone records for Associated Press reporters without prior notice to them.10 
Most alarmingly, the revelation that an FBI investigator had described in an 
affidavit a Fox News reporter as “aiding and abetting” the unauthorized 
disclosure of national security information had led to fears that the government 
may prosecute members of the press.11 Commentators have slowly begun to 
recognize that if leaks play an important role in our society, we should protect 
not only the media outlets that publish the leaked information, but also the 
leakers themselves.12 
Although a few scholars have recognized that penalties against leakers raise 
legitimate First Amendment issues,13 most of the scholarship in this area dates 
 
8 Tricia Bishop, NSA Espionage Case Closes Quietly; In Plea Deal, Drake Admits 
“Exceeding Authorized Use” of Computer, a Misdemeanor, BALT. SUN, June 11, 2011, at 
A2. (reporting Drake’s guilty plea to one misdemeanor count of “exceeding the authorized 
use of a computer” after originally facing up to thirty-five years in prison on Espionage Act 
and other charges); Michael Isikoff, Justice Case Against Alleged Leaker Collapses, NBC 
NEWS (June 9, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43349086/#.UoQqa2g2lUR, archived at 
http://perma.cc/49RN-G624 (reporting the possibility that the government’s case against 
Drake collapsed because information he disclosed arguably should never have been 
classified); Fred Kaplan, A Moderate Verdict, SLATE (July 30, 2013), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2013/07/bradley_manning_wasn_t_guilty_of_treaso
n.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NT73-HMN3 (arguing that the decision to charge 
Manning with the military equivalent of treason, a charge for which he was acquitted, was 
the result of prosecutorial overzealousness). 
9 United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 492, 499 (4th Cir. 2013) (rejecting reporter 
James Risen’s challenge to a subpoena seeking the identity of his source in connection with 
Jeffrey Sterling prosecution).  
10 Charlie Savage & Leslie Kaufman, Phone Records of Journalists Seized by U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, May 13, 2013, at A1. 
11 Michael Calderone & Ryan J. Reilly, DOJ Targeting of Fox News Reporter James 
Rosen Risks Criminalizing Journalism, HUFFINGTON POST (May 21, 2013), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/20/doj-fox-news-james-rosen_n_3307422.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/D72Q-AXAT. 
12 See, e.g., Mika C. Morse, Honor or Betrayal? The Ethics of Government Lawyer-
Whistleblowers, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421, 423 (2010). 
13 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 521, 609 (“[P]enalties against ‘leakers’ should be thought to raise serious First 
Amendment issues, and not to be available to public authorities as a matter of 
prerogative.”). Heidi Kitrosser recently published an outstanding article arguing, as I do 
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back to the time of Samuel Morison’s prosecution for delivering classified 
satellite photos to Jane’s Weekly in 1988.14 Even more importantly, none of the 
prior scholarship regarding the rights of leakers has grappled with the 
complications posed by massive changes in communications technology in the 
last two decades, including the decline of traditional media as the exclusive 
arbiter of the flow of national security information between the government 
and the public. Changes in communications technology and the media have 
made it exponentially more difficult to make distinctions among the different 
types of leakers. 
This Article focuses on rebutting the prevailing view among the public, 
commentators, and scholars that leakers lack First Amendment rights. It 
concludes that these rights are, in fact, substantial. The First Amendment 
should support the common sense distinction between those who leak 
information with the purpose and effect of contributing to the public debate, 
and those who engage in espionage or even treason by giving national security 
information to foreign countries or organizations. 
Part I addresses potential explanations for the recent uptick in leak 
prosecutions and the important – yet imperfect – role leaks play as part of our 
government’s system of check and balances. Part II summarizes the current 
statutory and regulatory protections and penalties applicable to traitors, spies, 
whistleblowers, and other leakers. Part III examines the scope of First 
Amendment protection for leakers and concludes that, while treason and 
espionage are not “speech” for constitutional purposes, all other leaks are 
“speech.” Part III also confronts – and dismantles – the prevailing assumption 
that the First Amendment does not apply to leakers because they received 
information in a position of trust and because they contractually waived their 
First Amendment rights.15 
 
here, that national security leakers enjoy some measure of First Amendment protection, but 
her article does not focus on the differences between traitors, whistleblowers, and other 
leakers. Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First 
Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. NAT’L L. & POL’Y 409, 
441 (2013) (arguing for the application of the balancing test in Pickering v. Board of 
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), in the context of civil and administrative sanctions and 
strict scrutiny for criminal sanctions). 
14 In the 1980s a few commentators argued for a balancing test. See, e.g., James A. 
Goldston et al., Comment, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 
21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 457-58 (1986) (advocating for a balancing test that 
considers the leak’s contribution to public discourse). 
15 Other commentators have addressed the enforceability of confidentiality agreements, 
although not always in the context of national security employees. See, e.g., Alan E. 
Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
261 (1998) (discussing the limits of nondisclosure agreements generally and asking whether 
there is “something inherently troubling about a promise to suppress one’s speech that 
warrants regulation,” id. at 264); Lilli Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in 
Confidential Press-Source Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 645-55 & nn.141-52 (1991) 
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Part IV argues that the First Amendment limits the government’s power to 
bring criminal prosecutions against leakers who are not traitors or spies. 
Although treason and espionage are not “speech” under the First Amendment, 
and therefore are not entitled to constitutional protection, these categories must 
be carefully defined – like every category of unprotected speech – so that they 
apply only in cases where the defendants intended to communicate with a 
foreign power (or “enemy,” in the case of treason). This Article argues that by 
carefully considering what was disclosed, why it was disclosed, and to whom it 
was disclosed, it is possible to discern the leaker’s intended audience and make 
the necessary distinctions among leakers. 
This Article also argues that although the First Amendment permits the 
government, when functioning as an employer, to restrict the speech of 
government insiders more easily than it can restrict the speech of government 
outsiders, this power should be limited to the imposition of employment-
related civil and administrative sanctions. The Article concludes that the 
government should be entitled to pursue criminal sanctions against leakers who 
are neither traitors nor spies only when government outsiders could be 
prosecuted: that is, when the disclosures pose a direct, grave, and immediate 
threat to national security that is not outweighed by the public interest in the 
information. 
Under the approach this Article advocates, the government is not powerless 
to control the unauthorized dissemination of national security information by 
its employees and contractors. The government retains significantly greater 
power to pursue employment-related sanctions. This power is not, however, 
unlimited. The protection the First Amendment provides against such sanctions 
is quite limited, leaving the government with important means of deterring and 
punishing leaks.  
I. THE CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION LANDSCAPE 
Until recently, the government prosecuted those engaged in traditional 
espionage activities, but it rarely prosecuted government insiders who 
disclosed information to the press. Indeed, it is difficult to find any record of 
leak prosecutions in our country’s early history; instead, those who leaked 
information faced only civil sanctions, like termination from government 
employment (and perhaps some public disgrace).16 Before President Obama 
took office, all prior presidential administrations combined prosecuted a total 
 
(noting that confidentiality contracts are not as absolute as many assume). 
16 SCHOENFELD, supra note 6, at 81. 
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of three leakers.17 During Obama’s presidency alone, however, the Department 
of Justice has indicted eight.18 
As I discuss elsewhere,19 unauthorized leaks provide a wealth of valuable 
information essential for government oversight and accountability. The 
nation’s deeply flawed classification system makes it hard to know what truly 
needs to be kept secret, and leaks help combat the executive’s tendency to err 
on the side of secrecy. At the same time, leaks are a highly imperfect and 
inefficient vehicle through which to challenge excessive secrecy. As 
technology makes it harder than ever to distinguish among traitors, spies, and 
whistleblowers, unease about allowing leakers to go unpunished grows. 
A. Possible Explanations for Increase in Leak Prosecutions 
Although Attorney General Eric Holder claims that the sudden increase in 
leak prosecutions was largely unplanned, President Obama has made clear that 
stemming the tide of leaks is a high priority for his Administration.20 The 
primary causes of the dramatic increase in prosecutions are likely changes in 
technology and the media, exploding growth of and access to classified 
information, and a belief that it is especially important in a war against 
terrorists to protect our secrets vigilantly. 
Changes in technology have led government officials to come down hard on 
leakers in order to stop leaks before they occur.21 It cannot be a coincidence 
that the rise of leak prosecutions coincides with the rise of nontraditional 
media entities like WikiLeaks. For at least the last century, only the nation’s 
leading newspapers and broadcasters published sensitive national security 
information, and for the most part, these entities have been both cooperative 
with government officials and responsible in their publication decisions.22 
 
17 In the 1970s, Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo were indicted on Espionage Act 
charges for leaking the Pentagon Papers, but the case against them was dropped due to 
prosecutorial misconduct. Cora Currier, Charting Obama’s Crackdown on National Security 
Leaks, PRO PUBLICA (July 30, 2013, 2:40 PM), http://www.propublica.org/special/sealing-
loose-lips-charting-obamas-crackdown-on-national-security-leaks, archived at http://perma. 
cc/L2CZ-CRCW. In the late 1980s, Samuel Morison was successfully prosecuted for 
disclosing satellite photographs to a British publication; this was the last leaker prosecution 
until Lawrence Franklin was prosecuted in 2005 for disclosing information about Israel to 
lobbyists from AIPAC. Kevin Gosztola, Obama’s Aversion to Leaks Channels Reagan, 
SALON (June 22, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/06/22/obamas_aversion_to_leaks_ 
channels_reagan, archived at http://perma.cc/WQ7E-NNWA. 
18 See Charlie Savage, Former F.B.I. Agent to Plead Guilty in Press Leak, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 23, 2013, at A1. 
19 Papandrea, supra note 3. 
20 Shane & Savage, supra note 7.  
21 PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 2, at 276 (stating that the leak prosecutions are intended, 
“at the very least, to scare government employees with security clearances into not speaking 
with reporters”). 
22 Some might say the mainstream media tends to be more compliant than responsible, at 
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They have routinely asked the government for guidance on the ramifications of 
the national security information in their possession and have frequently 
withheld stories or limited their scope in order to guard against harm to U.S. 
security interests.23 
In the digital age, the ability to engage in the mass dissemination of 
information is no longer reserved to an elite few, and this makes government 
officials nervous.24 Those who want to reveal information to the public have a 
wide variety of foreign and domestic intermediaries to reach their desired 
audience; indeed, they can forego intermediation entirely and distribute their 
information directly to the public. From the government’s perspective, foreign 
intermediaries like WikiLeaks are particularly dangerous because they operate 
outside the conventional Beltway atmosphere in which the media and 
government’s mutually beneficial relationship exists.25 They also serve very 
different audiences. The traditional media publishes for a general audience 
and, and as a result, it is less likely to publish hypertechnical material that is 
incomprehensible to its readers (but potentially very valuable to the nation’s 
enemies and allies alike).26 In addition, the government may fear that, given 
the possibility of leaks from nontraditional sources, even the traditional media 
will not delay or forego the publication of secrets, given its need to compete in 
a challenging business environment.27 
Furthermore, the U.S. media makes its publication decisions in the shadow 
of federal law, which necessarily affects their publication decisions. Although 
the standard that the government must meet to prosecute a publisher who 
discloses national security information is unclear,28 newspapers like the New 
York Times and Washington Post are unlikely to publish national security 
secrets simply for the sake of publishing secrets.29 Moreover, the government 
 
least in some instances, because as a repeat player it wants to preserve its good relationship 
with the government. 
23 See Papandrea, supra note 3, at 261 (“There may be many reasons why the press is as 
cooperative as it is with the government.”). 
24 Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: WikiLeaks and the Battle over the Soul of 
the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 313 (2011). 
25 I detail this symbiotic relationship in a previous article. See Papandrea, supra note 3, at 
248-62. 
26 See David Pozen, Leaky Leviathan, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 615 (2013). 
27 Cf. Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security 
Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1499-1502 (2012) (stating that WikiLeaks’ information 
brokering with multiple newspapers made it impossible for the New York Times to delay 
publication). 
28 See Papandrea, supra note 3, at 236. 
29 See, e.g., Barton Gellman, Remarks at the Georgetown Journal of National Security 
Law and Policy Symposium: Leakers, Whistleblowers, and Traitors: An Evolving 
Paradigm, at 02:47:00 (Feb. 25, 2014), http://apps.law.georgetown.edu/webcasts/event 
Detail.cfm?eventID=2275 (arguing that it is “profoundly wrong” to suggest that journalists 
are indifferent to the risk of prosecution they might face under the Espionage Act and 
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cannot realistically threaten foreign publishers with prior restraint or ex post 
criminal prosecution for disseminating particularly dangerous secrets because 
they operate largely outside of U.S. jurisdiction. Any attempt to enforce a prior 
restraint against an entity like WikiLeaks would be an exercise in futility. 
WikiLeaks hosted its content on a complicated web of redundant servers 
located in a variety of jurisdictions.30 As the pursuit of Julian Assange 
demonstrates, extraditing foreigners to the United States to face prosecution for 
publishing leaks is also extraordinarily difficult.31 
The Bradley Manning mass document dump illustrates how easily, 
indiscriminately, and potentially anonymously leakers can reveal the nation’s 
secrets. The costs of gathering and disseminating information to the public (or 
an intermediary) have diminished to almost zero. While Daniel Ellsberg had to 
copy each page of the Pentagon Papers painstakingly, Bradley Manning just 
had to download files onto a flash drive. The internet makes it possible to 
disseminate information in searchable format throughout the world in a matter 
of moments. Although Adrian Lamo revealed Manning’s identity,32 and 
Edward Snowden did not seek anonymity,33 the government may not be as 
lucky in the future. Speaking anonymously online becomes easier by the day, 
and forcing foreign publishers to comply with a subpoena to reveal their 
sources is difficult. The hope, then, is that severely punishing the identified 
leakers will deter future leakers. 
Indeed, the government’s overwhelming desire to stop leaks may have 
changed its cost/benefit analysis regarding the overall value of leak 
prosecutions. In the past, government officials pursued few leak prosecutions 
out of the fear that more harm than good would come from the prosecution; 
they might have to reveal even more sensitive information in order to 
demonstrate that the information was properly classified and damaging to U.S. 
national security interests.34 So-called “graymail” can still happen – the 
 
related statutes for publishing national security information). 
30 See Bellia, supra note 27, at 1482-83. 
31 Bill Dedman, U.S. v. WikiLeaks: Espionage and the First Amendment, NBC NEWS, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/40653249/ns/us_news-wikileaks_in_security/t/us-v-wikileaks-
espionage-first-amendment/#.UwVrNP1td-U (last visited Feb. 8, 2014), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/MRK9-DADK. 
32 Kevin Pouslen & Kim Zetter, U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in WikiLeaks Video 
Probe, WIRED (June 6, 2010), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/leak, archived at 
http://perma.cc/VJH8-LXY9. 
33 Glenn Greenwald, Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance 
Revelations, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/ 
edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance, archived at http://perma.cc/98QS-YUBS 
(revealing the identity of Edward Snowden as the source of information about NSA 
surveillance practices “at his request”). 
34 National Security Leaks and the Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 11 (2012) 
(statement of Kenneth Wainstein, Homeland Security Advisor) (“[E]ven when investigators 
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government claimed it dropped its prosecution of Thomas Drake for this 
reason35 – but the Classified Information Procedures Act has made it much less 
likely that the government will have to expose more classified information in 
order to have a successful prosecution.36 Furthermore, because improvements 
to surveillance technologies make it easier to obtain evidence of a defendant’s 
guilt, the risk of graymail is low; indeed, most defendants plead guilty.37 
Another possible explanation for the rise in leak prosecutions is that the 
government feels that it has more valuable secrets to protect than in the past. 
Gabriel Schoenfeld argues that leaks from the founding era were much more 
innocuous, and much less capable of compromising national security, than 
more recent leaks regarding methods of fighting global terrorism.38 Whether 
today’s secrets are that much more valuable is debatable; Dana Priest and 
William Arkin report that their military and intelligence sources cannot name a 
single post–September 11 leak that has caused serious harm to national 
security.39 Determining whether a particular leak causes harm can be difficult, 
but what matters is whether the executive branch believes that leaks connected 
with its counterterrorism efforts are particularly dangerous. 
Relatedly, the government may simply be overwhelmed with the number of 
secrets it is trying to keep. The number of covert and clandestine operations 
has multiplied.40 Many of these operations are controversial, leading to a 
 
can get by those challenges and the leaks are identified, the agency whose information was 
compromised is often reluctant to proceed with a prosecution out of fear that trying the case 
in public will both highlight the compromised information and disclose further sensitive 
information that it wants to keep confidential.”). 
35 Charlie Savage, Finding Sources of Leaked Secrets Is Hard; Bringing a Case Is 
Harder, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2012, at A20. Critics suggest that the government invoked the 
need to protect classified information as a cover for its desire to drop a weak case, especially 
given Drake’s plan to present testimony from a former classification czar that the 
information at issue in the case should never have been classified. See, e.g., Isikoff, supra 
note 8. 
36 18 U.S.C. app. § 3 (2012) (“Upon motion of the United States, the court shall issue an 
order to protect against the disclosure of any classified information disclosed by the United 
States to any defendant in any criminal case in a district court of the United States.”). 
37 Ann E. Marimow, Former State Dept. Arms Expert Pleads Guilty in Leak to Fox News 
Reporter, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2014, at A4 (“[M]ost accused leakers in recent years have 
pleaded guilty rather than go to trial.”). 
38 SCHOENFELD, supra note 6, at 82 (stating that the age of global terrorism poses far 
greater intelligence risks than the “age of musket fire and wind-borne ships”). 
39 PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 2, at xx (“Despite all the unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information and programs in scores of articles since September 11, 2001, our 
military and intelligence sources cannot think of an instance in which security has been 
seriously damaged by the release of information.”); see also id. at 269 (“[L]oss of any 
particular technology that would have had a severe impact on U.S. capabilities [during the 
Cold War] would these days likely just prompt a new round of innovation to replace it          
. . . .”). 
40 Id. at 12. 
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greater likelihood of leaks.41 The digital age has led to the collection of 
incredible amounts of data, much of which is accessible in digital form (and 
thus more easily copied and disseminated). The government now struggles to 
strike the right balance between providing sufficient access to information to 
those who may need it for work purposes, and concerns that broad access to 
information will make it harder for the government to control the information. 
After the September 11 attacks, the 9/11 Commission criticized the 
government for excessively compartmentalizing information.42 On the other 
hand, some critics have lambasted the government for giving too many people 
access to the nation’s secrets, especially after the Manning and Snowden 
leaks.43 While insufficient information control poses its own set of risks, 
excessive secrecy may undermine respect for the classification system.44 The 
government might believe that leak prosecutions counteract this loss of respect. 
The government often claims that one reason why it has not prosecuted 
more leakers is that they are difficult to identify.45 But the prosecution of 
Jeffrey Sterling,46 as well as recent revelations regarding the widespread 
collection of phone records for Associated Press (AP) reporters47 and the 
surveillance of Fox’s Chief White House Correspondent James Rosen,48 
 
41 Id. at 32 (explaining that people have a number of reasons for talking about what they 
know, including “a desire to correct the record or to explain away something that sounds 
evil, or to save the agency from itself, or to stop wrongdoing”). 
42 See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 417 (2004), archived at http://perma.cc/W4LF-GB7Z. 
43 Brad Plumer, About 500,000 Private Contractors Have Access to Top-Secret Info, 
WONKBLOG WASH. POST (June 11, 2013, 11:01 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/11/about-500000-private-contractors-have-access-to-top-secret 
-information, archived at http://perma.cc/X7A5-ERQM (“One of the big questions raised 
after Edward Snowden exposed the NSA’s secret surveillance programs is how a private 
contractor working at Booz Allen Hamilton had access to such sensitive information in the 
first place.”). 
44 Elizabeth Goitein & David M. Shapiro, Reducing Overclassification Through 
Accountability, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. N.Y.U. SCH. L. 7 (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www. 
brennancenter.org/publication/reducing-overclassification-through-accountability, archived 
at http://perma.cc/5NRW-BVSB (“[O]verclassification erodes government employees’ 
respect for the classification system . . . .”). 
45 Adam Liptak, A High-Tech War on Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2012, at SR5 (“As a 
general matter, prosecutions of those who leaked classified information to reporters have 
been rare, due, in part, to the inherent challenges involved in identifying the person 
responsible for the illegal disclosure and in compiling the evidence necessary to prove it 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting a Justice Department official) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
46 See United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 489 (4th Cir. 2013). 
47 Savage & Kaufman, supra note 10, at A1. 
48 Anne E. Marimow, Records Offer Rare Glimpse at Leak Probe, WASH. POST, May 20, 
2013, at A1. The government obtained a warrant to search the reporter’s personal emails, 
traced the timing of his phone calls with a State Department security advisor, and combed 
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illustrate how things have changed. Today, the government can search not only 
work-related communications devices (even if used for non-work-related 
purposes),49 but also email, phone, and travel records from third parties and 
track the communications and movements of both government insiders and 
journalists through GPS-enabled cellphones. Even meetings in dark parking 
garages à la Bob Woodward in All the President’s Men are not safe if a camera 
captures footage of every person that comes in and out.50 Journalists report that 
their government sources have become “reluctant to discuss even unclassified 
information with them,” as these sources are worried about the possibility of a 
leak investigation based on government surveillance of every email and phone 
call they make.51 Advances in surveillance technology not only make it easier 
for the government to identify leakers without subpoenaing reporters, but also 
make it more likely that a prosecution will be successful.52 
To the extent that such action is necessary, the government’s reluctance to 
subpoena a reporter in a leak prosecution has diminished. Since the early 
1970s, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has had internal guidelines that 
prohibit issuing subpoenas to reporters unless other avenues of investigation 
have been exhausted and the Attorney General expressly grants approval.53 
These guidelines are not binding on the government and do not apply to special 
prosecutors.54 As a result, Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald did not hesitate 
to subpoena various members of the press during his investigation of the 
 
security badge records to track the reporter’s visits to the State Department. Id. 
49 See Savage & Kaufman, supra note 10, at A1. A lawsuit has been filed based on the 
admitted practice of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of accessing employees’ 
private email accounts accessed on work computers; the agency also reviewed documents 
stored on government-issued computer and took electronic screen shots of computer 
desktops. Ellen Nakashima & Lisa Rein, FDA Says It Monitored E-Mails to Investigate 
Leaks, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2012, at A18. 
50 Liptak, supra note 45. Concerns that the government is conducting surveillance of 
reporters has led many journalists to become experts in encryption and other tools to protect 
the security of communications with their sources. See, e.g., Lauren Kirchner, Encryption, 
Security Basics for Journalists, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Sept. 17, 2013, 2:50 PM), http:// 
www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/hacks_hackers_security_for_jou.php?utm_source=dlvr.it&ut
m_medium=twitter, archived at http://perma.cc/JNS6-WHVC; Amy Zhang, Whistleblowers 
to Journalists: Protect Your Data, NEWS MEDIA & L., Summer 2013, at 3.  
51 See Leonard Downie, Jr., Special Report: The Obama Administration and the Press: 
Leak Investigations and Surveillance in Post-9/11 America, COMM. TO PROTECT 
JOURNALISTS (Oct. 10, 2013), http://cpj.org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-
surveillance-post-911.php, archived at http://perma.cc/89LV-PVDD. 
52 Id. 
53 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 n.41 (1972). 
54 In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 n.3 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The regulation states 
that ‘the following guidelines shall be adhered to by all members of the Justice Department 
in all cases,’ 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2003), but a special prosecutor is not a member of the 
Justice Department.”). 
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Valerie Plame leaks, and a New York Times reporter ended up spending eighty-
five days in jail.55 Perhaps as a result of the Plame case, prosecutors subject to 
DOJ regulations appear less reluctant to subpoena reporters and third parties 
holding their records. In May 2013, it was revealed that DOJ issued sweeping 
subpoenas for the phone records of AP reporters without prior notification56 
and obtained a warrant for the phone and email records of White House 
correspondent James Rosen of Fox News on the grounds that he had “aided 
and abetted” a leak.57 In addition, Holder approved the subpoena of New York 
Times reporter James Risen in the Jeffrey Sterling prosecution, and won a big 
victory when the Fourth Circuit denied Risen’s motion to quash.58 Although 
DOJ just revised its internal guidelines regarding media investigations in 
response to the recent controversies,59 it also said “leaks of classified 
information to the press can pose a serious risk of harm to our national security 
and it is important that we pursue these matters using appropriate law 
enforcement tools.”60 
DOJ may also feel emboldened to subpoena reporters in light of weakening 
judicial support for a reporter’s privilege, especially in leak cases.61 In 
addition, Congress has shown little interest in protecting journalists in leak 
investigations. Although thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have 
statutory shield laws, the frequent efforts to pass a federal shield law have 
failed.62 The WikiLeaks disclosures derailed a bill approved by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in 2009; ultimately, the bill never reached a vote in the 
 
55 Michael Calderone, Times’ Abramson Is on—Then off! in Scooter Trial, N.Y. 
OBSERVER, Feb. 19, 2007, at 1. 
56 See Sari Horwitz, Justice Dept. Seized Phone Records of AP Journalists, WASH. POST, 
May 14, 2013, at A1. 
57 Calderone & Reilly, supra note 11. 
58 Shane & Savage, supra note 7. 
59 DOJ, REPORT ON REVIEW OF NEWS MEDIA POLICIES 1 (2013), archived at http://perma. 
cc/8G8U-SX8C. 
60 Justice Department Affidavit Labels Fox News Journalist as Possible ‘Co-
Conspirator,’ FOX NEWS (May 30, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/05/20/ 
justice-department-obtained-records-fox-news-journalist, archived at http://perma.cc/ZW4F 
-XYSR. Indeed, in announcing that Donald Sachtleben had plead guilty to leaking 
information to AP about a foiled bombing plot in Yemen, DOJ made clear that the phone 
record search was critical in identifying him as the source of the unauthorized disclosure. 
Savage, supra note 18. 
61 See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 492, 499 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that there is no First Amendment or federal common law protection for a reporter’s 
privilege); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the First 
Amendment did not provide privilege for a reporter). 
62 Legislative Protection of News Sources, REPORTERS COMM., http://www.rcfp.org/first-
amendment-handbook/introduction-legislative-protection-news-sources-constitutional-privil 
ege-a (last visited Nov. 13, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/YPN5-J7U3. 
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full Senate.63 Although DOJ says that it supports a shield bill, the government 
has been careful to push for legislation that would offer little protection to 
reporters in national security leak investigations.64 
To be sure, the government is still not prosecuting every leak. This selective 
prosecution is arguably part of the problem.65 One researcher who has 
interviewed many active and retired CIA officials reports that the agency 
“selectively enforces its edicts on secrecy, using different standards depending 
on rank, message, internal politics and whim.”66 As tempting as it is to argue 
that the government prosecutes only those who leak embarrassing or negative 
information, it is not clear that the government’s track record during the last 
decade would actually support this argument. The government has declined to 
prosecute many leaks, including some significantly damaging ones.67 
Nevertheless, even if the increase in leak prosecutions is largely accidental, 
the Obama Administration has clearly made a commitment to prosecute 
leakers aggressively, and journalists claim these prosecutions are having the 
desired effect of chilling the willingness of government insiders to share 
information with them. New York Times national security reporter Scott Shane 
reports that “[g]overnment officials who might otherwise discuss sensitive 
topics will refer to these cases in rebuffing a request for background 
 
63 Charlie Savage, Criticized on Seizure of Records, White House Pushes Media Shield 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2013, at A19. 
64 David Stout, After Debating Definition of ‘Journalist,’ Senate Panel Passes Shield 
Law, MAIN JUST. (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.mainjustice.com/2013/09/12/after-debating-
definition-of-journalist-senate-panel-passes-shield-law, archived at http://perma.cc/W2F8-
6VQ2 (stating that both President Obama and DOJ supported the Free Flow of Information 
Act, a bill that would put into law “recently revised Department of Justice guidelines for 
investigations involving journalists and information pertaining to national security”). The 
proposed legislation has a national security exception for criminal investigations or 
prosecutions of “allegedly unlawful disclosure of properly classified information” when 
compelled disclosure would “materially assist” the Department of Justice “in preventing or 
mitigating . . . (i) an act of terrorism; or (ii) other acts that are reasonably likely to cause 
significant and articulable harm to national security.” Free Flow of Information Act, S. 987, 
113th Cong. § 5(a)(2)(A) (2013). Critics complain that this exception will essentially 
eliminate protection for national security reporters in most instances. See David 
Freedlander, Media Balks at Band-Aid Shield Law, DAILY BEAST (May 16, 2013), http:// 
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/16/media-balks-at-band-aid-shield-law.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/FXK5-3UQV. 
65 The same could be said for the government’s prepublication clearance requirements; 
some books by former employees are subject to extensive redactions; others sail through 
with the government’s blessing. 
66 Ted Gup, Secrecy Double Standard, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2013, at A21. 
67 See Pozen, supra note 26 (detailing the government’s failure to prosecute leaks 
aggressively); see also SCHOENFELD, supra note 6, at 239 (arguing that the low numbers of 
leak prosecutions “does not exactly constitute a reign of terror”); Richard Moberly, 
Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National Security Dilemma, 16 EMPLOYEE 
RTS. & EMPL. POL’Y J. 51, 80 n.177 (2012). 
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information.”68 He believes the recent uptick in leak prosecutions has 
“definitely [had] a chilling effect” on the willingness of government insiders to 
talk to reporters.69 This effect has also taken hold of some journalists who are 
afraid to publish stories likely to lead to a subpoena, and potential jail time and 
crippling fines if they refuse to testify.70 
Despite President Obama’s proclaimed commitment to government 
transparency,71 critics complain that his presidency is “turning out to be the 
administration of unprecedented secrecy and of unprecedented attacks on a 
free press.”72 In addition to chilling discussions between the press and 
government officials, this Administration has been much less willing than prior 
administrations to discuss sensitive information with reporters.73 Journalists 
claim that designated spokespersons “are often unresponsive or hostile to press 
inquiries, even when reporters have been sent to them by officials who won’t 
talk on their own.”74 Another common concern is that the crackdown on leaks, 
and the executive branch’s desire to exercise tight control over the flow of 
information to the media, has chilled all unauthorized disclosures, not just 
those involving classified or otherwise sensitive information.75 The recently 
established Insider Threat Program encourages government insiders to report 
their coworkers’ suspicious conduct and to monitor “indicators” that suggest 
they may leak information, including “stress, divorce, and financial 
problems.”76 One reporter observed that journalists often talk to their 
 
68 Margaret Sullivan, Op-Ed., The Danger of Suppressing the Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
10, 2013, at SR12. 
69 Id. 
70 RonNell Anderson Jones, Media Subpoenas: Impact, Perception, and Legal Protection 
in the Changing World of American Journalism, 84 WASH. L. REV. 317, 393-94 (2009) 
(stating that the upswing in subpoenas has spurred “a wave of terror in journalism that is 
leading even those who have not been subpoenaed to limit their news coverage”). I have 
also had off-the-record conversations with reporters who have told me that they are 
sometimes reluctant to publish information that their sources willingly provide because they 
are concerned about what will happen to their sources as a result of their disclosures. 
71 Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“My Administration is 
committed to creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government.”). 
72 Margaret Sullivan, Op-Ed., Leak Investigations Are an Assault on the Press, and on 
Democracy, Too, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2013/05/14/leak-investigations-are-an-assault-on-the-press-and-on-democracy-too, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4ENM-3WEG. Not surprisingly, Administration officials 
disagree with this characterization. See Downie, Jr., supra note 51. 
73 Downie, Jr., supra note 51. 
74 Id. According to Downie, Chief Washington Correspondent for the New York Times 
David E. Sanger claims that “[t]his is the most closed, control freak administration I’ve ever 
covered.” Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.; Taylor & Landay, supra note 2 (reporting that experts and current and former 
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government sources through third-party intermediaries “so the sources can 
truthfully answer on polygraphs that they didn’t talk to reporters.”77 
These measures are not likely to prevent all leaks, but are likely primarily 
affecting those that undermine the executive branch’s agenda. The executive’s 
control over national security information includes its power to leak – or 
“plant” – information when it suits its purposes.78 As I detail extensively 
elsewhere,79 Presidents commonly use leaks (or plants) to serve their own 
agendas. Indeed, the majority of leaks appear to come not from disgruntled 
employees or contractors but from high-level government officials – the “ship 
of state is the only ship that leaks from the top.”80 It is also important to keep 
in mind that these leaks often concern the military, national security, and 
foreign affairs.81 The rise in leak prosecutions may therefore distort public 
debate by primarily discouraging leaks from lower-level employees critical of 
those in power. 
B. The Imperfect Role of Leaks 
Leaks play an essential, yet imperfect, role in checking executive power and 
informing the American public about the government’s policies and programs. 
The “name game” in the public discourse of characterizing leakers as traitors, 
spies, or whistleblowers reflects the unease with which Americans view 
leakers, as well as the fuzzy lines that separate each category. 
1. Checks and Balances 
The executive branch needs some control over the dissemination of national 
security information in order to conduct effective military actions, foreign 
policy, and diplomatic relations. In some instances, the disclosure of national 
security information outside of the executive branch can pose a genuine threat 
to our nation’s national security.82 Although the Constitution makes little 
mention of secrecy,83 the Framers certainly recognized that some governing 
 
officials predict that the Insider Threat Program “could make it easier for the government to 
stifle the flow of unclassified and potentially vital information to the public, while creating 
toxic work environments poisoned by unfounded suspicions and spurious investigations of 
loyal Americans”). 
77 Downie, Jr., supra note 51 (quoting Washington Post National Editor Cameron Barr). 
78 Papandrea, supra note 3, at 248-57. 
79 Id. at 248-55. 
80 Id. at 253. 
81 Id. 
82 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (describing the 
importance of secrecy in the executive branch). 
83 The only mention of secrecy is in Article I, in a provision requiring the House and 
Senate to keep journals of their proceedings and to publish them “from time to time . . . 
excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, 
cl. 3. 
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must take place outside of the public eye to be effective.84 The problem is that 
the Framers “did not fully explain how citizens and lawmakers could know 
whether the president is in fact exercising this power responsibly.”85 Various 
reforms in the last several decades, including the passage of the Freedom of 
Information Act and the creation of congressional oversight committees, have 
failed to serve as significant counterweights to the executive’s ability to control 
the flow of national security information.86 Since September 11, the Bush and 
Obama Administrations have both aggressively asserted their power to control 
the dissemination of national security information and undermined the 
checking function of Congress and the judiciary.87 
The very nature of the executive branch’s duties and responsibilities makes 
true transparency and accountability difficult. The executive is charged with 
“executing” the law, and the vast administrative state enables the execution of 
many laws to transpire in the dark.88 The difficulties of monitoring the 
executive are exponentially greater whenever national security is involved. The 
executive exercises tight control over national security information through the 
classification system; the assertion of the executive and state secrets privileges; 
and general assertions time and time again that the executive has the power to 
keep information from Congress whenever disclosure would harm foreign 
relations, national security, or the executive’s deliberative processes or 
constitutional duties.89 The executive branch has repeatedly asserted its power 
to control the dissemination of national security information during battles 
with Congress over Congress’s efforts to exercise some meaningful oversight 
of presidential power.90 
 
84 Papandrea, supra note 3, at 239 (“For example, Alexander Hamilton said that the 
Constitution would not have been ratified if the Convention had been open to the public 
because ‘the clamours of faction would have prevented any satisfactory result.’” (quoting 
Alexander Hamilton, Reply to Anonymous Charges, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION 1787, at 368 (Max Farrand ed., 1966))). 
85 RAHUL SAGAR, SECRETS AND LEAKS 49 (2013). 
86 Id. at 46-50. 
87 See HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript 
at 3) (on file with author); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 237 (2007); GARRY WILLS, 
BOMB POWER: THE MODERN PRESIDENCY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 210-20 
(2010); Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today’s 
Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 395, 399-400 (2009); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power 
Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 511-18 (2008). 
88 See KITROSSER, supra note 87 (manuscript at 3). 
89 See Heidi Kitrosser, National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26 CONST. 
COMMENT. 483, 519 (2010). 
90 Moberly, supra note 67, at 82-83 (detailing the House’s efforts to provide protection to 
whistleblowers who leak national security information, and the executive’s opposition to the 
measures, despite previous expressions of support for similar measures). 
  
466 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:449 
 
Although Congress sometimes appears to accept the executive’s assertions 
of national security power without putting up much of fight or exercising 
meaningful oversight,91 Congress generally disputes the executive’s theory of 
the separation of powers. Instead, Congress contends that it shares authority 
over national security matters with the executive.92 Congress has a number of 
tools at its disposal to encourage disclosures – for example, it can conduct 
hearings, subpoena testimony and documents, leverage its power in the 
appropriations and appointments process, and pass statutes that require 
periodic reports from the executive branch. The executive, however, strongly 
resists Congress’s attempts to force the disclosure of information, and there is 
very limited opportunity for judicial review of these interbranch disputes.93 
Congress has not been particularly effective in forcing the executive to reveal 
national security information.94  
Even when the executive is willing to share information regarding its 
national security initiatives, it generally does so with only a select group of 
congressional members, and the executive may – or may not – share all of the 
relevant details of its programs with these select members.95 Those members 
who do have access to information about the President’s activities may feel 
they have no meaningful way of voicing their concerns about them.96 While 
some have argued that the Constitution’s Speech and Debate Clause would 
immunize from prosecution disclosures of national security information a 
member might make on the House or Senate floor,97 such disclosures would 
 
91 PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 2, at 23 (explaining that Congress’s failure to exercise 
meaningful oversight is not always just “a matter of money and staff,” but rather that 
Congress sometimes simply takes the President at his word without “studying the best 
information available or conducting exhaustive hearings”); see also SAGAR, supra note 85, 
at 94-98 (outlining several possible reasons why secretive oversight committees provide 
generally ineffective oversight of the executive branch). 
92 See LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33215, NATIONAL SECURITY 
WHISTLEBLOWERS 41 (2005), archived at http://perma.cc/7T9G-EUZM (“Congress has 
never accepted the theory that the President has exclusive, ultimate, and unimpeded 
authority over the collection, retention, and dissemination of national security 
information.”). 
93 KITROSSER, supra note 87. 
94 See Moberly, supra note 67, at 96-101. 
95 See Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National 
Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1083 (2013); Nathan Freed Wessler, “[We] Can 
Neither Confirm Nor Deny the Existence or Non-Existence of Records Responsive to Your 
Request”: Reforming the Glomar Response Under FOIA, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1381, 1390 
(2010). 
96 SAGAR, supra note 85, at 95 (arguing that limiting the disclosure of national security 
information to a select group of members of Congress leaves those members “unable to 
explain to the public why they wish to block or investigate the president’s policies or 
decisions”). 
97 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Breach or Debate, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 1, 2013), http:// 
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violate House and Senate procedures regarding the release of classified 
information obtained from the executive branch.98 Although Congress could 
certainly repeal these rules, it is not clear it would be wise to do so. It is likely 
that at some point a member would reveal information that causes serious 
national security harm; in addition, a relaxation of these rules could give the 
President another justification for refusing to share information with 
Congress.99 
The executive’s disclosures to Congress may also be misleading, 
incomplete, or even false. For example, in March 2013 Senator Ron Wyden 
directly asked James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence: “[D]oes 
the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions, or hundreds of millions, of 
Americans?”100 Clapper stated that the government did not collect such data, at 
least “not wittingly.”101 After the Snowden leaks made clear that this response 
was false, Clapper explained that his response was the “least untruthful” 
answer he could give when asked about a classified program in an open 
session.102 Concerned about the failure of intelligence agencies to provide full 
 
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/1/breach_or_debate_congress_snowden_prism, 
archived at http://perma.cc/K4NX-RT7Q (arguing members of select intelligence 
committees “cannot be prosecuted for reading classified material into the public record– and 
it is up to them, and them alone, to decide what is worth talking about”); see also United 
States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972). 
98 See Michael Stern, Congressional Release of Classified Information and the Speech 
and Debate Clause, POINT ORDER (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.pointoforder.com/2013/08/06/ 
congressional-release-of-classified-information-and-the-speech-or-debate-clause, archived 
at http://perma.cc/G6ZD-X5WV.  
99 Id. 
100 Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearing 
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 66 (2013) (statement of Sen. Ron 
Wyden, Member, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence). 
101 Id. (statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence). 
102 Interview by Andrea Mitchell with James Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence (June 8, 
2013) (transcript archived at http://perma.cc/SJF4-FJ7K). Some contend that Clapper could 
not have misled the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence because members of that 
committee already knew about the collection of information about Americans. See Steven 
Aftergood, The Clapper “Lie,” and the Senate Intelligence Committee, SECRECY NEWS (Jan. 
6, 2014), http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2014/01/clapper-ssci, archived at http://perma.cc/3MK 
3-9TB8. Members of Congress disagree about how much knowledge and information they 
had about NSA’s surveillance programs. See Scott Shane & Jonathan Weisman, Disclosures 
on N.S.A. Surveillance Put Awkward Light on Previous Denials, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2013, 
at A18; see also In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted] 3, No. BR 13-158 (Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Ct.), archived at http://perma.cc/6NBT-MF9F (“Although the 
existence of this [collection of metadata under section 215] was classified until several 
months ago, the record is clear that before the 2011 re-enactment of Section 215, many 
Members of Congress were aware of, and each Member had the opportunity to learn about, 
the scope of the metadata collection and this Court’s interpretation of Section 215.”). 
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and accurate information to Congress, Senator John McCain has submitted a 
resolution to establish a select committee to investigate NSA’s intelligence-
collecting programs, including “the provision of incomplete or inaccurate 
information by officials of the intelligence community [that] has inhibited 
effective congressional oversight” of those programs.103 
Given how tightly the executive branch attempts to control the 
dissemination of national security information, it is no surprise that leaks have 
played an important role in informing Congress about what its co-branch of 
government is doing.104 A member of the Senate Intelligence Committee has 
said, “I can recall numerous specific instances where I found out about serious 
government wrongdoing – such as NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program, or 
the CIA’s coercive interrogation program – only as a result of disclosures by 
the press.”105 The Snowden leaks regarding the mass collection of 
communications metadata similarly appear to have told Congress how the 
executive was executing the law.106 When the Guardian revealed that the 
government had ordered Verizon to collect information on all of its customers’ 
calls,107 Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. stated: 
As the author of the Patriot Act, I am extremely disturbed by what 
appears to be an overbroad interpretation of the Act. . . . I do not believe 
the released FISA order is consistent with the requirements of the Patriot 
Act. How could the phone records of so many innocent Americans be 
relevant to an authorized investigation as required by the act?108 
Another particular concern about government surveillance is the inability of 
congressional leaders to understand what the government is doing. The few 
congresspersons with access to information about the government’s inventive 
and expansive use of technology to spy on millions of people are generally not 
 
103 160 CONG. REC. S765-67 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2014) (statement of Sen. John McCain); 
see also S. Res. 343, 113th Cong. (2014). 
104 SAGAR, supra note 85, at 48 (“To the extent that citizens and lawmakers have become 
aware of potential wrongdoing in the past decade—the establishment of secret prisons, the 
practice of extraordinary rendition, and the existence of warrantless surveillance 
programs—this has been due to unauthorized disclosures.”). 
105 158 CONG. REC. S6793-94 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2012) (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden). 
106 James Risen, Bipartisan Backlash Grows Against Domestic Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 17, 2013, at A14. 
107 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers 
Daily, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone 
-records-verizon-court-order, archived at http://perma.cc/64ZM-P5ZG. 
108 Letter from F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., U.S. Congressman, to Eric H. Holder, Jr., 
U.S. Attorney Gen. (June 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/6S5L-LJW6. In September 
2013, Congressman Sensenbrenner wrote a second letter to Holder expressing his 
displeasure. Letter from F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., U.S. Congressman, to Eric H. Holder, 
Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen. (Sept. 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/HT7W-6CHK. 
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“child[ren] of the digital age.”109 The few members of Congress and Senators 
who are given access to highly classified national security activities are not 
permitted to speak with their lawyers or staff about the issues these programs 
raise, even if those individuals have the requisite security clearances.110 Indeed, 
although the national security state has dramatically expanded since September 
11, the support staff numbers for Congress’s intelligence committees has not 
grown much at all.111 As a result, “members of Congress were left on their own 
to make sense of highly technical issues.”112 Leaks and the accompanying 
media analysis help government officials within the political branches do their 
job better.113 
Even when Congress knows what the executive is doing, it has been 
generally deferential to the executive’s claims of expansive power in the 
national security realm.114 Part of this phenomenon stems from the political 
party system and the unwillingness of congresspersons to challenge actions 
taken by Presidents from the same political party.115 But experience indicates 
that congressional oversight is not much more effective even when the 
executive and legislative branches are controlled by different parties.116 
Furthermore, as Heidi Kitrosser has observed, “ignorance can be bliss.”117 
When unaware of what the executive is doing, Members of Congress can 
easily distance themselves from any public outcry that might ensue when those 
 
109 Alan Rusbridger, The Snowden Leaks and the Public, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 21, 
2013, at 31, 33.  
110 PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 2, at 23. 
111 Id. at 22. 
112 Id. at 23. 
113 See Blasi, supra note 13, at 539 (“Moreover, even with their own investigative 
resources, government officials engaged in the process of checking other public officials 
often benefit from the work of journalists and private citizens.”). 
114 For example, although Congress resorted to holding up the confirmation of President 
Obama’s nominees for the CIA and Department of Defense until the President provided 
Congress with the legal memoranda justifying drone attacks, Congress capitulated after 
receiving redacted copies. See Scott Shane, Nominee to Lead C.I.A. Clears Hurdle After 
Release of Drone Data, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2013, at A13; see also Martha Minow, The 
Constitution as Black Box During Emergencies, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 597-98 (2006) 
(arguing that the U.S. experience after 9/11 reveals the failure of Congress to provide 
meaningful oversight of the executive in the face of terrorism). 
115 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2313-14, 2323, 2344 (2006) (“[P]arties can – and often do – change 
the relationship between Congress and the President from competitive to cooperative.”). 
116 See, e.g., SAGAR, supra note 85, at 97 ([C]oncerns about the quality of oversight do 
not fade away even when a majority of the members of the core [oversight] group come 
from the party opposed to the president.”); Minow, supra note 114, at 598 (arguing that the 
Democrats’ resistance to NSA’s secret surveillance programs during the Bush 
Administration was “flabby”). 
117 KITROSSER, supra note 87 (manuscript at 6). 
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activities are revealed. In addition, challenging the executive’s national 
security policies opens congresspersons up to criticism, such as accusations 
that they are not tough on terrorism, and the professional staff of the oversight 
committees tends to consist disproportionately of former intelligence 
community employees. Although these individuals bring important expertise to 
their jobs, they have not devoted their careers to “civil liberties, government 
accountability, or personal privacy.”118 The realities of the political process 
may also limit the effectiveness of congressional oversight because elected 
officials cannot engage in any “inside baseball” discussions about the 
congressional intelligence committee’s work with potential donors.119 
More cynically, as the national security state continues to expand and 
depend on government contractors, federal lawmakers are coming to rely on 
significant campaign donations from these contractors.120 As a result, many 
senators and representatives will find it does not serve their political self-
interest to exercise meaningful oversight over these contractors. Indeed, after 
the House narrowly defeated a bill to restrict NSA’s spying program, a study 
revealed that those who voted against the bill received twice as much in 
campaign donations from defense contractors as those who voted in favor of 
the law.121 It is hard to view this as a coincidence. 
Legislative attempts to counteract excessive secrecy have been minimally 
effective. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), as well as other federal 
laws providing for the disclosure of government information,122 exempt 
properly classified national security secrets from disclosure.123 Generally 
 
118 Steven Aftergood, A Candid Look at the Senate Intelligence Committee, SECRECY 
NEWS (June 18, 2013), http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2013/06/ssci-candid, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/DYB4-8EMH. 
119 JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 
9/11, at 91 (2012). 
120 See Ken Heanley, Big Campaign Donations from Contractors Doing Secret Work for 
NSA, DIGITAL J. (June 22, 2013), http://digitaljournal.com/article/352922, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/TE4T-R9NH. 
121 See David Kravets, Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying Received Double the 
Defense Industry Cash, WIRED (July 26, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/ 
2013/07/money-nsa-vote, archived at http://perma.cc/DL98-BCM3. 
122 See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1) (2012) (preventing 
disclosure of properly classified information); Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(1) 
(exempting properly classified material from normal agency disclosure requirements); 
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(b) (mandating that advisory 
subcommittees make their information available to the public); Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (requiring notice to the public of certain types of agency rules); 
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006) (instructing agencies to 
make public information concerning potential environmental effects from federal actions); 
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3501(2) (2006) (stating that one purpose of the Act 
is to promote the public interest by revealing government information). 
123 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Exemption 3 provides that the FOIA does not apply to 
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unwilling to second-guess classification decisions, the Court has often deferred 
to the executive branch’s claims that disclosure of the desired information 
would harm national security.124 The Court’s decision in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project indicates that the Court is just as likely as ever to 
defer to the executive branch in national security affairs.125 
In addition to the tremendous amount of time, money, and patience that 
FOIA litigation takes, interested citizens cannot make a FOIA request to a 
government agency involved in national security seeking access to any 
information concerning “misconduct that has been improperly classified.”126 
Instead, the requesters have to have some idea what they are looking for. As a 
result, requesters frequently only initiate FOIA litigation after leaks have 
already provided initial revelations about the activity. For example, the abuses 
at Abu Ghraib came to light only after portions of the Taguba Report were 
leaked to the media; even after a firestorm of congressional activity, the 
executive was not forthcoming until additional leaks provided documentation 
to support the initial allegations.127 
 
information that is exempted from disclosure under a separate statute. Id. § 552(b)(3). These 
separate statutory exemptions often raise national security issues. In addition, the FOIA 
specifically permits the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to exercise its discretion in 
determining whether to disclose documents that “pertain[] to foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence, or international terrorism,” provided these documents constitute 
“classified information as provided in subsection (b)(1).” Id. § 552(c)(3). 
124 See, e.g., Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[A reviewing 
court must] accord substantial weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning the details of the 
classified status of the disputed record because the Executive departments responsible for 
national defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse affects 
[sic] might occur as a result of a particular classified record.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. DOJ, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) ((internal 
quotation marks omitted))). For a lengthy discussion of the judiciary’s failure to provide 
meaningful review of classification decisions, see SAGAR, supra note 85, at 55-65. 
125 The Court said: 
[W]hen it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in [cases 
implicating national security and foreign policy concerns], “the lack of competence on 
the part of courts is marked,” and respect for the Government’s conclusions is 
appropriate. 
One reason for that respect is that national security and foreign policy concerns arise in 
connection with efforts to confront evolving threats in an area where information can 
be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct difficult to assess. 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981)). 
126 Elizabeth Goitein, Our Antiquated Laws Can’t Cope with National Security Leaks, 
TIME (June 12, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/06/12/our-antiquated-laws-cant-cope-with 
-national-security-leaks, archived at http://perma.cc/SRQ7-E4XT. 
127 See Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42 
(describing the role of leaks to the media in bringing to light improper activity at a military 
prison in Iraq). 
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One of the brightest spots in the sad story of the rampant overclassification 
of national security information is the Interagency Security Classification 
Appeals Panel (ISCAP). Both government insiders with authorized access to 
classified information as well as members of the general public can ask the 
ISCAP to review the classification of information.128 As Steven Aftergood has 
proclaimed, the ISCAP “is among the most successful classification reform 
initiatives of the last half century.”129 The ISCAP’s record is impressive: it 
“has overturned more executive branch classification decisions than any court 
or legislative action.”130 According to the most recent government report, the 
panel has declassified information in almost sixty-five percent of its decisions 
since 1996.131 The ISCAP arguably provides a more effective means of 
obtaining national security information from the government than FOIA 
because FOIA court appeals are time consuming, expensive, and usually 
unsuccessful given judicial deference to the executive on national security 
matters.132 Aftergood has suggested that the success of the ISCAP is due to its 
ability to eliminate the bureaucratic and political uses of secrecy.133 In 
addition, because the members of the ISCAP are all executive branch officials 
from national security agencies, concerns about deferring to the judgment of 
the executive are nonexistent.134 
Although the ISCAP has certainly declassified a significant percentage of 
the information it has reviewed, it lacks the staff to review more than several 
dozen requests each year.135 The lack of a robust staff to deal with the 
increasing number of appeals, larger systemic issues of overclassification, and 
the possibility for agencies to appeal the panel’s decision remain significant 
challenges.136 To date, the ISCAP has also largely dealt with declassification 
requests from historians and has spent little time on more current classification 
 
128 Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 1.8, 3 C.F.R. 298, 303 (2010). 
129 Steven Aftergood, Roslyn Mazer to Be ODNI Inspector General, SECRECY NEWS 
(Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2009/04/mazer_odni_ig.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/382L-KZ83. 
130 Steven Aftergood, National Security Secrecy: How the Limits Change, 77 SOC. RES. 
839, 848 (2010). 
131 INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., 2011 REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT 23 (2012), archived at http://perma.cc/J7BA-3EXB. 
132 Nate Jones, The CIA’s Covert Operation Against Declassification Review and 
Obama’s Open Government, UNREDACTED (Feb. 10, 2012), http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/ 
2012/02/10/the-cias-covert-operation-against-declassification-review-and-obamas-open-gov 
ernment, archived at http://perma.cc/J2VX-MZAZ. 
133 Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 399, 407-09 (2009). 
134 See Steven Aftergood, An Inquiry into the Dynamics of Government Secrecy, 48 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 526 (2013). 
135 Id. at 527. 
136 Aftergood, supra note 133, at 407-08. 
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issues.137 Furthermore, the ISCAP does not consider the public’s interest in the 
information at issue, nor does it balance that interest against the potential harm 
of disclosure. 
Perhaps Congress’s most significant exercise of its oversight powers has 
come through the creation of independent inspectors general. Congress passed 
the first inspector general (IG) legislation in 1978 to “promote economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness” in agency programs and to “prevent and detect 
fraud and abuse.”138 IGs have played an important role in increasing 
transparency, arguing for reform, and pushing for accountability.139 
Nevertheless, the ability of IGs to check executive power suffers from 
significant limitations; importantly, IGs are appointed and removable by the 
President, and they cannot report even serious wrongdoing to Congress without 
first giving the relevant agency head the opportunity to delete sensitive 
information.140 It might therefore come as no surprise that the CIA’s IG has 
never exposed major wrongdoing within the agency that would have otherwise 
gone unexposed.141 Notably, the CIA IG’s major investigations all involved 
matters first revealed by leaks to the press.142 
If the public does not know what the government is doing in the public’s 
name, accountability is impossible. Without proper public debate, government 
officials are more likely to adopt ill-conceived programs or policies.143 
Subjecting government action to public discussion and oversight also may 
make government officials more reluctant to engage in wrongdoing in the first 
place.144 Secrecy provides cover for waste, fraud, and illegal actions,145 and 
 
137 See Aftergood, supra note 134, at 527. 
138 Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(2) (2012). 
139 Sinnar, supra note 95, at 1043. 
140 See Moberly, supra note 67, at 93. If an agency head blocks an IG investigation, he 
must submit a report within seven days to the intelligence committee and to the IG 
explaining the decision. 50 U.S.C. § 403q(b)(4) (2006). 
141 Ryan M. Check & Afsheen John Radsan, One Lantern in the Darkest Night: The 
CIA’s Inspector General, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 247, 269, 286-87 (2010). 
142 Id. at 287 (concluding that government insiders must regard the press as “a more 
effective agent of change than OIG”). 
143 Papandrea, supra note 3, at 239 (“Information concerning national security and 
foreign policy is necessary for citizens to engage in meaningful debate of important public 
issues. Permitting the government to limit what information the public is given threatens the 
democratic process.”). 
144 See Lisa Driscoll, A Better Way to Handle Whistleblowers: Let Them Speak, BUS. 
WK., July 27, 1992, at 36 (postulating that if improper employer behavior is made public, 
employees will have more confidence in the future that their employers will behave 
properly). 
145 Goldston et al., supra note 14, at 450 (“Had the policymaking apparatus 
accommodated more criticism in open debate . . . waste and ineptitude could have been 
discovered, flawed conceptions of national objectives might have been corrected, and 
policies that better enhanced national security might have been pursued.”). 
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stifles debate on important policy issues both within the government and 
among the general public.146 
2. Classification System 
Although U.S. law expressly prohibits the disclosure of all classified 
information, the classified status of a document nonetheless plays an important 
role in leak prosecutions. It is essential to understand the shortcomings of the 
classification system in this country to understand why it would be problematic 
to criminalize the dissemination of classified information wholesale and how 
the classification system itself contributes to the problem of leaks. 
The rapid growth of digital information and the increase in the government’s 
clandestine and covert operations have resulted in an explosion of classified 
documents. In the “culture of caution” that pervades the intelligence 
agencies,147 individuals with classification authority have every incentive to err 
on the side of classifying information.148 As more people have access to 
national security secrets – over 4.9 million people at last count149 – it is more 
likely that leaks will occur. But more fundamentally, the excessive 
classification breeds distrust for the need for secrecy and a lack of respect for 
the classification stamp.150 
 
146 The Snowden leaks are just the latest demonstration of how little Congress (and the 
American public) knows about the execution – even the existence – of national security 
programs that raise fundamental civil liberties concerns. Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, 
U.S. Mines Internet Firms’ Data, Documents Show, WASH. POST, June 7, 2013, at A1; 
Jillian Rayfield, Susan Collins: I Wasn’t Briefed on PRISM, SALON (June 11, 2013, 9:12 
AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/06/11/susan_collins_i_wasnt_briefed_on_prism, archived 
at http://perma.cc/UH8D-6NM9. 
147 PUB. INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BD., TRANSFORMING THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
SYSTEM 3 (2012), archived at http://perma.cc/LK8A-4CJJ. 
148 Goitein & Shapiro, supra note 44, at 21 (“[T]he incentive structure underlying the 
current system, in which a multitude of forces pushes in the direction of classification while 
no force pushes meaningfully in the other direction, virtually ensures that overclassification 
will occur.”). 
149 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 2012 REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE 
DETERMINATIONS 3 (2012), archived at http://perma.cc/4HMM-54PK. 
150 See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 217 
(1982) (“Leaking has a symbiotic relationship with secrecy.”); PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 
2; ‘Top Secret America’: By the Numbers, WEEK (July 19, 2010), http://theweek.com/article 
/index/205145/top-secret-america-by-the-numbers, archived at http://perma.cc/Y6SN-X54P. 
The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies 
recommended that the government “increase transparency and . . . decrease unnecessary 
secrecy, in order to enhance both accountability and public trust.” PRESIDENT’S REVIEW 
GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING 
WORLD 80 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/3SAM-TJZD. 
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Information is classified based on the assessed level of harm its disclosure 
would cause to national security.151 What constitutes the requisite “damage to 
national security” is unclear; the current executive position simply defines 
“damage” as “harm,” and “national security” as “national defense or foreign 
relations.”152 Harm can range from tangible to intangible, from concrete to 
speculative, from imminent to long-term, from minor to severe. As a result, 
classification is more art than science, often based on subjective rather than 
objective considerations.153 Classification determinations are a matter of 
judgment based on vague criteria and necessarily speculative predictions of 
harm, and these determinations can be influenced by a variety of bureaucratic 
concerns and the desire to avoid public controversy.154 
It is often easiest to identify harms when a disclosure undermines the 
nation’s ability to preserve its physical safety or the safety of its personnel and 
facilities. Disclosures revealing the movements of troops or ships or the 
identities of intelligence operatives, sources, and methods typically undermine 
their effectiveness. But even in these instances, an unauthorized leak can have 
a positive impact on national security. For example, Jack Goldsmith has 
observed that the Stuxnet leak may have actually “enhance[d] U.S. cyber 
deterrence overall” because “it demonstrates that the [United States 
Government] has sophisticated legal weapons that – despite legal and other 
obstacles – it is willing to deploy.”155 The same might be said regarding reports 
that a double agent thwarted another underwear bombing of an airliner.156 The 
government claims that now it will make future infiltration difficult, but the 
leak might also have “sow[ed] some corrosive mistrust among the fanatics.”157 
Like these other leaks, Snowden’s leaks about widespread NSA surveillance 
might also make clear to would-be terrorists that the United States will stop at 
nothing to catch them. In other instances, leaks may hurt national security in 
the short run but serve to strengthen it in the long run. Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates has said that he frequently heard about problems he needed to 
correct only through the media, and not from the affected agencies themselves. 
 
151 Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 1.2(a)(1)-(3), 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 707-08 (Jan. 5, 2010); 
Papandrea, supra note 3, at 241-42. 
152 Aftergood, supra note 134, at 513 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
727, 729). 
153 See id. 
154 See id. at 519. 
155 Jack Goldsmith, The Significance of Panetta’s Cyber Speech and the Persistent 
Difficulty of Deterring Cyberattacks, LAWFARE (Oct. 15, 2012, 1:26 PM), http://www.law 
fareblog.com/2012/10/the-significance-of-panettas-cyber-speech-and-the-persistent-difficult 
y-of-deterring-cyberattacks, archived at http://perma.cc/BFW8-8Y3Z. 
156 Scott Shane & Eric Schmitt, Qaeda Foiled in Plot to Plant Redesigned Bomb on 
Plane, U.S. Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2012, at A12. 
157 Bill Keller, Op-Ed., The Leak Police, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 7, 2012, at 7. 
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For example, he said that he learned about the lack of armored vehicles in Iraq 
from a story in USA Today.158 
Some national security harms are intangible and often speculative. 
Government officials frequently proclaim that the leaker and publisher have 
placed U.S. soldiers at risk.159 Government officials also complain that leaks 
render foreign nations less forthcoming and cooperative with the United States 
because they cannot trust the United States to keep secrets.160 In the Bradley 
Manning sentencing hearings, the judge ruled that the government could 
present evidence only of harms that resulted directly from his disclosures, and 
threw out as “speculative” the prosecution’s attempts to argue that the leak of 
U.S. diplomatic cables could dissuade people from seeking help on human 
rights issues in the future.161 
Classification decisions are fluid, and they depend upon changing 
assessments of the risks and benefits of disclosure as well as other more self-
serving bureaucratic reasons.162 In a recent article, Steven Aftergood details the 
executive branch’s shift regarding the necessity of classifying the intelligence 
budget and the current size of the United States’ nuclear weapon stockpile.163 
On these topics, the executive branch went from asserting that secrecy was 
essential for national security to saying that national security in fact required 
disclosure.164 On other matters, the executive decided that declassification 
served to deflect public criticism. Recently, the executive attempted to deflect 
 
158 Al Kamen, Robert Gates on Obama, Leaks and More, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2012, 
4:33 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/post/robert-gates-on-obama-le 
aks-and-more/2012/03/20/gIQAExr3PS_blog.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P6UE-T2F9. 
159 See, e.g., Katie Connolly, Has Release of WikiLeaks Documents Cost Lives?, BBC 
(Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11882092, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/C4UH-VP5J (“US military officials contend that allowing enemies access to their 
strategic and operational documents creates a dangerous environment for American troops 
serving abroad.”); James Clapper Says Snowden Damaged US Security, BBC (Jan. 29, 
2014, 4:09 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-25954638, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/M4CF-9G3D (reporting Clapper’s testimony that the Snowden leaks have caused 
“profound damage” to U.S. national security because “[w]e’ve lost critical foreign 
intelligence collection sources,” and enemies “are going to school on US intelligence 
sources, methods and trade craft”). 
160 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 512 (1980) (per curiam) (“The continued 
availability of these [friendly] foreign sources depends upon the CIA’s ability to guarantee 
the security of information that might compromise them and even endanger the personal 
safety of foreign agents.”). 
161 Associated Press, Bradley Manning Judge Limits Scope of ‘Damage’ Testimony, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/07/bradley-man 
ning-testimony_n_3718484.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SF4G-AQKT.  
162 See Aftergood, supra note 134, at 519. 
163 Id. at 517-21. 
164 Id. at 520. 
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criticism of NSA’s widespread collection of telephone metadata by 
declassifying information about the program.165 
Surprisingly, the current classification scheme does not prohibit the 
classification of information revealing illegal government behavior.166 
Executive orders on classification provide that national security information 
should not be classified to “conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or 
administrative error,” or “prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or 
agency.”167 But these provisions apply only when the classifier had the intent 
to use the classification system to conceal wrongdoing or embarrassment.168 In 
other words, the information is not improperly classified simply because the 
information pertains to some kind of government wrongdoing or 
embarrassment. 
Another weakness of the classification system is that it does not take into 
account the public interest in knowing information. To be sure, striking the 
appropriate balance between an open government and security is extremely 
difficult. In some instances, the harm is both significant and likely while the 
public benefit small – like revealing the identities of confidential intelligence 
sources. In other cases, the risk is small but the public interest great. The hard 
cases, however, are those where the potential harm to national security 
interests is great but so too is the benefit to the public interest. The 
classification system, however, concerns only the first factor – risk to national 
security – and does not consider the public interest in disclosure, much less 
whether that interest outweighs the risk to national security.169 Information 
regarding major changes in U.S. policy – for example, our policies on torture 
or surveillance – is typically classified, thereby foreclosing public debate on 
important issues.170 
Ideally, Congress would be more aggressive in asserting its power to control 
the dissemination of national security information. As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, the executive has unlimited power in this area only if Congress 
does nothing.171 Along the same lines, some have suggested that instead of 
protecting leaks, we should focus on reforming the classification system and 
methods of challenging overclassification.172 Disturbingly, some national 
 
165 Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court Renews Authority to Collect Telephony Metadata (July 19, 2013), 
archived at http://perma.cc/AD2W-HBRY. 
166 Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 1.7(a)(1)-(2), 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 710 (Jan. 5, 2010). 
167 Id. 
168 See Stephen L. Vladeck, Democratic Competence, Constitutional Disorder, and the 
Freedom of the Press, 87 WASH. L. REV. 529, 544 (2012). 
169 See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. 
170 See Steven Aftergood, What Is Overclassification?, SECRECY NEWS (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2013/10/overclass, archived at http://perma.cc/6VAG-GQ7M. 
171 See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). 
172 Bellia, supra note 27, at 1524; Mark Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and 
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security agencies have been ignoring important attempts to rein in 
overclassification. Experts have expressed concern that the secrecy system is 
increasingly functioning autonomously, outside congressional or executive 
control.173 For example, in 2010 the Department of Defense completely 
ignored a directive from President Obama174 to issue final implementing 
regulations for the new executive order on classification policy.175 National 
security agencies have also defied orders from Presidents Obama, Bush, and 
Clinton requiring the automatic declassification of records older than twenty-
five years old.176 As Steven Aftergood has pointed out, the refusal of agencies 
to release and declassify information despite these directives “casts a different, 
more positive light on the role of unauthorized disclosures, which in some 
cases can compensate for the inability or refusal of government agencies to 
implement binding declassification and disclosure requirements.”177 
Efforts to reform the classification system are ongoing, and they may help 
curb overclassification. But it is highly unlikely that the classification system 
will ever do a perfect job of labeling as “secret” only the information that is 
justifiably confidential. Furthermore, it is essential to recognize that leaks will 
always play an important role in informing public debate, especially when both 
Congress and the executive agree to keep essential information from the 
people. 
Recognizing the shortcomings of the classification system is not the same as 
justifying all leaks. To be sure, in some instances leaks disclose information 
that should never have been classified; these leaks can play an important role 
in correcting the rampant and, to date, unsolved overclassification problem. 
But as commentators have noted, the problem here is whether government 
insiders should be permitted to evaluate whether the disclosure of certain 
information would not pose a threat to national security, or that the public 
value in disclosing such information outweighs any such threat.178 Neither 
giving the executive branch exclusive authority to keep secrets nor permitting 
indiscriminate leaks is a tenable position – a middle ground is needed. 
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3. Concerns About Leaks 
Our country has a complicated relationship with leakers. This is not 
surprising given that there are many different types of leaks, from a variety of 
sources, to a variety of recipients (especially in the digital age), for a variety of 
different motives. The value and harm of the information revealed – to the 
extent value and harm can even be calculated – add more variability to the 
relationship. In a time of war or national crisis, concerns about interfering with 
the executive’s expertise on national security information are heightened. 
One reason for the unease about leaks is that there are so many different 
kinds. At one end of the spectrum is the intentional leak to the enemy made 
with the purpose to help the enemy or harm the United States. At the other end 
is the selfless, morally compelled government insider who wants to expose 
government wrongdoing to the American public no matter what the personal 
cost. Most leaks fall somewhere in between these two poles. 
Although the leak prosecutions the government has undertaken all involve 
lower-level employees, by all accounts the “game of leaks” is most frequently 
one played by high-level officials.179 Some government officials leak in order 
to promote the Administration’s agenda,180 or to undermine the 
Administration’s foes,181 or to float a “trial balloon” to gauge public reaction to 
a proposed initiative.182 Sometimes a leak might more accurately be described 
as a plant made by political operatives as an effort to “manage the news, and 
orchestrate public debate from behind the scenes.”183 Government officials 
also use leaks to influence another branch of government or to reach a foreign 
country (often with “disinformation”).184 One significant concern those 
opposed to the recent leak prosecutions raise is that the government does not 
tend to prosecute the leaks that it likes.185 For example, the government has 
 
179 Levi, supra note 15, at 624. 
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theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/10/manning-prosecution-press-freedom-woodwar 
  
480 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:449 
 
made no indication it plans on prosecuting Bob Woodward’s sources, who 
revealed some of the nation’s most sensitive secrets. 
The most common argument against protecting leakers is, of course, that 
their disclosures harm the country’s national security. Although the 
government has not done a particularly good job of explaining exactly how any 
particular leak has directly harmed national security, it does seem likely that 
some leaks cause harm. As discussed above, harms may be intangible, 
speculative, and hard to quantify. Some critics have argued that the difficulty 
of determining harm is precisely the reason why government insiders should 
not be able to deputize themselves to decide when the disclosure of 
information would be the best thing for the American people.186 Information 
that may seem innocuous to a lower-level employee may in fact have the 
potential to cause great harm if revealed.187 As President Obama has argued: 
“If any individual who objects to government policy can take it into their own 
hands to publicly disclose classified information, then we will not be able to 
keep our people safe, or conduct foreign policy.”188 
In some instances, it is also difficult to determine when a leak adds value to 
the public debate.189 Some commentators contend that WikiLeaks’ disclosure 
of thousands of documents about the war in Afghanistan and 250,000 
American diplomatic cables has helped Americans become “exponentially 
more informed about the many facets of American involvement in Afghanistan 
and about the numerous issues of American foreign policy reflected in the 
once-secret cables.”190 Others contend just as vigorously that these disclosures 
cause far more harm than good and contribute little to the public discussion.191 
Some leaks can undermine public debate if they are inaccurate or tell only part 
of the story. Even reporter Declan Walsh, who has called leaks “the unfiltered 
lifeblood of investigative journalism,” concedes that leaks “may come from 
difficult, even compromised sources, be ridden with impurities and require 
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careful handling to produce an accurate story.”192 “Plants” that selectively 
disclose classified information are particularly likely to skew the public’s 
understanding, but so might leaks from lower-level employees. For President 
Obama, the Snowden leaks are a perfect example of this because they present a 
misleading portrait of the government’s surveillance activities.193 In order to 
counteract the alleged misinformation or misperceptions the leak caused, the 
government felt forced to reveal even more information about programs they 
would have preferred to keep secret.194 
On the other hand, some leaks clearly do contribute significantly to public 
debate. For example, even government officials have conceded that the 
Snowden leaks have generated substantial public debate. In an order releasing 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) opinions regarding NSA 
surveillance revealed by Snowden’s leaks, FISC Judge Dennis Saylor IV 
explained that Snowden’s leaks, as well as the government’s statements in 
response, “have engaged considerable public interest and debate about Section 
215.”195 This public debate raises the question of whether NSA’s massive 
surveillance activities should have ever been classified in the first place. 
Another related concern is that some leaks undermine the democratic 
process. Many scholars who recognize the rampant overclassification of 
information and the important role leaks have played in informing public 
debate about important issues express concern about giving a “disgruntled 
employee” the ability to disrupt government programs and policies.196 With 
respect to the Snowden leaks, President Obama claimed (perhaps 
disingenuously) that the timing of Snowden’s disclosures short circuited a 
more orderly and “thoughtful fact-based debate” about the challenged 
surveillance operations.197 
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Some commentators fear that if government insiders were entitled to reveal 
sensitive information, government officials would likely curtail information 
sharing in largely negative ways. Thus, fearful of leaks, government officials 
would share sensitive information with only a small circle of trusted 
employees, undermining the thoughtfulness of the decisionmaking process 
and, ultimately, our security efforts.198 Judicially sanctioned leaking also may 
undermine cooperative efforts between government agencies and with foreign 
entities (which logically would be less likely to share sensitive information).199 
In light of Bradley Manning’s disclosures, the government should be more 
careful about who has access to information. Obviously, allowing government 
insiders to reveal classified information willy nilly is bound to reduce the 
quality of government decisionmaking. 
4. The Name Game 
The uncertainty regarding leakers has led to a vigorous “name game” as 
commentators, public officials and lawyers argue whether someone is a traitor, 
spy, or whistleblower.200 The lines between each category have always been 
blurry, but changes in technology have made them more difficult to discern 
than ever. 
From the government’s point of view, the various labels for leakers are 
irrelevant because the potential harm of the disclosures is the same whether the 
information is delivered directly to Al Qaeda or published in the New York 
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Times: our enemies obtain access to our secrets.201 In the national dialogue, 
however, these labels are relevant to the determination of who deserves praise 
and who should be condemned. The debate tends to focus on what was 
revealed, to whom it was revealed, and why it was revealed.  
Although defenders of leakers like Snowden and Manning would rather see 
them labeled “whistleblowers” than “traitors” or “spies,” whistleblowers are 
not universally beloved.202 In the United States, individuals who reveal 
wrongdoing are subject to a variety of negative epithets, including “disgruntled 
or disruptive employee,” “informer,” and “snitch, grass, rat, rat fink, stoolie, 
stool pigeon, squealer, tattletale, backstabber, skunk, spy, mole, and traitor.”203 
Some organizations fear that whistleblowers threaten “a loss of group identity, 
loyalty, and morale, and a consequent loss of efficiency.”204 A government 
official who deals with whistleblowers reflected these concerns when he said 
that “[i]f we didn’t have loyalty, nothing would get done in this 
government.”205 
Although historically whistleblowers may have been distrusted, in the last 
several decades whistleblower protections have become part of the “cultural 
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landscape” in the United States.206 Professor Robert Vaughn has offered a 
compelling narrative about how the civil rights movement influenced the 
acceptance of whistleblowing. Notably, Vaughn points out, a “clear theme in 
most whistleblower narratives” is that “whistleblowers voluntarily proceed in 
the face of personal suffering in order to disclose misconduct and to pursue 
their allegations.”207 The passage of federal whistleblower laws arose out of a 
“perfect storm” of events in the late 1960s and 70s, including “the positive 
narratives of whistleblowers, the changing perceptions of the place of the 
individual in large institutions, and the discontent and dissent generated by the 
civil rights and antiwar movements.”208 These developments led to popular 
concerns about “the risk of government institutions run by ‘team players’ and 
‘yea sayers.’”209 
For some, whistleblowing remains a form of civil disobedience that should 
not receive any legal protection.210 Those challenging Snowden’s classification 
as a whistleblower point to his failure to stay in the United States and accept 
whatever punishment might result from his unauthorized disclosure of national 
security information. For example, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
has argued that, if Snowden were truly motivated to reveal wrongdoing, “he 
should come home and face the music, much as earlier whistleblowers like 
Daniel Ellsberg and others did.”211 Other critics have made similar arguments, 
on both sides of the political spectrum.212  
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Many state and federal statutes enacted precisely to encourage 
whistleblowing, however, take a different view.213 The trick to determining the 
appropriate scope of whistleblowing protections is to determine which 
disclosures constitute the ethical and moral behavior we as a society wish to 
encourage and protect.214 
Whistleblower protections are based primarily upon what information the 
insider reveals. Generally, state and federal whistleblower statutes protect 
reports of illegality, fraud, waste, corruption, or abuse. Many statutes do not 
require the disclosures to be correct as long the insider reasonably believes 
wrongdoing has occurred.215 Protecting good faith allegations of wrongdoing is 
particularly important in the national security arena. It is often difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine whether particular government conduct or action is 
unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful,216 and “presidents can – and do – cite 
the public interest as the justification for any violation of the law.”217 
In the public debate, a leaker’s motive plays a large role in the popular 
conception of who is deserving of praise,218 and may play a role in the Court’s 
treatment of a particular defendant.219 For example, when Samuel Morison was 
prosecuted for leaking satellite photos to Jane’s Defence Weekly, a British 
magazine, the government argued that he leaked the photos in order to better 
his chances of receiving a permanent position with the publication.220 This 
self-serving motivation may have played a role in the Court’s unwillingness to 
recognize his First Amendment defense.221 The narrative surrounding the 
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Manning and Snowden leaks has also focused on the motivations for their 
leaks. 222 Manning is portrayed as a troubled young man who leaked in a 
desperate plea for attention;223 Snowden was initially characterized as a “high 
school dropout” with a “Mother Teresa gene.”224 Yet both of them claim they 
made their disclosures to reveal the government’s wrongdoing to the American 
public.225 Even someone who reveals plainly unlawful government conduct 
might have a more selfish motive and leak information “for spiteful or petty 
reasons . . . [or in order to] insulate [themselves] from disciplinary or other 
personnel actions.”226 In any given case, a leaker might have multiple 
motivations, some praiseworthy and some less so. 
Although it can be difficult to determine the reason why someone reveals 
information, some states incorporate questions of motive into their definition 
of what constitutes protected whistleblowing, and courts frequently consider 
motive regardless of whether they are statutorily required to do so.227 Many 
states are reluctant to protect individuals who stand to gain from their 
disclosures. For example, Wisconsin law denies protection to any 
whistleblower whose disclosures are motivated by gaining “anything of value” 
– unless it is a reward offered by the state.228 Both Pennsylvania’s and West 
Virginia’s laws only protect good-faith reports of wrongdoing that are “made 
without malice or consideration of personal benefit.”229 Congress is more 
 
the progress of the Soviets would enable the Navy to obtain greater appropriations. Id.  
222 See Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA 
Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/201 
3/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance?guni=Podcast:in%20body%20lin 
k, archived at http://perma.cc/9EJT-VFUB; Glenn Greenwald, The Motives of Bradley 
Manning, SALON (July 4, 2011, 8:05 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/07/04/manning_11, 
archived at http://perma.cc/PL7C-ES2E. 
223 Associated Press, Bradley Manning Wanted Attention for Spilling to WikiLeaks, 
Prosecutors Say, CBS NEWS (July 25, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
bradley-manning-wanted-attention-for-spilling-to-wikileaks-prosecutors-say, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3LZT-QPVQ. 
224 Barbara Starr & Holly Yan, Man Behind NSA Leaks Says He Did It to Safeguard 
Privacy, Liberty, CNN (June 23, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/10/politics/edward-
snowden-profile, archived at http://perma.cc/Y6VV-RVUQ. 
225 Greenwald et al., supra note 222; Starr & Yan, supra note 224. 
226 Robert Vaughn, Statutory Protection of Whistleblowers in the Federal Executive 
Branch, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 617. 
227 See, e.g., Forsyth v. City of Dall., 91 F.3d 769, 773 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that police 
officers who had revealed allegedly illegal wiretapping were primarily motivated by public, 
and not personal, concerns). 
228 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.83(2) (West 2009) (“This section does not apply to an 
employee who discloses information if the employee knows or anticipates that the 
disclosure is likely to result in the receipt of anything of value . . . unless the employee 
discloses information in pursuit of any award offered by any governmental unit . . . .”). 
229 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1422 (West 1986); see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6C-1-
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willing to offer monetary awards to whistleblowers to encourage them to come 
forward.230 
Although motive plays a significant role in the popular debate about which 
unauthorized disclosures are worthy of protection, most legal scholars and 
social scientists have tended to agree that motive is irrelevant when disclosures 
reveal clear wrongdoing.231 In such instances, what is important is whether the 
“whistleblowing provides information beneficial to societal interests.”232 
Motive potentially plays a more important role when it turns out that the 
disclosure does not, in fact, reveal wrongdoing because it can serve “as a 
reflection of the whistleblower’s good faith belief in the legitimacy of the 
information about the wrongdoing.”233 
One big issue regarding the definition of whistleblower is whether those 
who reveal information to the press can ever be included in that category. Most 
whistleblower statutes do not protect disclosures that are not made through the 
official channels.234 The lack of protection for public disclosures is most likely 
based on the belief that whistleblowers who truly care about correcting 
wrongdoing – as opposed to self-aggrandizing or publicity – are more likely to 
report misconduct internally within the government agency than to a 
reporter.235 This assumption may prove incorrect in some cases; an employee 
may disclose information to the media because the internal agency is too 
corrupt to handle it appropriately, or because internal efforts to remedy the 
problem were ignored. A whistleblower may also choose to go to the media to 
avoid retaliation, even though such a route does not guarantee a 
whistleblower’s anonymity.236 Whistleblowing to the media is particularly 
appropriate when internal avenues have not responded adequately or the 
 
2(g) (LexisNexis 2010). 
230 See, e.g., Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-1(e) (supplying authority to award monetary rewards to informants); False Claims Act, 
31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012). For an interesting analysis of the psychological effectiveness of 
monetary rewards, see Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 204, at 273. 
231 Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 204, at 319-20. 
232 Id. 
233 Id.; see also SAGAR, supra note 85, at 137 (arguing that, while motive is not important 
when insiders reveal “gross or obvious wrongdoing,” motive matters when the disclosures 
involve “suspected or prima facie wrongdoing”). 
234 Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employee Disclosures to the 
Media: When Is a “Source” a “Sourcerer”?, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357, 368-69 
(1993). 
235 Id. at 369. They may also be based on the hope that the agency can correct 
wrongdoing on its own. Id. at 378. 
236 Although over thirty states and the District of Columbia recognize some form of the 
reporters’ privilege, in many states the privilege is not absolute. Mary-Rose Papandrea, 
Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 545-46 (2007). In 
addition, efforts to pass a federal statutory shield law have not yet been successful, and the 
availability of a constitutional or common law privilege is not certain. Id. at 564. 
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employee suffers retaliation.237 Thus, although the federal whistleblowing 
statutes do not protect disclosures made directly to public, some commentators 
will sometimes label such disclosures “whistleblowing” whenever they reveal 
illegal behavior, waste, fraud, mismanagement, or other questionable conduct. 
Espionage is distinct from disclosures to the press in crucial ways. 
Espionage is a form of information gathering, but it is conducted in a 
clandestine manner, so that the fact that the information has been 
communicated, as well as the information itself, is kept secret.238 Inherent in 
the definition of espionage is some sort of relationship or agreement between 
the spy and another country or foreign power. Because the recipient of covertly 
shared information knows who the source of that information is, the 
information is more trustworthy and credible than information published in the 
media based on disclosures from anonymous sources. Most importantly, in the 
case of traditional espionage, the United States does not know which of its 
secrets have been compromised and accordingly cannot take steps to limit the 
damage.239 
Those engaged in espionage do not always give secrets to our enemies; 
sometimes they give them to our friends. Take, for example, the spy Jonathan 
Pollard, who sold U.S. intelligence secrets to Israel.240 One reason that selling 
secrets to our allies is criminalized is that allies do not always agree with each 
other’s policies, and they are not willing to exchange all of their intelligence 
information.241 
 
237 Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 234, at 397 (“With reference to public employee 
whistleblowers, information about organizational misconduct may be conveyed legitimately 
to the media in instances where intragovernmental authorities have failed to respond, have 
not responded in an adequate manner, or where the whistleblower has experienced 
retaliation for reporting.”). 
238 The British Security Service defines espionage as “a process which involves human 
sources (agents) or technical means to obtain information which is not normally publically 
available. It may also involve seeking to influence decision makers and opinion-formers to 
benefit a foreign power.” What Is Espionage?, SEC. SERVICE: MI5, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/ 
home/the-threats/espionage/what-is-espionage.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZL64-ESNE. 
239 Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 186, at 400-01 (arguing that “the greatest damage” 
to national security occurs in cases of traditional espionage because the government 
mistakenly believes that its “secrets are secret” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In 
addition, foreign governments may be less willing to trust the information in the media 
because they do not know the media’s anonymous sources in the same way they know their 
own agents. See id. at 401. 
240 Kerry Reportedly Says He Will Consider Freeing Jonathan Pollard as Part of 
Prisoner Swap, FOX NEWS (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/12/29/ 
kerry-returns-to-israel-to-talk-with-leaders-about-peace-negotiations-amid-new, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7ZL8-8MY7. 
241 See Bernard Weintraub, The Darker Side of U.S.-Israeli Ties Revealed, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 5, 1986, at B9. One commentator explained that Israel was “frustrated by the refusal of 
the United States to provide certain information on troop deployments by moderate Arab 
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Motivation is not particularly helpful in defining espionage. People have had 
various motivations for committing espionage: (1) desire for money or other 
financial rewards; (2) ideological affinity242 (communism, fundamental Islamic 
causes, etc.); (3) a desire to avoid embarrassment; (4) sexual gratification; (5) 
enjoyment of the “thrill” of spying; and (6) the need to feel important, redress 
perceived lack of appreciation, or unfair treatment, or a feeling of frustration. 
Individuals who seek out spying opportunities are most likely to be motivated 
by personal reasons, including frustration at work and delusions of grandeur.243 
Examples include Edward Lee Howard, who defected to the Soviet Union after 
the CIA fired him; Aldrich Ames, whose government career had stalled; 
Robert Hanssen, who believed that his colleagues at the FBI did not appreciate 
him as much as they should; and Earl Edwin Pitts, who sought revenge against 
his FBI superiors.244 One important trend since the end of the Cold War is that 
the majority of spies who have disclosed information to foreign powers are 
naturalized citizens who have a pre-existing connection to another country.245 
Many of these spies are not compensated; money is not their motivation.246 
They may feel loyalty to their native land and feel alienated in the United 
States.247 
A potentially more helpful factor in distinguishing among traitors, spies, and 
other leakers is to whom the disclosures are made, but even this factor has 
potential difficulties. When we think of spies we might think of secret 
meetings in a dark place where classified documents are exchanged for money. 
 
countries, including Jordan and Egypt. Moreover, some Israelis have said that the United 
States declined to turn over all the intelligence data that would be helpful in protecting 
Israel.” Id. 
242 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are examples of spies with a strong ideological 
motivation; they strongly supported the communist movement in the Soviet Union. Sam 
Roberts, Book Review, The Rosenbergs Revisited, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at BR23.  
243 Erin Creegan, National Security Crime, 3 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 373, 409-10 (2012) 
(“Alienated spies are those who betray their country for personal reasons. The most 
common reasons seem to be: a perception of unfair treatment in their government jobs, a 
sense of personal importance and frustration when others fail to acknowledge these 
delusions of grandeur, a need to be important . . . .”). 
244 Id. at 409-10. 
245 Id. at 413 (“This report claims that most spies since 1990 have spied out of loyalty to 
another country, with money as a motivation coming second and disgruntlement, noted 
above, a third-place motivator.”). 
246 Id. 
247 Id. Terrorists like the Boston Marathon bombers also may fit this profile. Akbar 
Ahmed, Opinion: Boston Bombings Show Muslims Between Worlds, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
NEWS (Apr. 22, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130422-boston-
marathon-bombings-terrorism-islam-muslims-chechnya-opinion, archived at http://perma.cc 
/BP3B-75ZV (“[T]he suspected bombers found themselves suspended in that dangerous 
territory between two worlds—the old not quite faded from their lives and the new still too 
new to absorb them.”). 
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Certainly any direct delivery of information to a foreign nation or its agents 
tends to be a sign of espionage, if not treason. But espionage and treason can 
be committed through a more indirect method of delivery. The government 
attorneys prosecuting Bradley Manning have pointed to Civil War cases in 
which individuals were convicted of aiding and abetting the enemy based on 
the inclusion of information in a widely circulated publication.248 In one case, a 
Union officer was convicted after he gave a Virginia newspaper a list of the 
rosters of Union units.249 The precise facts of this case are unclear – Manning 
contends that in these Civil War cases the publications contained coded 
messages – but at the very least they demonstrate that sometimes the exchange 
of information with the enemy can be indirect.250 Thus, it might be important 
to focus not solely on “to whom” disclosures are made, but rather on to whom 
the leaker intended the audience for his disclosures to be. 
II. PROTECTIONS AND PENALTIES 
Anyone who discloses national security information without authorization 
potentially faces a broad range of civil and criminal sanctions. The current 
statutory scheme does not do a particularly good job of distinguishing among 
traitors, spies, whistleblowers in the intelligence community, and every other 
leaker. The statutory protections for whistleblowers are woefully insufficient 
and, given the current political atmosphere, unlikely to improve any time soon. 
Indeed, the Obama Administration has been largely supportive of 
whistleblowers generally, but has strongly resisted extending the same robust 
protections to government insiders with access to national security 
information.251 A recent presidential policy directive provides national security 
employees with some additional whistleblowing protections they have not 
enjoyed until now, but these protections still fall far short of what other 
government employees have, and they do not cover government contractors.252 
In addition, national security whistleblowers have little shelter from retaliation, 
and the judicial branch has no authority to review any retaliation claims they 
might have.253 As a result, the executive branch has virtually unchecked 
authority to declare what information is secret and to punish leakers as it sees 
fit.254 
 
248 Yochai Benkler, The Dangerous Logic of the Bradley Manning Case, NEW REPUBLIC 




251 Moberly, supra note 67, at 95. 
252 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-19: Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to 
Classified Information (Oct. 10, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/NQ2T-WYHA. 
253 See, e.g., Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-272, §§ 702-703, 112 Stat. 2396, 2414-17 (specifically prohibiting judicial review). 
254 Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 186, at 356. 
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A. Statutory and Regulatory Protections 
The government often claims that it is unnecessary to search, actively 
prevent, or protect against national security leakers because there are adequate 
official channels through which whistleblowers may expose wrongdoing.255 
This is not the case. As Stephen Vladeck has observed, the current legal regime 
“would give pause to even the most altruistic and well-intentioned 
whistleblowers.”256 
The paucity of protections for national security employees stands in great 
contrast to the safeguards afforded to other government employees. The 
Federal Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) protects a government employee 
who discloses information that he “reasonably believes” demonstrates a 
violation of any law, rule, or regulation, an instance of gross mismanagement, 
a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific 
danger to public health or safety, so long as he is not prohibited by law or 
required by executive order to keep the information secret.257 Other federal 
laws in certain situations protect whistleblowers who act on a “reasonable 
belief” of wrongdoing258; still others protect those who report “potential”259 or 
“alleged”260 violations of federal law.261 The reason for protecting these good 
faith beliefs is to encourage disclosures.262 
The WPA offers virtually no protection to national security employees and 
contractors.263 First, the WPA makes no mention of contractors at all and 
 
255 See, e.g., Larissa Epatko, Former Defense Secretary Gates Calls NSA Leaker 
Snowden a ‘Traitor,’ PBS (Jan. 14, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/run 
down/gates-on-snowden, archived at http://perma.cc/7FFQ-ACPF (recounting Secretary 
Gates’ comments that there are “avenues” within the intelligence community to report 
government wrongdoing, and that Snowden’s decision to go to the media instead is “an 
extraordinary act of hubris”). 
256 Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After 
Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1531, 1535 (2008). 
257 See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)-(B) (2012). 
258 See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 
1553(a), 123 Stat. 115, 297; see also 5 U.S.C. § 2303(a); 6 U.S.C. § 1142(a)(1) (2012); 10 
U.S.C. § 2409(a) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 2087(a) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012). 
Relatedly, some laws protect “good faith” reports of a violation of a law or regulation. See, 
e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 2114(a)(1) (2006). Other federal whistleblower protection laws protect 
employees who object or refuse to participate in activities they reasonably believe violate 
federal law. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2087(a); 21 U.S.C. § 399d(a) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 218c(a) 
(2012); 49 U.S.C. § 30171(a) (2006). 
259 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2651. 
260 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
261 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). Covered employees who refuse to obey an order to violate a 
law are also protected. Id. 
262 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33918, THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT: AN 
OVERVIEW 1 (2007), archived at http://perma.cc/FVS7-WRHF. 
263 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). 
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appears on its face to apply only to government employees.264 Second, 
government employees in national security agencies are generally excluded 
from the WPA’s coverage.265 Third, federal employees covered under the 
WPA will find themselves without protection under the WPA if they disclose 
classified information that is marked as an executive order and regarding 
defense or foreign affairs to anyone except the Inspector General (IG) or 
Special Counsel.266 
Under the WPA, federal employees may not give classified information to 
the IG or Special Counsel when they are reporting a violation of “any law, 
rule, or regulation,” or “gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an 
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or 
safety.”267 In addition, the IG and Special Counsel can share these reports with 
only the National Security Advisor and the House and Senate Permanent Select 
Committees on Intelligence.268 While this limited oversight may help in some 
cases, it is likely to be completely ineffective when the highest government 
officials have already approved of the alleged illegal activity.269 And as 
observed above, IGs do not offer an independent check on executive power 
because they are under the command and authority of their respective agency 
heads and subject to removal by the President. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that some agencies use IGs to retaliate against whistleblowers “by initiating IG 
investigations about whistleblowers.”270 
Recognizing that the WPA provided essentially no protection to intelligence 
community employees,271 Congress passed the Intelligence Community 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (ICWPA).272 The ICWPA protects 
employees of federal intelligence agencies, as well as contractors for any of 
those agencies, who disclose classified information directly to Congress.273 
Hindered by arguments from the executive branch that the protection for such 




266 Id. (exempting employees from protection if the information reported is specified by 
executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense).  
267 Id. § 2302(b)(8)(B) (containing no exception for classified information). 
268 Id. § 1213(j). 
269 Vladeck, supra note 256, at 1544 (“This problem could occur in cases where the 
‘unlawful secret’ was been approved at the highest levels of the federal government.”). 
270 See MELISSA GOODMAN ET AL., ACLU, DISAVOWED: THE GOVERNMENT’S 
UNCHECKED RETALIATION AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS 9 (2007), 
archived at http://perma.cc/LCG9-L34T. 
271 Thomas Newcomb, In from the Cold: The Intelligence Community Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1998, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1235, 1237-40 (2001). 
272 This act was codified in 50 U.S.C. § 403(q) (2006) for the CIA; for all other 
intelligence organizations, it was codified under 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8H. 
273 50 U.S.C. § 403q(d)(5)(D). 
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power to withhold confidential communications and national security 
information, the statute provides much less protection than the WPA does for 
federal employees generally.274 
The ICWPA protects a government employee only if he discloses a matter 
of “urgent concern,” narrowly defined to include “a serious or flagrant” 
violation of law or executive order, a false statement to Congress (or willful 
withholding of information from Congress), or a reprisal against a person who 
reported a matter of urgent concern.275 Bowing to the executive’s concerns, the 
legislation does not permit intelligence community employees to make direct 
disclosures to Congress.276 Instead, the employees must make disclosures to 
the appropriate Inspector General,277 who in turn must notify the relevant 
agency head.278 Furthermore, the employee may report directly to the 
congressional intelligence committees only if several onerous conditions are 
met.279 
Notably, unlike the WPA, the ICWPA provides no legal remedy for 
retaliation against a covered employee. The ICWPA specifically states that 
“[a]n action taken by the Director or the Inspector General . . . shall not be 
subject to judicial review.”280 Agencies can, and often do, try to stop a 
whistleblower from talking to Congress “by claiming Congress is not 
authorized to hear what the whistleblower has to say.”281 Thus, absent any 
enforcement mechanism, the ICWPA arguably fails to provide any real 
protection to national security whistleblowers. 
Another common criticism of the current whistleblower protection statutes 
is that they do not protect covered employees from security clearance-related 
retaliation.282 Despite the seemingly expansive statutory language regarding 
what qualifies as a personnel action, courts have held that an agency’s decision 
to revoke or suspend security clearance is not reviewable.283 Thus, the 
 
274 See generally Newcomb, supra note 271. 
275 50 U.S.C. § 403q(d)(5)(G)(i). 
276 Id. § 403q(d)(5)(A). 
277 Id. (“An employee of the Agency, or of a contractor to the Agency, who intends to 
report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report 
such complaint or information to the Inspector General.”). 
278 Id. § 403q(d)(5)(B). 
279 Id. § 403q(d)(5)(D) (explaining that an employee may report to intelligence 
committees if the Inspector General does not find the disclosure credible, the employee 
gives written notice to Inspector General, and obtains instructions from Director on how to 
contact them). 
280 Id. § 403q(d)(5)(F). 
281 See Goodman et al., supra note 270, at 10. 
282 Moberly, supra note 67, at 102. 
283 Gargiulo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 727 F.3d 1181, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Robinson 
v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 498 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Federal Circuit has 
recently held that government agency determinations concerning the eligibility of an 
employee to occupy a “sensitive” national security position are not reviewable, even if that 
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revocation of security clearance has become a common tactic allowing 
agencies to retaliate against lawful whistleblowers with impunity.284 Allowing 
agencies to alter an employee’s security clearance provides agencies with a 
back door way to effectively fire or blacklist employees who blow the whistle. 
Reformers have called for the implementation of fair internal due process 
rights, which can be reviewed by the Merit Systems Protection Board, to 
provide a mechanism for resolving adverse clearance judgments, and also the 
option of an independent appeal to those decisions to a forum free from 
institutional conflict.285 
Members of the armed forces are protected under the Military 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988, which offers the same sort of limited 
protection that members of the intelligence community have. The Act excludes 
communications that are “unlawful,” without defining the term,286 thus leaving 
open the possibility that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information 
would not be covered. At the same time, the law protects from retaliation 
members of the military who report their reasonable belief of illegal action as 
well as “[g]ross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, 
or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”287 These 
disclosures must be made to a Member of Congress, the IG, or other 
designated officials to be protected.288 It is unclear as a matter of statutory 
construction whether these disclosures are protected if they include classified 
information given the exclusion of “unlawful” disclosures in another part of 
the statute. 
The executive branch has continued to oppose attempts to remove some of 
the limitations inherent in the WPA and ICWPA, as applied to intelligence 
community employees. As originally drafted, the Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act (WPEA), which passed in 2010, would have amended the 
WPA to extend whistleblower protections to national security employees and 
 
position does not involve access to classified information. Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 
1148 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
284 See Goodman et al., supra note 270, at 15 (“This means that even if an employee is 
covered by the WPA, the employee is unprotected if an agency retaliates not by suspending 
or firing the employee outright but by first revoking her security clearance and then firing 
her because she no longer a has clearance. There is no independent court or administrative 
body that can review whether a suspension or revocation of a security clearance is 
retaliatory.”). 
285 SHANNA DEVINE ET AL., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, WHISTLEBLOWER WITCH 
HUNT: THE SMOKESCREEN SYNDROME 39 (2010), archived at http://perma.cc/38Q7-H4Q5 
(“Legitimate reform requires that – whistleblower rights extending to protect against 
security clearance retaliation; fair internal agency due process rights to resolve proposed 
adverse clearance judgments; and independent appeal of those decisions to a forum free 
from institutional conflict of interest.”). 
286 10 U.S.C. § 1034(a)(2) (2012). 
287 Id. § 1034(c)(2). 
288 Id. § 1034(b)(B). 
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contractors.289 The original legislation proposed in 2007 would also have made 
decisions to revoke or suspend security clearance actionable and would have 
permitted employees to bring actions in any federal court.290 The President 
opposed this legislation,291 repeating the common refrain that the expansion of 
whistleblower protection to national security employees who disclose 
classified information to Congress without authorization from the executive 
branch would jeopardize national security and would impede the President’s 
coordination function.292 The Executive Office further objected to the portions 
of the legislation that would prohibit the government from invoking the state 
secrets privilege, and more generally argued that allowing administrative and 
judicial review of executive branch security clearance determinations was 
inconsistent with the executive branch’s discretion in that area.293 The letter 
also objected to the WPEA’s expansion of protected disclosures, which it 
claimed would lead to frivolous lawsuits.294 
Congress ultimately acceded to the executive’s arguments to exclude 
national security employees and contractors from the WPEA, and President 
Obama signed the legislation into law. The timing of Congress’s decision to 
strip the bill of protections for these individuals corresponded with the 
unauthorized leak of hundreds of thousands of classified diplomatic cables to 
the website WikiLeaks, allegedly by Manning. Although Manning would have 
received no protection under the WPEA, some believe the massive leak was 
partially responsible for the bill’s failure.295 Congress has also excluded 
members of the intelligence community from the recently adopted pilot 
program passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013.296 
Although the WPEA does not cover most members of the intelligence 
community, President Obama released Presidential Policy Directive 19 (PPD-
19) in an effort to extend some of the WPEA protections to national security 
employees.297 PPD-19 prohibits retaliation against any employee with access 
to national security information who reports a reasonable belief of waste, 
fraud, or abuse to someone in his chain of command, the IG of his agency, the 
 
289 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 262, at 17. 
290 Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 985 – Whistleblower Protection 





295 Miranda Leitsinger, As Manning Heads to Trial over Wikileaks, New Push for 
Whistleblower Protections, MSNBC (Dec. 16, 2011, 6:54 AM), http://usnews.msnbc.msn. 
com/_news/2011/12/16/9483316-as-manning-heads-to-trial-over-wikileaks-new-push-for-
whistleblower-protections, archived at http://perma.cc/ZFV7-5LFC. 
296 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 
828(a)(1), 2013 U.S.C.C.A.N. (126 Stat.) 1632, 1837-41. 
297 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-19, supra note 252.  
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Director of National Intelligence, to the IG of the Intelligence Community, or 
anyone designated by these officials to receive such disclosures.298 Although 
this is a laudable measure, it lacks the force of a statute, relies on the individual 
agencies for implementation, and appears to offer more procedural than 
substantive protections.299 PPD-19 gives aggrieved employees the right to 
appeal to a three-member panel of IGs, but the decision of that panel is subject 
to review by the agency head, thereby potentially mitigating much of the 
benefit of the outside review. PPD-19 makes clear that it “is not intended to, 
and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable 
in law or equity by any party against the United States” or any other agency or 
person.300 Furthermore, PPD-19 does not give employees the right to external 
review – such as in an Article III court – of any personnel action, and offers no 
protection to employees who disclose information to a congressional 
committee or to the media.301 Finally, PPD-19 refers only to “officer[s] or 
employee[s] of a Covered Agency,” and therefore appears to give no 
protection to government contractors.302 
B. Criminal Sanctions 
In addition to constitutional and military treason, government insiders who 
engage in the unauthorized dissemination of national security information can 
face a range of potential criminal charges. The existing law does not do a 
particularly good job of distinguishing traitors, spies, whistleblowers, and other 
leakers. 
1. Constitutional Treason 
As Chief Justice Marshall said, “there is no crime which can more excite 
and agitate the passions of men than treason.”303 Since the founding of the 
nation, commentators and politicians on both sides of the aisle have labeled the 
leaking and publication of national security information as treason.304 
 
298 Id. 
299 For criticism of the Presidential Policy Directive, see Owen Dunn, Presidential Policy 
Directive on Whistleblowers Draws Criticism, WHISTLEBLOWER’S PROTECTION BLOG (Oct. 
16, 2012), http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2012/10/articles/news-1/presidential-policy-
directive-on-whistleblowers-draws-criticism/#more, archived at http://perma.cc/5UJN-YV 
MC. 
300 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-19, supra note 252. 
301 See Elizabeth Goitein, A Mixed Message for National Security Whistleblowers, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-goitein/obama 
-whistleblowers_b_1989629.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SM7C-G8KL. 
302 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-19, supra note 252. 
303 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125 (1807). 
304 SCHOENFELD, supra note 6, at 73-74 (writing that Thomas Paine was accused of 
treason for disclosing in his Crisis pamphlets that the French were secretly financing 
American forces in the Revolution); Editorial, Snowden’s Disclosures Do Not Amount to 
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Although it is sometimes unclear whether policymakers mean that the leakers 
are guilty of treason, or whether they are simply using the loaded words 
“treason” and “traitor” to condemn the disclosures. The frequency with which 
this label is thrown around begs the question whether leakers could be 
convicted of treason. 
Treason is the only crime specified in the Constitution.305 Article III, Section 
3 provides: “Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying 
War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and 
Comfort. No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of 
two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”306 
Treason can take two forms: (1) levying war against the United States, or (2) 
adhering to the enemy.307 No one has been charged with the first type of 
treason since the end of the Civil War,308 and while the second type “has 
achieved a considerably longer and more useful existence,”309 only one person 
has been charged with treason since World War II.310 Since that time, the 
government has relied more heavily on other charges to punish those who 
threaten the security of the nation.311 Nevertheless, given the government’s 
 
Treason, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at A26 (observing that both Republican House Speaker 
John Boehner and Democratic Senator Diane Feinstein have accused Edward Snowden of 
treason); Adam Liptak, In Rulings, Spy vs. Leaker, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2013, at A1 (writing 
that President Richard Nixon called the publication of the Pentagon Papers “treasonable”); 
Chris Mondics, Santorum Says NSA Leakers Committed Treason, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 
12, 2006, at A9. 
305 United States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 21 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) (No. 15,254). 
306 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. Although the Constitution defines the crime of treason, 
Congress determines the applicable punishment. See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012) (“Whoever, 
owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, 
giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and 
shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title 
but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United 
States.”). 
307 See 18 U.S.C. § 2381. 
308 See Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. at 22; Captain Jabez W. Loane, IV, Treason and Aiding 
the Enemy, 30 MIL. L. REV. 43, 58 (1965). 
309 Loane, IV, supra note 308, at 58. 
310 See Eric Litchblau, American in Qaeda Tapes Accused of Treason, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
12, 2006, at A22 (reporting the 2006 treason indictment of Adam Yahiye Gadahn based on 
his participation in several Al Qaeda video tapes in which he expresses his support for 
terrorism, as the first of its kind “in more than a half-century”). Gadahan remains at large 
and is currently listed as one of the FBI’s most wanted terrorists. Wanted by the FBI: Adam 
Yahiye Gadahn, FBI (2013), http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/adam-yahiye-
gadahn, archived at http://perma.cc/YDV4-V8DF. 
311 Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 HARV. L. REV. 806, 806 (1945) 
(“[A]fter the nineteenth century the executive and legislative branches no longer considered 
the treason charge as the principal bulwark of state security.”). In Cramer v. United States, 
the seminal case on treason, the Supreme Court opined that as a nation “[w]e have managed 
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decision to charge an American-born terror propagandist with treason and to 
prosecute Bradley Manning with the similar charge of aiding the enemy, it is 
possible that the government will bring treason charges more frequently in the 
future.312 
The second type of treason requires two separate elements: (1) “adhering to 
the enemy,” and (2) the provision of “aid and comfort” to the enemy.313 The 
Supreme Court has held that the crime of treason requires both overt acts and a 
specific intent to betray.314 These two requirements are “packed with 
controversy and difficulties,”315 and the Supreme Court has made clear that 
both elements are necessary for proving treason: 
A citizen intellectually or emotionally may favor the enemy and harbor 
sympathies or convictions disloyal to this country’s policy or interest, but 
so long as he commits no act of aid and comfort to the enemy, there is no 
treason. On the other hand, a citizen may take actions, which do aid and 
comfort the enemy—making a speech critical of the government or 
opposing its measures, profiteering, striking in defense plants or essential 
work, and the hundred other things which impair our cohesion and 
diminish our strength—but if there is no adherence to the enemy in this, if 
there is no intent to betray, there is no treason.316 
Whether the defendant has committed an overt act that provides aid and 
comfort to the enemy is a question of law to be determined by a court.317 
 
to do without treason prosecutions to a degree that probably would be impossible except 
while a people was singularly confident of external security and internal stability.” 325 U.S. 
1, 26 (1945). 
312 Furthermore, as one scholar has observed, “[t]he recent lull in [treason] prosecutions 
should not blind us to the peril that the law of treason conceals.” Tom Bell, Treason, 
Technology, and Freedom of Expression, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 999, 1002 (2005). 
313 See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 736 (1952); Cramer, 325 U.S. at 29. 
The government must also prove that the defendant owed “allegiance” to the United States. 
18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012). U.S. citizens (including dual citizens) and resident noncitizens all 
owe a duty of allegiance to the United States. Bell, supra note 312, at 1011 (citing 
Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 736; Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 155 (1873)). 
314 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 29. Although court opinions are quite clear that treason requires 
the specific intent to betray the United States, and not just a general intent to commit the 
overt acts, some scholars disagree. See, e.g., JUSTIN MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 
502 (1934) (“In order that the crime of treason be committed there must be an intent. 
However no specific intent is required. It is sufficient that the defendant intended to do the 
prohibited act.”). 
315 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 46-47 (“The framers’ effort to compress into two sentences the 
law of one of the most intricate of crimes gives a superficial appearance of clarity and 
simplicity which proves illusory when it is put to practical application.”). 
316 Id. at 29; see also Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 736; Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 
634-35 (1947). 
317 See Haupt, 330 U.S. at 635-36 (holding that the acts alleged were sufficient to sustain 
the finding of an overt act, provided the jury credit the evidence); Cramer, 325 U.S. at 34 
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Unless the defendant testifies in open court, any prosecution for treason 
constitutionally requires two witnesses who can testify that the defendant 
committed the allegedly treasonous actions.318 Witnesses are not required, 
however, to demonstrate that the defendant had the specific intent to betray the 
country; after all, witnesses cannot read someone’s mind.319 
To satisfy the overt act requirement, the government does not have to show 
that the attempt to assist the enemy was substantial, complete, effective, or 
successful.320 In cases involving the transmission of information, U.S. courts 
have made clear that it is not necessary for the government to demonstrate that 
the enemy made use of the information,321 or, as in one case, that the 
information was even received.322 
The government, however, does, have to prove that the individual who 
transmitted information gave aid and comfort to an “enemy” of the United 
States.323 The Constitution provides no guidance for defining “enemy” within 
the Treason Clause,324 but the British statute upon which the Clause was 
modeled had been interpreted broadly such that “enemy” was not limited by 
formal declarations of war against nation states.325 The Constitution is also 
silent on whether a formal declaration of war is required,326 yet the few 
 
(“The very minimum function that the overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is 
that it show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the 
accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy.”). 
318 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
319 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 31. 
320 See Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 738-39; Haupt, 330 U.S. at 644; United States v. 
Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 24 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) (No. 15,254) (“It is not essential, to 
constitute the giving of aid and comfort, that the enterprise commenced should be 
successful, and actually render assistance.”). 
321 Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 941 (1st Cir. 1948). 
322 Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. at 24 (explaining that sending a letter to the enemy that 
contains intelligence constitutes giving aid and comfort, even if the letter is intercepted 
before delivery). 
323 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 29. 
324 The term appears twice in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 3 (using the 
term “Enemies” in the definition of treason); id. amend. XIV, § 3 (prohibiting any person 
who has engaged in insurrection or rebellion or aided the enemy from running for public 
office). 
325 Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy 
Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 915-16 (2006) (defining the English statute on 
which the Constitution’s Treason Clause was predicated as broad and “not limited only to 
those foreign states against which England had declared war”); see Treason Act, 1351, 25 
Edw. 3, c. 2 (Eng.) (declaring it to be treasonous “if a Man do levy War against our Lord the 
King in his Realm, or be adherent to the King’s Enemies in his Realm, giving to them Aid 
and Comfort in the Realm, or elsewhere”). 
326 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
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decisions to address the matter327 limit the term “enemy” to “subjects or 
citizens of a foreign State at war with our own.”328 Thus, once war has been 
declared against the United States, a foreign power’s subjects, military, agents, 
and spies are enemies of the United States until the cessation of hostilities.329 
For example, the Rosenbergs, who famously gave nuclear secrets to the Soviet 
Union in the 1950s, were not charged with treason because the United States 
was not at war with Russia at that time.330 In the context of the United States’ 
struggle against terrorism, however, organizations such as Al Qaeda might 
qualify as “enemies” under the Treason Clause.331 
Assuming Al Qaeda is an enemy under the Treason Clause, the transmission 
of classified information directly to Al Qaeda would plainly satisfy the “aid 
and comfort” to the enemy requirement.332 It does not matter whether the 
information was useful to the enemy or its disclosure harmful to the United 
States; indeed, even entirely futile attempts to aid the enemy can be treason.333 
It is less clear whether the government could bring treason charges against 
someone who disseminates classified information directly to the public 
(perhaps through a personal blog) or through some sort of media intermediary 
(such as WikiLeaks or the New York Times) with the asserted intent of 
 
327 See Larson, supra note 325, at 917 n.270 (“A consistent line of cases holds that a 
United States citizen who remains in enemy territory after the initiation of hostilities may be 
treated as an enemy, at least insofar as seizure of his property by the military in wartime is 
concerned.”). 
328 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 672 (1863). 
329 United States v. Fricke, 259 F. 673, 675-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (holding that upon 
declaration of war with the United States anyone attempting to contravene the United 
States’s counterpursuance of war was an enemy of the United States); Benjamin A. Lewis, 
Note, An Old Means to a Different End: The War on Terror, American Citizens . . . and the 
Treason Clause, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1215, 1227 (2006). The formal war requirement, 
however, is not absolute. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 666-67 (holding that a civil war 
begins with an insurrection, so war is never formally declared, but instead arises “by its 
accidents” and under certain conditions). During the Civil War, for instance, President 
Abraham Lincoln was permitted to establish a Union blockade of Confederate ports absent a 
formal declaration of war because, as per the international laws of war, the Confederate 
rebels had “cast off their allegiance and made war on their government.” Id. at 671, 674. 
330 See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 588-90, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1952) 
(responding to an argument by the Rosenbergs that they should have been prosecuted for 
treason and hence afforded the protections of that charge by holding that “an essential 
element of treason, giving aid to an ‘enemy,’ is irrelevant to the espionage offense”). 
331 See Larson, supra note 325, at 920 (arguing that Al Qaeda, unlike Russia during the 
Cold War, would likely be classified as an enemy because “Al Qaeda has engaged in 
violent, war-like attacks on the United States,” whereas Russia and the United States were 
never in “open war”). 
332 See Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 941 (1st Cir. 1948) (holding that 
conveying military information “would be a completed act of aid and comfort”). 
333 Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 644 (1947). 
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informing the American public.334 Unlike Uniform Code of Military Justice 
Article 104, the Treason Clause does not contain language indicating that 
aiding the enemy can happen “directly or indirectly.”335 A defendant might 
argue that aiding the enemy under the Treason Clause requires the government 
to demonstrate that the individual disclosed the information to the public or 
through an intermediary with the intent that it would reach the enemy.336 
The government is likely to respond that the subjective intent of the 
defendant is irrelevant in determining whether the defendant provided aid and 
comfort to the enemy.337 Instead, it might argue, the defendant is assumed to 
be aware that the enemy can access anything revealed to the public at large.338 
The Court’s treason cases do not expressly require one to act with the enemy’s 
consent of the enemy or have any sort of direct relationship with the enemy, 
although in all of the cases the defendants did, in fact, serve as agents of the 
enemy.339 Requiring some sort of direct relationship, agreement, or 
arrangement with the enemy would seem essential to avoid a dramatic 
expansion of the Treason Clause.340 Any number of actions can “aid” the 
enemy – from sabotaging a weapons plant to criticizing the United States – but 
unless this act is done at the behest or at least in cooperation with the enemy, it 
does not seem correct to call this act “treason.”341 
Regardless of whether the defendant’s subjective intent is relevant in 
determining whether the “aid and comfort” requirement is met, this intent 
might be relevant in determining whether the adherence to the enemy 
 
334 See Marcy Wheeler, Whistleblowing Now Akin to Treason, SALON (Apr. 17, 2013, 
12:20 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/04/17/obama_administration_equates_whistle 
blowing_to_spying_partner, archived at http://perma.cc/Q3A7-TBWN. 
335 Compare Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2012) (defining the 
military crime of aiding the enemy), with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
336 See supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text (explaining the mens rea requirement 
that inheres in the adherence element of treason). 
337 Wheeler, supra note 334 (quoting the government as arguing that providing 
information to the New York Times was worse than selling information to an enemy because 
“every foreign adversary stood to benefit from the defendant’s unauthorized disclosure”). 
338 See William Saletan, Truth Is Treason, SLATE (July 31, 2013, 11:45 AM), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/2013/07/did_bradley_manning_aid
_the_enemy_the_prosecution_s_case_was_preposterous.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
U6VQ-BNHL (explaining that the Government based its argument that Manning “aided the 
enemy” on the idea “that the world includes our enemies, and that they use the Internet”). 
339 See Bell, supra note 312, at 1014-15. 
340 See id. at 1031-32 (discussing the First Amendment effects of this approach on a 
hypothetical defendant who might be subject to treason prosecution for posting criticism of 
U.S. military policy). 
341 See id. at 1033 (“Taken at face value, the law reaches all disloyal public criticism of 
U.S. military policy made by those who owe allegiance to the U.S. . . . Yet it is 
inconceivable that all such expressions would trigger prosecutions for treason.”). 
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requirement is met.342 The Court has said that the requisite intent can be 
“inferred from the overt acts themselves, from the defendant’s own statements 
of his attitude toward the war effort, and from his own professions of loyalty to 
[the enemy].”343 Some scholars have argued that this language leaves unclear 
whether the crime of treason simply requires general criminal intent to perform 
the overt act at issue – by permitting intent to betray to be inferred from the 
overt acts themselves – or whether the government must demonstrate a more 
specific intent to betray.344 
Eminent legal scholar Charles Warren, who served as an assistant attorney 
general during World War I, argued that a specific intent to betray is not 
necessary in most cases.345 He explained that “if . . . a person intends to do and 
actually does specific acts the natural and probable consequences of which are 
the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy, then he intends to commit treason, 
within the purview of the law.”346 To support his argument, Warren relied on 
Supreme Court decisions in which defendants claimed that they intended only 
to make money and did not intend to give aid to the nation’s enemies.347 
Showing little patience for the defendants in such cases, the Court relied on the 
general principle of law that a defendant cannot avoid civil or criminal liability 
by pretending that they did not know what the recipient of their support was 
going to do with that support.348 Furthermore, some lower courts have been 
clear that defendants who clearly aided the enemy cannot avoid a treason 
conviction by arguing that they believed it would be for the good of the nation 
in the long run.349 For example, the First Circuit has held that a defendant who 
gives the enemy advance information about a planned invasion cannot avoid a 
treason charge based on his sincere belief that it would be best for the country 
to be defeated and withdraw early from the conflict.350 
 
342 Id. at 1023 (observing that it is not the overt act element, but rather the adhering 
element that might prevent a treason conviction for expressive activities). 
343 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 742-43 (citing Haupt v. United States, 330 
U.S. 631, 642 (1947); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945)). 
344 Compare Loane, IV, supra note 308, at 78 (explaining that Cramer’s language, 
stating that intent can be inferred from the overt acts themselves, indicates that treason 
requires “something less” than specific intent to betray), with Hurst, supra note 311, at 826-
27 (acknowledging the tension in the cases but concluding that specific intent is required). 
345 See Charles Warren, What Is Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemy, 27 YALE L.J. 
331, 344 (1918). 
346 Id. 
347 Id. (“[The defendant] cannot be permitted to stand on the nice metaphysical 
distinction that, although he knows that the purchaser buys the goods for the purpose of 
aiding the rebellion, he does not sell them for that purpose. The consequences of his acts are 
too serious and enormous to admit of such a plea.” (quoting Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 
Wall.) 342, 347 (1870)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
348 Sprott v. United States, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 459, 463-64 (1874). 
349 Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 943 (1st Cir. 1948). 
350 Id. at 944. 
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But the arguments that specific intent is irrelevant are potentially 
inconsistent with the Court’s decision in Haupt v. United States, which 
affirmed the treason conviction of the father of a German saboteur during 
World War II.351 There, the Court suggested that it is appropriate to permit the 
jury to consider whether the defendant had benign motives for extending aid to 
the enemy.352 The trial court in Haupt instructed the jury that the intent 
element was not met if the father provided assistance to his son “as an 
individual, as distinguished from assisting him in his purpose, if such existed, 
of aiding the German Reich, or of injuring the United States.”353 The Supreme 
Court explained that it was up to the jury to weigh the evidence regarding the 
father’s motivations for assisting his son, which included the defendant’s 
argument that he was just trying to assist his offspring.354 The jury in that case 
ultimately found the father guilty.355 The Court affirmed the conviction, 
reasoning that the jury could have reasonably determined that the father did 
have intent to betray the United States, given the several statements he made 
indicating his “adherence to the German cause.”356 Haupt seems to indicate 
that juries are entitled to consider a broad range of factors when determining 
whether a defendant acted with the requisite intent to betray, including 
circumstantial evidence as well as the act itself, but the jury must conclude that 
the defendant acted with a specific intent to betray. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Treason Clause does not limit the 
United States’ ability to punish other conduct that has the effect of 
undermining our national security and cohesion.357 The lower courts have 
accepted this conclusion,358 but it is hardly a frivolous argument that at least 
some portions of the Espionage Act are unconstitutional.359 In the famous 
Rosenberg espionage case, Justice Black dissented from a denial of certiorari 
where the defendants had argued that they could not be convicted for the act of 
transmitting secrets to the Soviet Union unless the government satisfied the 
procedural requirements of the Treason Clause.360 
 




355 Id. at 644. 
356 Id. at 641-42. 
357 See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 & n.52 (1945) (“[T]he treason offense is 
not the only nor can it well serve as the principal legal weapon to vindicate our national 
cohesion and security.”). 
358 See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d 44, 49-51 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting 
the defendant’s “compelling and eloquent argument” that he “must be charged with treason 
or nothing at all”). 
359 See Paul Crane, Did the Court Kill the Treason Charge?: Reassessing Cramer v. 
United States and Its Significance, 36 FLA. ST. L. REV. 635, 694-95 (2009). 
360 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 300 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing 
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Not surprisingly, the few scholars to address the issue have expressed 
concern that the potentially staggering breadth of the Treason Clause conflicts 
with the First Amendment.361 The Supreme Court, which last decided a treason 
case in 1947, has not had the opportunity to consider this issue in light of 
modern First Amendment principles that developed in the decades following 
World War II.362 Although propagandists employed by our enemies like Ezra 
Pound and Iva Toguri d’Aquino, also known as “Tokyo Rose,” have been 
prosecuted for treason, never in the history of this nation has the government 
prosecuted someone for treason for leaking or publishing secrets to the 
press.363 
2. Military Treason 
Article 104 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is similar to the 
constitutional crime of treason in some ways, but it is an entirely separate 
offense.364 Manning was charged with violating this provision by providing 
approximately 700,000 government documents to WikiLeaks that were in turn 
allegedly read by Al Qaeda.365 Manning was acquitted of an article 104 charge 
after a full bench trial.366 
The law defines the crime as: 
Any person who— 
(1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, 
money, or other things; or 
(2) without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects or gives 
intelligence to, or communicates or corresponds with or holds any 
intercourse with the enemy, either directly or indirectly; shall suffer death 
or such other punishment as a court-martial or military commission may 
direct.367 
 
that the petition for certiorari should have been granted to review the fairness of the trial and 
the government’s right “to try these defendants except under the limited rules prescribed by 
the Constitution defining the offense of treason”). 
361 Bell, supra note 312, at 1040 (arguing that convictions involving treasonous 
expression must be limited to employees of U.S. enemies to avoid conflict with the First 
Amendment). 
362 Id. at 1030 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s post–World War II First Amendment 
decisions indicate “that the law of treason violates the First Amendment”). 
363 SCHOENFELD, supra note 6, at 80-81. 
364 See 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). 
365 Charlie Savage, Soldier Admits Providing Files to WikiLeaks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
2013, at A1. 
366 Charlie Savage, Manning Found Not Guilty of Aiding the Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, July 
31, 2013, at A1. 
367 10 U.S.C. § 904. 
  
2014] LEAKER TRAITOR WHISTLEBLOWER SPY 505 
 
Like constitutional treason, violations of article 104 are punishable by death.368 
Although article 104 is frequently compared to treason, there are significant 
differences.369 Most obviously, article 104 does not prohibit the “levying war” 
type of treason or contain the evidentiary requirement of either the testimony 
of two witnesses to the overt act or a confession in open court.370 Another 
important difference between treason and article 104 is that treason requires 
that the defendant have a duty of allegiance to the United States, and article 
104 does not.371 Despite the obvious differences between treason and article 
104, military courts appear to treat article 104 as the rough equivalent of 
treason.372 They frequently rely on civilian treason cases and even are mindful 
of constitutional treason’s two-witness rule.373 
Unlike constitutional treason, article 104(2) expressly prohibits any 
communications with the enemy.374 The statute is not limited to disclosures of 
classified information; it also does not require the government to demonstrate 
that the disclosure was harmful to the United States or useful for the enemy.375 
Furthermore, the communications can be “direct or indirect.”376 The 
explanatory notes accompanying the law make clear that the provision is 
intentionally broad: “The intent, content, and method of the communication, 
correspondence, or intercourse are immaterial. No response or receipt by the 
enemy is required.”377 Indeed, the Manning prosecution made clear that it 
would have considered bringing this charge even if Manning had disclosed 
 
368 Id. 
369 Compare id. (defining the military crime of aiding the enemy), with U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 3, cl. 1 (defining the criminal offense of treason). 
370 10 U.S.C. § 904. 
371 Id. This point is not free of debate. For a thorough discussion of whether article 104 
requires allegiance, see Michael J. Lebowitz, A Question of Allegiance: Choosing Between 
Dueling Versions of “Aiding the Enemy” During War Crimes Prosecution, 67 A.F. L. REV. 
131, 138 (2011). 
372 Loane, IV, supra note 308, at 78. 
373 Id. at 78-79. It is notable that in closing arguments, the prosecutor in the Manning 
trial declared that Manning “was not a whistle-blower. He was a traitor, a traitor who 
understood the value of compromised information in the hands of the enemy and took 
deliberate steps to ensure that they, along with the world, received it.” Charlie Savage, In 
Closing Argument, Prosecutor Casts Soldiers as ‘Anarchist’ for Leaking Archives, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2013, at A14. 
374 10 U.S.C. § 904(2). 
375 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. IV, ¶ 28.c.(6)(a) (2012) (“No 
unauthorized communication, correspondence, or intercourse with the enemy is permissible. 
The intent, content, and method of the communication, correspondence, or intercourse are 
immaterial.”). 
376 Id. 
377 Id. pt. IV, ¶ 28.b.(6)(a). 
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secrets directly to the New York Times instead of WikiLeaks,378 and our 
enemies are highly likely to read our major newspapers. 
As with constitutional treason, defendants facing article 104(2) charges have 
argued that the government must demonstrate that they acted with the specific 
intent of aiding the enemy.379 The Supreme Court has never addressed this 
issue, but in United States v. Batchelor, the Court of Military Appeals held that 
specific intent was not required.380 In that case, the accused was a prisoner of 
war who made speeches and public broadcasts within his prison camp 
condemning the United States, and also directly gave information about other 
prisoners to his captors.381 The defendant was convicted of, among other 
things, communicating with the enemy without proper authority in violation of 
article 104(2).382 The accused, who claimed that he believed he was acting in 
the best interest of the United States, argued that article 104(2) required the 
government to prove that he acted with the specific intent of harming his 
country or some other bad purpose.383 Although the Court of Military Appeals 
recognized that “an offense which is so closely akin to treason and may be 
punished by a death sentence cannot be viewed as a ‘public welfare’ kind of 
dereliction,”384 unlike treason, a specific criminal intent is not required. 
Instead, the court held, a finding of general criminal intent was sufficient.385 In 
support of its conclusion, the court cited an early treatise that expressly 
distinguished a predecessor statute from treason on the grounds that the former 
did not require specific intent: “Thus correspondence with an enemy in regard 
to matters purely social or domestic, while lacking the animus of treason, 
would, unless duly authorized, constitute an offence.”386 
As the Manning trial revealed, it is unclear under what circumstances 
someone could be convicted under article 104(2) for disseminating information 
that ultimately reaches the enemy. Article 104(2) requires that a defendant 
“knowingly” communicate with the enemy, “either directly or indirectly.”387 
The Manning prosecutors argued that this standard is met whenever a 
defendant knows that his communication could reach the enemy, even if that 
 
378 Scott Shane, New Evidence Expected in WikiLeaks Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2013, at 
A14. The New York Times, of course, did publish some of the materials Manning gave to 
WikiLeaks, but the paper did not receive the information from Manning directly. Id. 
379 See, e.g., United States v. Batchelor, 22 C.M.R. 144, 157 (C.M.A. 1956). 
380 Id. at 158 (“Article 104(2) of the Code does not require specific criminal intent of any 
sort.”). 
381 Id. at 150. 
382 Id. at 149. 
383 Id. at 156-57. 
384 Id. at 157 (quoting United States v. Doyle, 14 C.M.R. 3, 11 (C.M.A. 1954)). 
385 Id. at 158. 
386 Id. (quoting COLONEL WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 630 
n.78 (2d ed. 1920)). 
387 10 U.S.C. § 904(2) (2012). 
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was not his intent.388 Manning contended that the government must show that 
he intended to give intelligence to the enemy.389 He cited an article 104(1) case 
in which the Court of Military Appeals expressed held that article 104 cannot 
be held to criminalize inadvertent, accidental, or negligent conduct,390 lest a 
crime that carries the death penalty become a strict liability offense.391 The trial 
court rejected this argument, and as a result, the trial focused on whether 
Manning knew or should have known, at the time he made his disclosures, 
whether Al Qaeda read WikiLeaks.392 
The trial court ultimately ruled in favor of Manning on the article 104(2) 
charge, although it did not explain the basis for that decision.393 As with 
constitutional treason, article 104(2) as applied to the indirect communication 
with the enemy raises a number of potential First Amendment “overbreadth 
and vagueness” issues that could have been the basis for the court’s 
decision.394 
3. Espionage Act and Other Criminal Statutes 
At the outset, it is worth noting that Congress has not been able to pass the 
equivalent of an “Official Secrets Act” that would authorize the punishment of 
government insiders for the mere revelation of classification information, 
 
388 Matt Sledge, Bradley Manning Aided the Enemy Because He Knew Al-Qaeda Uses 
the Internet, Prosecutors Charge, HUFFINGTON POST (July 9, 2013, 7:31 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/09/bradley-manning-aiding-the-enemy_n_3543592 
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/K5QT-W263 (“The government’s argument, then, is that 
any member of the military who leaks classified information with the knowledge that it will 
be posted on the Internet is aiding enemies of the United States.”). 
389 Defense Motion to Dismiss the Specification of Charge I for Failure to State an 
Offense at 5-6, United States v. Manning (U.S. Army 1st Jud. Cir. Mar. 29, 2012), archived 
at http://perma.cc/UM6-7JAA (“The intent required is the intent to give the intelligence to 
the enemy.”). 
390 United States v. Olson, 20 C.M.R. 461, 464 (C.M.A. 1955) (“[T]his offense does 
require a general evil intent in order to protect the innocent who may commit some act in 
aiding the enemy inadvertently, accidentally or negligently.”). 
391 Defense Motion to Dismiss the Specification of Charge I for Failure to State an 
Offense, supra note 389, at 6. 
392 See Julie Tate, Judge in Manning Case Declines to Dismiss Key Charge, WASH. POST, 
July 19, 2013, at A4. 
393 Savage, supra note 366, at A1. Because Manning’s lawyers requested specific 
findings only with respect to the charges for which he was found guilty, the judge did not 
explain the basis for acquitting Manning of the article 104(2) charge in the written findings 
she issued after announcing her decision. Special Findings, United States v. Manning (U.S. 
Army 1st Jud. Cir. Aug. 15, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/F5YA-XEKG.  
394 See Bell, supra note 312, at 1031-33, 1039 (arguing, in the parallel context of the 
Treason Clause, that its “overbreadth and vagueness” render it “constitutionally suspect” 
under the First Amendment); see also 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2012) (defining the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice crime of aiding the enemy). 
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regardless of its content, the harm it might have on national security, its value 
to public debate, and the intent of the leaker.395 In vetoing one attempt to pass 
such legislation, President Bill Clinton observed that the law failed to strike the 
appropriate balance between the need to protect national security secrets and 
the need for the free flow of information in a democracy.396 In his veto 
statement, Clinton explained that, “[a]lthough well intentioned, [the bill] is 
overbroad and may unnecessarily chill legitimate activities that are at the heart 
of a democracy.”397 Congress has considered similar legislation many times,398 
but every time these efforts have failed. 
These proposed statutes have been criticized for several reasons. Some 
proposed legislation did not provide a defense for information that had been 
improperly classified, applied even to disclosures to Congress, and threatened 
the press with prosecution for either conspiracy to violate the proposed statute 
or for violating separation provisions criminalizing the failure to return 
national security information to the government.399 Furthermore, some 
commentators regarded the legislation as inherently suspicious because many 
high-level government officials leak information as part of their “news 
management” efforts.400 Critics have expressed concern that such legislation 
could undermine the important dialogue between government officials and the 
media about national security issues, and could also discourage whistleblowers 
and stifle public debate on important government issues.401 Most likely such 
sweeping legislation would actually do little to stop unauthorized leaks by top 
administration officials, and would instead chill only the lower-level 
whistleblowing employees.402 In addition, just because information is 
classified does not mean that it has been classified properly, nor does it mean 
that the information has been kept secret from the American public.403 
 
395 Papandrea, supra note 3, at 262-63.  
396 H.R. DOC. NO. 106-309, at 1-2 (2000). 
397 Id. at 1. 
398 Press Release, Sunshine in Gov’t Initiative, Bond Legislation Would Create an 
“Official Secrets Act” and Would Shield Information from the Public About Its Government 
(Sept. 14, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/JSF2-FK93. 
399 See, e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, Reform of Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics and 
Prospects, 1977 DUKE L.J. 171, 197-99. 
400 Id. at 199 (“Suspicion of the ‘Official Secrets Act’ was further intensified by common 
knowledge that intentional leaks relating to vital elements of international policy and 
security are a common feature of ‘news management’ by the highest executive officers.”). 
401 See, e.g., Press Release, Sunshine in Gov’t Initiative, supra note 398. 
402 Letter from John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Honorable J. Dennis Hastert, 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 20, 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
YUL6-YN8V (“The extent to which such a provision would yield any practical additional 
benefits to the government in terms of improving our ability to identify those who engage in 
unauthorized disclosures of classified information or deterring such activity is unclear, 
however.”). 
403 See Fiona Morgan, The Case for Leaks, SALON (Nov. 1, 2000, 9:16 PM), http://www. 
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Despite the repeated defeat of proposals to adopt the equivalent of an 
“Official Secrets Act” here in the United States, the existing criminal statutes 
give DOJ sufficient means for prosecuting unauthorized leaks. Indeed, 
government officials testifying before Congress have repeatedly said that the 
problem with prosecuting leakers does not lie in a lack of criminal statutes 
penalizing the disclosure of national security information.404 Although the 
name of the Espionage Act might suggest that it is limited to spies, the plain 
language of the statute and its legislative history reveal that it is not so 
limited.405 
Classic espionage is covered in 18 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b). Section 794(a) 
prohibits the transmission of documents or information relating to the national 
defense to “any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or 
naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by 
the United States, or to any representative . . . thereof,” provided that the 
defendant acted “with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the 
injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation.”406 Section 
794(b), applicable only in times of war and to a limited set of disclosures, also 
covers what is typically regarded as espionage, though direct contact with a 
foreign entity or its agent is not required.407 It applies to anyone who, “with 
intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, collects, records, 
publishes, or communicates, or attempts to elicit any information” regarding 
military operations or defenses.408 Violators of § 794(a) and (b) can be 
sentenced to life in prison or even death.409 The government has not indicted 
any leakers under § 794. 
Leakers are commonly charged under § 793(d) of the Espionage Act, which 
applies to those with authorized possession of national security information. 
This provision prohibits the “willful” communication of national security 
documents and information “to any person not entitled to receive it” – which 
most scholars have interpreted to include the press.410 There is some debate 
about the scienter requirements for this statute. In criminal law, “willful” intent 
simply requires that the defendant act with knowledge that his conduct was 
unlawful; this requirement is met in most leak cases. Another portion of the 
statute, however, requires that the defendant had “reason to believe [the 
 
salon.com/2000/11/02/security_3, archived at http://perma.cc/X36T-HKD9. 
404 See, e.g., Letter from John Ashcroft to J. Dennis Hastert, supra note 402, at 3. 
405 See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1063-64 (4th Cir. 1988). 
406 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). 
407 Id. § 794(b). 
408 Id. 
409 Id. § 794(a)-(b) (providing that violations under either of these sections “shall be 
punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life”). 
410 See, e.g., Morison, 844 F.2d at 1064-70 (concluding that § 793(d) applies to 
disclosures to the press). Morison relied on the classification system in its holding that this 
requirement was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1075. 
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disclosed information] could be used to the injury of the United States or to the 
advantage of any foreign nation.”411 There is some debate whether this 
provision modifies only “information,” which precedes the phrase, or all the 
documents listed earlier in the statute.412 The Act does not require that the 
disclosure harm the nation; it can be sufficient if the disclosure potentially 
benefits a foreign nation, whether friend or foe.413 The leaker’s intent to 
contribute to the public debate is irrelevant.414 The statute provides for a 
punishment of a fine and/or ten years of imprisonment.415 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the term “national defense” in the 
context of the Espionage Act statutes “is a generic concept of broad 
connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related 
activities of national preparedness.”416 Most courts interpreting §§ 793 and 794 
– both of which prohibit the disclosure of “information relating to the national 
defense” – have limited the sections’ applicability to information that was 
closely held and whose disclosure was “potentially damaging to the United 
States or might be useful to the enemy.”417 A recent district court decision 
relying on the plain language of the statute held that even this minimal 
showing was not required.418 Those courts that have required a showing of 
 
411 18 U.S.C. § 793(d). 
412 See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 625-27 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 557 
F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting vagueness and duplicity arguments pertaining to the 
requirement that the defendant had “reason to believe [the disclosed information] could be 
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation,” because 
the requirement pertains specifically to “intangible” information in a qualitative sense, 
compared to the physical or tangible nature of the information itself (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
413 See Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071-74 (holding that because “the defendant . . . knew that 
he was dealing with national defense materials” potentially advantageous to foreign 
governments, the scienter requirement of willfulness was met). 
414 Id. at 1063 (affirming the conviction of a defendant who provided stolen classified 
information about explosions in Russia and intelligence photographs to a publication from 
which he was seeking full-time employment because “[t]he language of the . . . statute[] 
declare[s] no exemption in favor of one who leaks to the press”). 
415 18 U.S.C. § 793 (“Whoever [violates a provision of this title] [s]hall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”); id. § 3571. 
416 Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941). 
417 See, e.g., Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 621 (“The second judicially imposed limitation on 
the phrase ‘information relating to the national defense’ is the requirement that its 
‘disclosure would be potentially damaging to the United States or useful to an enemy of the 
United States.’” (quoting Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071-72)).  
418 Memorandum Opinion Granting in Part Defendant’s Third Motion to Compel at 9-10, 
United States v. Kim, Criminal No. 10-255 (CKK) (D.D.C. May 30, 2013), archived at http 
://perma.cc/9EJ4-PM7K (“[T]he Court declines to construe section 793(d) to require the 
Government to show that the disclosure of the information would be potentially damaging 
to the United States or might be useful to an enemy of the United States in order to satisfy 
the statutory requirement that the information relate to the ‘national defense.’”). 
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potential harm have explained that “[t]his important requirement is implicit in 
the purpose of the statute and assures that the government cannot abuse the 
statute by penalizing citizens for discussing information the government has no 
compelling reason to keep confidential.”419 Classification is neither required 
nor sufficient to support the prosecution’s showing that the revealed 
information was potentially damaging.420 
Other provisions of the Espionage Act restrict the disclosure of more 
specific categories of information. For example, § 798 bans the dissemination 
of “classified information . . . concerning the communication intelligence 
activities of the United States.”421 This statute does not require any showing of 
harm or “intent or reason to believe” any such harm or benefit to a foreign 
power would result. The Atomic Energy Act permits government insiders to be 
prosecuted for communicating “Restricted Data” to anyone not authorized to 
receive it, as long as they did so “knowing or having reason to believe” that the 
information was restricted data.422 Former CIA operative John Kiriakou 
pleaded guilty to violating the Intelligence Identities Protection Act,423 which 
prohibits someone with authorized access to classified information identifying 
a covert agent from intentionally revealing that information to anyone not 
entitled to receive it.424 Leakers have also been charged under 18 U.S.C. § 641, 
which imposes criminal liability for the theft, conveyance, or sale of 
government property.425 This provision also does not require any showing of 
harm to the United States or any consideration of the public interest.426 In 
2002, a government employee pled guilty to charges under this statute after he 
sold confidential but unclassified information to a London newspaper.427 The 
government has also charged government insiders under this law – including 
Daniel Ellsberg – even when they have not received any pecuniary benefits.428 
Another useful provision for leak prosecutions is the Computer Fraud and 
 
419 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
420 See, e.g., id. at 623.  
421 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2012). 
422 42 U.S.C. § 2277 (2006). “Restricted Data” is statutorily defined as “all data 
concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of 
special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of 
energy.” Id. § 2014(y). 
423 Charlie Savage, Former CIA Operative Pleads Guilty in Leak of Colleague’s Name, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2012, at A16. 
424 50 U.S.C. § 421(a)-(b) (2006). 
425 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2012).  
426 See id. § 641; see also United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1076-77 (4th Cir. 
1988). 
427 Ashcroft v. Randel, 391 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 (2005); Rebecca Daugherty & Gil 
Shochat, DEA Analyst Given One-Year Jail Sentence for Leaking Unclassified Information, 
NEWS MEDIA & L., Winter 2003, at 25. 
428 Melville Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left 
Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311, 315-24 (1974). 
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Abuse Act, the broadest provision of which punishes whoever “intentionally . . 
. exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any 
protected computer.”429 
The government has also used other criminal law provisions against 
government insiders who disclosed national security information without 
authorization. Some of these charges are based on the mishandling of sensitive 
government information. Another possibility is to charge the government 
insider with obstruction of justice,430 perjury,431 or the making of false 
statements432 during a leak investigation. These statutes are available even if it 
is ultimately determined that no underlying criminal activity took place. The 
prosecution and conviction of Scooter Libby is a high-profile example of a 
case in which the government relied on § 1001.433 In that case, the government 
ultimately decided not to pursue charges under the Intelligence Identities 
Protection Act because it could not prove all of the elements of that crime.434 
III. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INSIDERS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Commentators have generally assumed that the First Amendment offers no 
protection to government insiders who engage in the unauthorized disclosure 
of national security information. Although the Supreme Court has never 
decided whether government insiders have a First Amendment right to disclose 
national security information without authorization, its decisions conceptually 
related to that issue are admittedly not promising. In addition, the only 
appellate court decision to address whether leakers have First Amendment 
rights ruled against the leaker.435 Courts are generally reluctant to interfere 
with the national security decisions of the executive branch, including its 
methods of controlling the flow of information to the public.436 
The Supreme Court has stated that government employees do not enjoy the 
same First Amendment rights as ordinary citizens.437 Although the Court has 
rejected the traditional view that the government can condition the benefit of 
public employment on the relinquishment of First Amendment rights, the 
Court’s jurisprudence in this area has become increasingly less protective of 
employee speech rights in recent years.438 
 
429 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
430 Id. § 1503. 
431 Id. § 1623. 
432 Id. § 1001(a)(2). 
433 Anthony S. Barkow & Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 GA. L. 
REV. 953, 957-65 (2010). 
434 Id. at 961. 
435 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1068, 1080 (4th Cir. 1988). 
436 William Lee, Left out in the Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press 
in Post-9/11 America, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1461 (2007). 
437 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1992). 
438 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423-24 (2006).  
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This Part takes on the various arguments that the First Amendment offers no 
protection to intelligence community insiders who disclose national security 
information. It begins by rebutting the argument that the unauthorized 
dissemination of national security information is not even “speech” under the 
First Amendment and goes on to tackle the claim that the First Amendment 
does not protect those “entrusted” with information. Next, this tackles the 
common argument that government insiders waive their First Amendment 
rights when they sign nondisclosure contracts. After concluding that laws 
restricting the unauthorized disclosures of national security information are 
subject to First Amendment analysis, this Part discusses the Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding national security insiders as well as the rights of 
government employees more generally. It concludes that the Court’s 
jurisprudence does not entirely foreclose the First Amendment claims of 
national security insiders. Instead, any restriction on their expressive activities 
is subject to constitutional scrutiny with due consideration given to the value of 
the speech and the resulting harm.439 
A. Most Leaks Are “Speech” 
The government has repeatedly argued that the dissemination of national 
security information is not speech protected under the First Amendment. It has 
made this this argument with respect to both government insiders and 
outsiders. This argument has had mixed success in the lower courts.440 The 
answer to this question is crucial, because if the speech is not entitled to any 
 
439 William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. 
REV. 107, 114 (1982) (stating that lying on the witness stand might be perjury, but it is still 
speech); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses 
of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1277, 1339 (2005) (arguing that certain types of speech ought to be punished under a 
“crime-facilitating” speech exception to First Amendment protection, and that “courts 
should develop the boundaries [of this exception] by considering the usual First Amendment 
factors – the value of the speech, the harm that it causes, the difficulty of drawing certain 
lines, the risk that punishing some speech will deter other speech, and so on” (citation 
omitted)). 
440 Compare United States v. Kim, No. 10-225, 2011 WL 838160, at *30 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 
2011) (“To the extent that the defendant’s conduct constitutes speech, that speech is wholly 
unprotected by the First Amendment.”), with United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 
629-30 (E.D. Va. 2006) (rejecting the Government’s categorical argument that the 
espionage statutes do not implicate the First Amendment), aff’d, 557 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 
2009). In United States v. Morison, the panel opinion stated “we do not perceive any First 
Amendment rights to be implicated here.” Morison, 844 F.2d at 1068. Two of the three 
judges, however, indicated in their concurring opinions that they simply believed that the 
conviction in that particular case did not offend the First Amendment. See id. at 1081 
(Wilkinson, J., concurring); id. at 1085 (Phillips, J., concurring). 
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First Amendment protection, judicial review is at an end, and the government 
is generally able to restrict that speech as it wishes.441 
The government and commentators have made several arguments why the 
unauthorized disclosure of national security information falls outside of the 
First Amendment: (1) unauthorized disclosures of national security 
information are not speech; (2) government insiders have been entrusted with 
the information and have obligations not to reveal it; (3) relatedly, government 
insiders have contractually waived any First Amendment rights they may have 
possessed; and (4) Garcetti v. Cebellos eliminated First Amendment protection 
for the disclosure of any information obtained on the job. This Section dissects 
each of these arguments. 
1. Unauthorized Disclosures Are Speech 
As Frederick Schauer has observed, “questions about the involvement of the 
First Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequential than are 
issues surrounding the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords 
to the speech to which it applies.”442 Determining whether something that is 
clearly “speech” falls within the scope of the First Amendment remains an 
unresolved and hotly debated issue, even outside of the national security 
context. The Court has held that certain categories of speech – like incitement, 
obscenity, child pornography, commercial speech, defamation, fighting words, 
and true threats – are “speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment but 
receive no protection.443 In the last several decades, the Court has revisited 
some of these categories and held that the First Amendment does in fact 
provide some protection. Commercial speech444 and defamation445 are the two 
most obvious examples of this. It is unclear whether “fighting words” is still a 
viable category of unprotected speech.446 The Court has added child 
pornography447 and true threats448 as categories of unprotected speech, but it 
has rejected the government’s efforts, in the context of “crush” animal videos, 
violent video games, and autobiographical lies, to add additional categories 
based merely on a balancing of the harm and the value of the speech.449 
 
441 But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (holding that the 
government cannot make content-based distinctions within a category of unprotected speech 
unless that distinction rests on the reason the category exists). 
442 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004). 
443 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012). 
444 Va. State Bd. Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
445 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
446 Schauer, supra note 442, at 1777 & n.53. 
447 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
448 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
449 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 123 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011) (rejecting the 
argument that violent video games were not “speech”); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 
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But the Court has failed to recognize First Amendment protection in a wide 
variety of other contexts. Sometimes the Court is explicit. The best example 
comes in the copyright context, where the Court has rejected First Amendment 
challenges to copyright law.450 In other cases, the Court simply does not 
address potential First Amendment defenses,451 or only lower courts have 
addressed whether the First Amendment is applicable. Examples include 
securities regulation,452 as well as antitrust, panhandling, hostile-environment 
sexual harassment, computer source code, conspiracy, criminal solicitation, 
fraud, trademark, and rules of evidence.453 It is important to note that in these 
contexts, it is not that the Court has determined that the speech restriction at 
issue satisfies some level of scrutiny; instead, the government’s actions are 
simply not subject to any First Amendment analysis at all. In other words, at 
least with speech that arguably constitutes incitement, for example, the 
government must demonstrate that the relevant law satisfies the Brandenburg 
test for incitement. In the context of conspiracy, the Court does not apply even 
that lesser level of First Amendment scrutiny.454 
One reason why it is so difficult to tell what the First Amendment covers is 
that the word “speech” is a broad term that covers much of what we do in our 
everyday lives.455 As Justice Holmes once said, “the First Amendment, while 
prohibiting legislation against free speech as such cannot have been, and 
obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of 
language.”456 The Court has never held that “the presence of ‘words’ [is] a 
 
1577, 1585 (2010) (rejecting arguments that “crush” videos were not speech); United States 
v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (rejecting the argument that lies are not speech). 
450 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (dismissing First Amendment 
objections to the Copyright Term Extension Act); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985) (holding that the First Amendment does not require a 
public figure exception to the fair use doctrine); Margot Kaminski, Copyright Crime and 
Punishment: The First Amendment’s Proportionality Problem, 73 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014) (arguing for the consideration of First Amendment concerns through a proportionality 
approach to copyright law); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 169-80 (1998) (arguing for an 
extension of prior restraint principles to intellectual property cases); Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 
(2001) (arguing for First Amendment scrutiny of copyright law). 
451 See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (failing to mention a First 
Amendment objection to a Title VII action even though the argument had been raised in the 
briefs); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1992) (rejecting a First 
Amendment defense to a Title VII action in dicta). 
452 See Symposium, The First Amendment and Federal Securities Regulation, 20 CONN. 
L. REV. 261 (1988). 
453 Schauer, supra note 442, at 1766-77 & n.7, 1783-84. 
454 Id. at 1769-71. 
455 Id. at 1773. 
456 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). 
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‘sufficient condition’ for testing the regulation of [speech] against First 
Amendment standards.”457 
Robert Post has argued that “First Amendment analysis is relevant only 
when the values served by the First Amendment are implicated.”458 
Unfortunately, the Court has not consistently embraced a particular theory of 
the First Amendment. Several different theories for First Amendment 
protection exist, including the marketplace of ideas, self-governance, 
autonomy, toleration, distrust of government, checking government abuse, and 
perhaps others. No single theory, however, can explain the Court’s existing 
jurisprudence. Because these various theories apply in some cases and not 
others, it is hard to use any of these theories to determine definitively what 
speech is “in” and what speech is “out.”459 
Despite the uncertainty regarding how to determine what counts as “speech” 
for First Amendment purposes, it is possible that the speech involved in 
traditional espionage is not speech that the First Amendment protects.460 If one 
analyzes the various theories supporting the protection of speech under the 
First Amendment, it is hard to see how espionage fits in. Traditional espionage 
involves the secret exchange of information; accordingly, by definition, it does 
not contribute to the marketplace of ideas and cannot be said to promote self-
government and deliberation.461 Although the Court has been reluctant to 
create new categories of unprotected expression,462 it is quite possible that 
espionage has a sufficient historical pedigree to justify the Court’s recognition 
of espionage as unprotected speech. 
Even if espionage is a category of unprotected expression, however, a 
precise definition of that category is essential. Not all speech secretly 
communicated to a foreign power or hostile entity is espionage, particularly if 
it is information already in the public domain.463 Furthermore, as one federal 
court of appeals has recognized, not all national security information 
communicated to a foreign power or hostile entity poses harm to the national 
security interests of the United States.464 In addition, one hallmark of 
 
457 Schauer, supra note 442, at 1777. 
458 Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255 
(1995). 
459 Schauer, supra note 442, at 1784-87. 
460 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 591 (2d Cir. 1952) (“The communication 
to a foreign government of secret material connected with the national defense can by no 
far-fetched reasoning be included within the area of First-Amendment protected free 
speech.”). 
461 See Thomas Emerson, National Security and Civil Liberties, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. 
ORD. 78, 87-88 (1982). 
462 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-72 (2010) (refusing to 
recognize “depictions of animal cruelty” as a category of unprotected speech). 
463 See Gorin v. United States, 32 U.S. 19 (1941) (holding that the Espionage Act did not 
apply to information that the military had made public). 
464 United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 815-17 (2d Cir. 1945) (expressing concern that 
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espionage is that the information is disseminated with the intent of reaching the 
foreign power rather than the American public.465 
National security information is generally core political speech, and like 
other kinds of political speech, it can make a valuable contribution to the 
public debate.466 National security information is a category that is virtually 
without limits and hard to distinguish from information pertaining to the 
general welfare.467 Certainly the fact that some government official has 
classified a document as “secret” should not end all First Amendment inquiry 
and render the courts “powerless to go beyond such legislative or 
administrative action.”468 
As Thomas Emerson has argued, “the existence of a national security 
interest does not in and of itself justify alteration of constitutional principles, 
but is merely one factor in the application of constitutional principle.”469 
Instead, “the focus turns not toward a general definition of national security but 
toward an examination of the specific national security factors involved in the 
particular situation.”470 Indeed, the Pentagon Papers case indicates that the 
government’s attempts to control the dissemination of national security 
information are subject to First Amendment analysis.471 Although that case 
involved a prior restraint and not subsequent criminal punishment, even the 
dissenting Justices who argued for a sharply limited judicial role regarding the 
executive’s national security decisions did not argue that restrictions on the 
dissemination of national security information are immune from First 
Amendment scrutiny. 
 
statutes prohibiting the disclosure of information “advantageous to a foreign nation,” even if 
not harmful to the United States, sweep too broadly, stating, “so drastic a repression of the 
free exchange of any information it is wise carefully to scrutinize, lest extravagant and 
absurd consequences result”). 
465 Professor Emerson has argued that essential to any definition of espionage as a 
category of unprotected expression is also a requirement that “the government prove that the 
person making the communication has done so with the primary intent that the information 
be used by the foreign power to the injury of our national defense.” Emerson, supra note 
461, at 88. As discussed in Part II, requiring some sort of intent that the information would 
be used to injure our national defense might narrow the definition of espionage. 
466 Compare Bruce Methven, Comment, First Amendment Standards for Subsequent 
Punishment of Dissemination of Confidential Government Information, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 
83, 86-87 (1980) (arguing that there is a distinction between “pure political speech,” which 
is entitled to robust First Amendment protection, and leaks of national security information, 
which are entitled to some lesser amount of protection). 
467 See Emerson, supra note 461, at 78-79 (discussing broad and narrow conceptions of 
national security). 
468 Nimmer, supra note 428, at 328. 
469 Emerson, supra note 461, at 79. 
470 Id. 
471 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
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2. Professional Duty 
The government’s argument that the unauthorized dissemination of national 
security information falls completely outside of the First Amendment has little 
merit. Much weightier is the government’s argument that the First Amendment 
does not apply to government insiders because they have been entrusted with 
that information and have a professional obligation not to disclose it.472 
In support of its argument, the government often relies on language in 
various appellate and Supreme Court decisions stating that one who is 
entrusted with information has no First Amendment right to disseminate it. 
One frequently cited473 case is United States v. Aguilar,474 where the Supreme 
Court upheld the conviction of a federal judge who revealed the contents of a 
wiretapping application475 based on the principle that “those who accept 
positions of trust involving a duty not to disclose information they lawfully 
acquire while performing their responsibilities have no First Amendment right 
to disclose that information.”476 
A closer reading of Aguilar reveals, however, that the judge in that case was 
not convicted simply of passing along information about a wiretap, but rather 
was convicted under a specific statute applicable only when someone gives 
notice or attempts to give notice about an authorized wiretap warrant “in order 
to obstruct, impede, or prevent [the] interception.”477 In other words, this 
statute requires that someone have the specific intent to interfere with an 
authorized wiretap – it does not impose a general duty of nondisclosure.478 
Furthermore, it is not hard to see how such a statute would satisfy strict 
scrutiny; indeed, Aguilar concluded that “the Government’s interest is quite 
sufficient to justify the construction of the statute as written, without any 
artificial narrowing because of First Amendment concerns.”479 
To be sure, Aguilar’s constitutional analysis is not the model of clarity. The 
majority opinion also states without qualification that “[g]overnment officials 
 
472 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 4, at 1461 (concluding that government insiders’ duty of 
nondisclosure prevents courts from recognizing the First Amendment rights of leakers); 
Edward Xanders, A Handyman’s Guide to Fixing National Security Leaks: An Analytical 
Framework for Evaluating Proposals to Curb Unauthorized Publication of Classified 
Information, 5 J.L. & POL. 759, 800 (1989) (arguing that it is “morally justifiable” to require 
government employees to keep secrets “in light of the special nature of their positions”). 
473 See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d 44, 57 (D.D.C. 2011); Wilson v. CIA, 
586 F.3d 171, 183 (2d Cir. 2009). 
474 515 U.S. 593 (1995). 
475 Id. 
476 Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 579 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
477 18 U.S.C. § 2232(d) (2012). 
478 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 603; see also Boehner, 484 F.3d at 588-90 (Sentelle, J., 
dissenting) (noting the limits of Aguilar). 
479 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 606. 
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in sensitive confidential positions may have special duties of nondisclosure.”480 
To support this point, the Court cites Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
6(e),481 which prohibits the disclosure of grand jury information, and Seattle 
Times v. Rhinehart,482 which upheld the imposition of protective orders 
preventing attorneys from disseminating information obtained during civil 
discovery.483 The Court could have also cited Cohen v. Cowles, which upheld 
the breach of contract claim of a source whose identity was revealed.484 
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit relied on the foregoing cases in Boehner v. 
McDermott, where it stated categorically that “those who accept positions of 
trust involving a duty not to disclose information they lawfully acquire while 
performing their responsibilities have no First Amendment right to disclose 
that information.”485 But none of these cases rests on the categorical 
assumption that the speech at issue was not “speech” within the meaning of the 
First Amendment; instead, the holdings were limited to the particular claims at 
issue in those cases.486 
The Court’s recent decision in United States v. Alvarez487 supports the 
argument that determining whether speech falls outside the protections of the 
First Amendment is a highly context-specific inquiry.488 The Court recognized 
that some false speech – like perjury – is not protected under the First 
Amendment, but rejected the government’s argument that it therefore followed 
that all false speech was outside of the First Amendment.489 Instead, certain 
false statements are unprotected because of the context in which they occur.490 
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer also emphasized the importance of context 
in distinguishing between protected and unprotected speech.491 The same can 
be said with regard to the dissemination of national security information. First 





482 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984). 
483 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 606. 
484 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991). 
485 Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 579 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
486 See id. at 588 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
487 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
488 Id. at 2539-40 (plurality opinion). 
489 Id. at 2545-46. 
490 Id. at 2546 (explaining that the fact that certain types of falsehoods are unprotected 
“does not lead to the broader proposition that false statements are unprotected when made to 
any person, at any time, in any context”). 
491 Id. at 2553-54 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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3. Limits of Contractual Waiver Argument 
One of the biggest obstacles facing government insiders who engage in the 
unauthorized dissemination of national security information is that they have 
signed nondisclosure agreements that arguably amount to a waiver of rights 
they might have otherwise enjoyed to disclose information. Although the trust 
relationship between the government and its employees does support some 
restrictions on the dissemination of information obtained as a result of that 
relationship, it is essential to recognize that “contracts are not enforced simply 
because they are made.”492 As a matter of contract law, confidentiality 
agreements cannot be enforced when they violate public policy.493 As a result, 
the existence of these contracts should not be regarded as an absolute bar to 
any First Amendment claim a government insider might make. 
Since 1983, all government employees and contractors with access to 
national security information have been required to sign nondisclosure 
agreements.494 These agreements provide that the government insider will not 
disclose classified information to anyone unauthorized to receive it and will 
submit to the government for prepublication review any communications they 
plan to make to the public, including speeches, articles, and books, including 
works of fiction.495 The purpose of requiring employees to sign confidentiality 
contracts is to promote employee awareness of their duty to keep information 
secret and to reduce the chances of inadvertent disclosure.496 Before obtaining 
access to classified information, government employees are also required to 
receive training on “basic security policies, principles, practices, and criminal, 
civil, and administrative penalties.”497 
The government is not alone in requiring its employees to sign 
nondisclosure agreements. Indeed, such agreements are very common in the 
private sector and are used for a variety of reasons.498 On their face, these 
agreements apply regardless of the purpose for which an unauthorized 
disclosure is made.499 In most cases, confidentiality agreements serve the 
public interest, as they prevent the disclosure of sensitive private, financial, or 
government information, protect valuable trade secrets, encourage the sharing 
 
492 Medow, supra note 4, at 811-12. 
493 Perricone v. Perricone, 972 A.2d 666, 685 (Conn. 2009). 
494 National Security Decision Directive 84 (1983), archived at http://perma.cc/8JAS-V5 
XS. 
495 Dep’t of Def., Form 1847-1, Sensitive Compartmented Information Nondisclosure 
Statement (1991) (illustrating the terms of an agreement that government employees sign 
regarding their access to confidential government information). 
496 Timothy Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 151, 157 (1998). 
497 32 C.F.R. § 2001.71(b) (2013). 
498 See Garfield, supra note 15, at 268-74. 
499 Id. at 302-03 (explaining that the law rejects arguments that contend that the 
protection of trade secrets harms public and commercial interests). 
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of information, and in the case of settlement agreements, promote dispute 
resolution.500 In some instances, however, nondisclosure agreements can 
suppress the sharing of newsworthy information about public health and safety 
as well as the conduct of important public figures and public officials.501 It 
would be a mistake to declare, as did the trial court in Cohen v. Cowles Media 
Co., that “[t]his is not a case about free speech, rather it is one about 
contracts.”502 
The enforceability of confidentiality agreements received significant 
scholarly attention in the 1990s after Jeffrey Wigand, a former vice president 
for research and development at Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
revealed that top executives had knowingly approved the use of addictive 
additives in their products.503 Right before 60 Minutes was about to air an 
interview with whistleblower Wigand, CBS withdrew the segment because the 
tobacco company had threatened to sue the station for tortious interference 
with a contract.504 Soon thereafter, confidentiality agreements were under 
attack in a number of other high-profile cases. For example, in 1996, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) successfully voided a 
company’s settlement agreements with current and former employees on 
grounds that the agreements undermined the Commission’s ability to conduct 
investigations, two of which involved allegations of class-wide sexual 
harassment.505 
Confidentiality agreements are not automatically enforceable. Although the 
precise inquiry can vary from state to state, many states permit the 
enforceability of confidentiality agreements only when they are 
“reasonable.”506 One factor that states frequently consider as part of the 
“reasonableness” inquiry is whether the agreements are more restrictive than 
necessary.507 For example, courts have routinely held that nondisclosure 
agreements are unenforceable when they preclude the use of information 
 
500 Id. at 275. 
501 Id. 
502 14 Med. L. Rep. 1460, 1464 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1987). 
503 See, e.g., Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 496, at 151-52; Garfield, supra note 15, at 
264-65; Brian Stryker Weinstein, In Defense of Jeffrey Wigand: A First Amendment 
Challenge to the Enforcement of Employee Confidentiality Agreements, 49 S.C. L. REV. 129, 
131 (1997). Some scholars have argued that in such circumstances, the contracts are 
unenforceable either because they violate public policy or because they violate the First 
Amendment (or both). See, e.g., Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality 
Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 707-08 (1999) (arguing in favor 
of a public policy exception to confidentiality agreements); Weinstein, supra (arguing for 
First Amendment protection for whistleblowers). 
504 Marie Brenner, The Man Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR, May 1996, at 170. 
505 See EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., 929 F. Supp. 512 (D. Mass. 1996), modified, 94 F.3d 738 
(1st Cir. 1996). 
506 Bast, supra note 503, at 639-44. 
507 Id. 
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already publically available.508 These cases typically arise in the context of 
trade secret litigation when a court denies enforcement of a contract because 
the information at issue does not qualify as a trade secret.509 In the national 
security arena, the analogous situation would arise if the government tried to 
enforce a contract to protect information that is not closely held. The contract 
might also be unenforceable if the information does not pose any harm to 
national security.510 
Another method of attacking the validity of a nondisclosure agreement is to 
argue that its enforcement is against public policy. The Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts section 178(1) provides that a contract is “unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the 
interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a 
public policy against the enforcement.”511 Under this balancing approach, the 
scope of the public policy exception is unclear; it can also lead to varied results 
over time as community mores change.512 Although courts sometimes express 
reservations about the public policy exception “of indefinite and uncertain 
definition,”513 they nevertheless have frequently refused to enforce a wide 
variety of contracts on public policy grounds based on their own view of right 
and wrong.514  
Analogizing national security secrets to trade secrets does not support the 
argument that the government has unlimited power to punish government 
insiders. Trade secret law is also subject to exceptions for the public interest. 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act recognizes that “exceptional circumstances” 
may protect the disclosure of trade secrets despite the potential harm to the 
 
508 See, e.g., Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 238 S.E.2d 368, 369-70 (Ga. 1977) (“This 
nondisclosure covenant is overly broad and unreasonable in that it would prohibit disclosure 
of information not needed for the protection of the employer’s legitimate business 
interests.”); Cherne Indus. v. Grounds & Assoc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 90 (Minn. 1979) 
(“[M]atters of general knowledge within the industry may not be classified as trade secrets 
or confidential information entitled to protection.” (quoting Whitmyer Bros. v. Doyle, 274 
A.2d 577, 581 (N.J. 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
509 See, e.g., Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 90; Nasco, 238 S.E.2d at 369-70.  
510 See, e.g., Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of U.S. Trade Representative, 845 F. 
Supp. 2d 252, 256 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 718 F.3d 899 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
511 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981). 
512 Garfield, supra note 15, at 294, 298; see also Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. 
Rep. 294 (C.P.); 2 Bing. 229 (describing the public policy exception as “a very unruly horse, 
and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you”). 
513 In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 779 (Iowa 2003). 
514 See, e.g., Verduzco v. Gen. Dynamics, 742 F. Supp. 559, 560-61 (S.D. Cal. 1990) 
(applying a public policy exception “not based on or derived from a statute” in a case in 
which an employee reported to his defense contractor employer that security was so lax it 
compromised national security, and citing “general societal concerns” for the health, safety, 
and welfare of its citizens); 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§§ 12.2-.3 (4th ed. 2009). 
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trade secret owner; these “exceptional circumstances include the existence of 
an overriding public interest.”515 Trade secret law also recognizes a privilege to 
disclose trade secrets “in connection with disclosure of information that is 
relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, or to 
other matters of substantial public concern.”516 If a company claimed that the 
use of a certain chemical to manufacture a product was a trade secret, but that 
chemical was toxic, trade secret law would not protect that information.517 
Other areas of the law also recognize exceptions to the duty of 
confidentiality. Although attorneys are generally required to refrain from 
disclosing a client’s confidences relating to the attorney’s representation of that 
client, the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct permit attorneys to break that confidence in a number of 
circumstances.518 One exception permits attorneys to breach a client’s 
confidence when the lawyer “reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent 
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”519 All jurisdictions have 
adopted some form of this exception, and some jurisdictions make these sorts 
of disclosures mandatory.520 As an example of what the Model Rule 
encompasses, the annotations state that an attorney can tell the authorities 
when a client has accidentally released toxic waste into a town’s water supply 
and there is a substantial risk those who drink the water will “contract a life-
threatening or debilitating disease.”521 Another exception in ABA Model Rule 
1.6 permits lawyers to make disclosures when necessary “to prevent the client 
from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another,”522 or “to 
prevent, mitigate or rectify” such injury when the client has used or is using the 
lawyer’s services in furtherance of the crime or fraud.523 These exceptions to 
the attorney-client privilege demonstrate that other important privileges have 
exceptions to the usual confidentiality requirements when necessary to serve 
the public interest. 
The government is not entitled to condition federal employment as it 
pleases. The Fourth Circuit has held that “the First Amendment limits the 
 
515 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(b) cmt. background (1985). 
516 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1993). 
517 Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the 
First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 788 (2007). 
518 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2013). 
519 Id. 
520 Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 1-20. The precise scope of the exceptions to the attorney confidentiality 
rules varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For a helpful chart setting forth these 
differences, see JOHN DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & 
STATUTES 108-15 (2011-12 ed.). 
521 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b), cmt. 6. 
522 Id. R. 1.6(b)(2). 
523 Id. R. 1.6(b)(3). 
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extent to which the United States, contractually or otherwise, may impose 
secrecy requirements upon its employees and enforce them with a system of 
prior censorship.”524 Indeed, the Court’s decisions in the public employment 
area suggest the same thing. The Court has never held that a law restricting the 
First Amendment rights of government employees passes constitutional muster 
simply because those employees took their positions with full knowledge of 
the restrictions those laws imposed.525 As Thomas Emerson has argued, these 
contracts “must be viewed in First Amendment terms, not private contract 
terms.”526 Whether a restriction takes the form of a contract or a statute, the 
government’s actions must still survive constitutional scrutiny. As a result, the 
Court has struck down laws that required government employees to take an 
oath regarding their political affiliation,527 or that forbade expressions of 
hostility528 or criticism of the government’s policies;529 it has also invalidated 
laws that banned honoraria for expression outside of work.530 
Certainly some restrictions on the ability of government insiders to 
disseminate sensitive information are important for the proper functioning of 
the government’s national security mission. At the same time, simply stating 
that secrecy and loyalty are important in the context of national security does 
not answer the question of whether these restrictions are constitutional. 
Furthermore, as discussed more fully below, it is hardly clear that the 
government can impose criminal penalties on those who violate a condition of 
employment. Although, as a general matter, the government – like a private 
employer – has good reasons for wanting its employees to keep its secrets, the 
trust relationship does not justify restricting the ability of employees to reveal 
wrongdoing or information that poses no harm to the nation’s interests. 
4. First Amendment Rights of Public Employees Generally 
The Supreme Court has accepted the government’s argument that the 
ordinary rules of the First Amendment do not apply to government 
 
524 United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 (4th Cir. 1972). 
525 See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477 (1995); 
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 (1973); 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1966); see 
also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 n.13 (1967) (plurality opinion). 
526 See Emerson, supra note 461, at 97. 
527 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 609-10; Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952). 
528 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 309 (1987) (holding that the State’s purported 
interest in discharging a federal employee who made disparaging remarks about government 
officials did not warrant the violation of the discharged employee’s First Amendment 
rights). 
529 Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979); Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). 
530 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 454. 
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employees.531 For decades, courts commonly understood that the First 
Amendment placed no restrictions on the ability of the government to 
discipline its employees based on their expressive activities.532 The basis for 
this understanding was a rights/privilege distinction; in other words, the 
argument ran, being a public employee is a privilege, not a right, and the 
government is free to condition the exercise of that privilege on the 
relinquishment of constitutional rights.533 As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously 
said, “[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has 
no constitutional right to be a policeman.”534 
Over time, the Court’s reliance on the rights/privilege distinction 
diminished, and the Court instead required any restrictions on the free speech 
rights of public employees to pass constitutional scrutiny.535 In its landmark 
1968 decision in Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that 
the First Amendment provides some protection for the free speech rights of 
public employees to make statements regarding matters of public concern, 
even when the statements involve the subject matter of their employment and 
are critical of their ultimate supervisors.536 The Court recognized that the 
government “has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its 
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with 
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”537 At the same time, the 
Court observed, “free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by 
the electorate,” and government employees often are the ones “most likely to 
have informed and definite opinions” about matters of public concern relating 
to their employment.538 To reconcile these competing interests, the Court set 
up a balancing test for determining whether the employee’s constitutional 
rights had been violated. This test requires a “balance between the interests of 
the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern 
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees.”539 
 
531 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that the First 
Amendment only protects speech of government employees when they are speaking as 
private citizens, not when they are speaking pursuant to their official duties). 
532 See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in 
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1439-40 (1968). 
533 Id. 
534 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
535 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1973) (holding that it was well settled 
that government employment could not be denied or penalized “on a basis that infringes [the 
employee’s] constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of 
speech”). 
536 391 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1968). 
537 Id. at 568. 
538 Id. at 571-72. 
539 Id. at 568. 
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Despite broad statements in the opinion about the valuable contributions 
government employees can make to debates on public issues, the Court was 
careful to limit its holding to the facts. The case offers little direct guidance 
regarding the First Amendment rights of government employees who leak 
national security information. Indeed, the Court may have had national security 
leakers in mind when it noted that “[i]t is possible to conceive of some 
positions in public employment in which the need for confidentiality is so great 
that even completely correct public statements might furnish a permissible 
ground for dismissal.”540 
Since Pickering, the Court has chipped away at the First Amendment 
protections government employees enjoy. Most significantly,541 in Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, the Court held that the First Amendment offers public employees no 
protection when they are speaking pursuant to their “official duties.”542 It did 
not address what counts as speaking pursuant to official employment duties, 
and brushed aside Justice Souter’s concerns that “one response to the Court’s 
holding will be moves by government employers to expand stated job 
descriptions to include more official duties and so exclude even some currently 
protectable speech from First Amendment purview.”543 Justice Kennedy 
simply stated that the job description would not be dispositive and that, 
instead, courts would conduct a practical inquiry in each case to determine job 
duties.544 Unsurprisingly, lower courts have struggled to determine the scope 
of plaintiffs’ job duties.545 Some have held that raising concerns about the 
workplace is an element of an employee’s job duties, even if making such 
complaints was not expressly part of the job description.546 First Amendment 
 
540 Id. at 570 n.3. 
541 In Connick v. Meyers, the Court declared that public employees have to demonstrate 
as a threshold matter that their speech involved “a matter of public concern.” 461 U.S. 138, 
146 (1983). Although there certainly could be some national security disclosures that would 
fail the public concern inquiry, the public concern requirement will not stand as a significant 
barrier in the majority of cases. 
542 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
543 Id. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
544 Id. at 424-25. 
545 See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines: Garcetti v. 
Ceballos in the Federal Appellate Courts, 262 EDUC. L. REP. 357 (2011); Christine Elzer, 
The “Official Duties” Puzzle: Lower Courts’ Struggle with First Amendment Protection for 
Public Employees After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 367 (2007). 
546 See, e.g., Huppert v. City of Pittsburgh, 574 F.3d 696, 706-07 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting the First Amendment claim of a police officer because he acted within his broader 
duties as a law enforcement officer when he cooperated in an undisclosed manner with the 
FBI); Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating that reporting 
misconduct through chain of command lacks First Amendment protection under Garcetti); 
Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570-72 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the First Amendment 
claim of a police officer who was forced to resign after he reported the misconduct of other 
officers to his superiors). 
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claims brought by employees who have made statements adverse to the 
government in the course of performing their job duties have not fared well in 
the lower courts.547 
In Garcetti, Justice Kennedy writes that government employees have no 
First Amendment rights with respect to speech “that owes its existence to a 
public employee’s professional responsibilities.”548 Professor Stephen Vladeck 
relies on this language to argue that national security employees must have no 
First Amendment right to share confidential information because they would 
not have access to this information but for their employment.549 In addition, 
Vladeck comments, the majority appeared willing to leave whistleblower 
protections to the whim of legislatures who could pass statutory protections.550 
Vladeck’s interpretation of Garcetti goes too far.551 In Garcetti, the Court 
attempted to draw a line between speech “as an employee” and speech “as a 
citizen.”552 It would not make a lot of sense to say that a public employee 
speaks “as an employee” every time he says something that he learned through 
work. In determining what an employee’s official duties are, Kennedy 
explained that “the proper inquiry is a practical one” that should focus on “the 
duties an employee actually is expected to perform.”553 The appropriate 
inquiry, then, is not whether an employee reveals information he obtained on 
the job in the course of performing his job, but whether his job duties required 
him to disclose information. The Supreme Court may soon decide whether 
Vladeck or I have the better argument on how to interpret the scope of 
Garcetti.554 
 
547 See, e.g., Green v. Barrett, 226 Fed. App’x 883, 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
there is no First Amendment protection for court testimony given pursuant to official job 
duties). 
548 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22. 
549 Vladeck, supra note 256, at 1540; see also Jamie Sasser, Silenced Citizens: The Post-
Garcetti Landscape for Public Sector Employees Working in National Security, 41 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 759, 760 (2007) (arguing that Garcetti bars any First Amendment claim a 
government employee might make with respect to the unauthorized disclosure of national 
security information). 
550 Vladeck, supra note 256, at 1541. 
551 See Kitrosser, supra note 13, at 3 (discussing how Garcetti has been misinterpreted to 
apply more broadly than it really does in limiting protection of free speech); Morse, supra 
note 12, at 430 (arguing that Garcetti does not undermine the right of national security 
employees to engage in whistleblowing). 
552 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (explaining that the respondent acted as a federal employee, 
and not as a citizen, when “conducting his daily professional activities, such as supervising 
attorneys, investigating charges, and preparing filings”). 
553 Id. at 424-25. 
554 Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, No. 
13-483, 2013 WL 5675531 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2014) (granting cert on the question of whether a 
government employee who gave truthful testimony pursuant to a subpoena about 
information he learned on his job is entitled to any First Amendment protection). 
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To be sure, Garcetti has had a “catastrophic” effect on the free speech rights 
of public employees.555 Although the Court couched this new rule in the notion 
that it would make the government more accountable, it actually has the 
opposite effect.556 Garcetti has served to strip many government employee-
whistleblowers of First Amendment protection for their speech.557 But this is 
only because, in those cases, whistleblowing is an expected part of the 
employees’ positions. And I agree that in cases involving high-level 
government employees who are encouraged to reveal national security 
information, the employees might have a harder time arguing that these 
disclosures are not an expected part of their job.558 If a government employee 
gives information to the media as part of a coordinated public relations 
campaign – as some critics claim occurred with leaks during the election about 
President Obama’s role in authorizing drone attacks – there is a decent 
argument that Garcetti would bar any First Amendment claim.559 But that is 
because the leaks were arguably made as part of the employee’s employment 
duties. None of the leak prosecutions to date appear to have involved that sort 
of situation. If anything, the job duties of the prosecuted leakers required them 
not to disclose information without authorization. 
Furthermore, Vladeck’s reading of Garcetti would strip the First 
Amendment protections of government employees to a bare nullity. In 
Garcetti, the Court reiterated that government employees frequently have 
much to contribute to the public debate as a result of their expertise gained 
through their employment.560 If government insiders were no longer permitted 
to share any insights they learn as a result of their employment, the special 
contribution they could make to the public debate would be minimalized. 
B. Government Insiders and National Security Cases 
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether a government 
insider can find any shelter under the First Amendment for the disclosure of 
national security information to the press. The most relevant case, Snepp v. 
United States, does not bode well for leakers, but as a civil case, it is 
distinguishable.561 Furthermore, the decision is widely out of step with the 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and should be overruled. The only 
 
555 Paul Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal 
Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 119 (2008). 
556 Id. 
557 Id. 
558 Cf. Bonn v. City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587, 593 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a “Public 
Safety Auditor” lacked First Amendment protection for releasing a report to the public and 
discussing it in the media “as a function or official duty of [her] position”). 
559 For example, Garcetti might also have been an obstacle to any First Amendment 
claim Scooter Libby might have had regarding his leak about Valerie Plame.  
560 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419-20 (2006). 
561 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). 
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appellate opinion to address the First Amendment rights of government 
insiders in the context of a criminal prosecution rejected the First Amendment 
claim before it, but the concurring opinions of two of the three judges on the 
panel left open the possibility of such a claim in a future case.562 
1. Civil Cases 
One of the strongest arguments the government has to support its position 
against First Amendment rights for national security employees is Snepp v. 
United States, in which the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does 
not invalidate nondisclosure agreements signed by a federal employee that 
require the employee to obtain prior government approval before publishing 
any information or materials relating to the employing agency.563 Snepp has 
been the subject of scathing academic criticism because it is not consistent 
with the rest of the Court’s jurisprudence relating to either government 
employees or national security information.564 The decision should be 
overruled. But even if it is not, it is not clear that it should have any bearing on 
the First Amendment rights of government insiders who are facing criminal 
charges based on the disclosure of national security information. 
Frank Snepp was a former CIA employee who signed an agreement as a 
condition of his employment agreeing that he would not publish any 
information relating to the agency without obtaining the agency’s prior 
approval.565 The CIA brought a lawsuit to enforce this contract when Snepp 
published a highly critical book about CIA activities in South Vietnam without 
first obtaining agency approval.566 The government wanted a declaration that 
Snepp had breached his contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit his 
future writings for prepublication clearance, and an order authorizing a 
constructive trust for the government’s benefit over all the past and future 
profits Snepp earned and would earn from the unauthorized publication of his 
 
562 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1081 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson, J., 
concurring); id. at 1085 (Phillips, J., concurring). 
563 Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510. 
564 Emerson, supra note 461, at 100 (characterizing Snepp as an “aberration”); Goldston 
et al., supra note 14, at 441-42 (arguing that Snepp “can hardly be viewed as an 
authoritative resolution of the first amendment/national security questions in the government 
employee context” given its unusual procedural posture and cursory attention to the First 
Amendment questions at issue); see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 393 
(1985) (arguing Snepp was “wrong on the merits, and not just as a matter of procedure and 
remedy”); GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 285 n.2 (stating that the author is “among the 
many critics who think that the result in that case was far from sufficiently attentive to free 
speech concerns and that the failure to have full briefing and oral argument was 
disgraceful”). 
565 Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507-08. Snepp also signed a similar agreement when he terminated 
his government position. Id. at 508 n.1. 
566 Id. at 507. 
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book.567 Without the benefit of briefs or oral argument, the Court issued a 
highly controversial per curiam opinion that turned First Amendment doctrine 
on its head.568 As Judge Easterbrook has observed, the Court “treated Snepp’s 
argnments [sic] with disdain.”569 Although the Court had previously set a very 
high bar for prior restraints in the Pentagon Papers case, the Court rejected 
Snepp’s argument that the agreement amounted to an unconstitutional prior 
restraint, reasoning that traditional First Amendment principles did not apply 
because Snepp’s employment with the CIA “involved an extremely high 
degree of trust.”570 
The Court’s analysis of the enforceability of a system of prior restraints was 
relegated to a single footnote that summarily rejected Snepp’s constitutional 
challenge.571 The Court held that even though the government could not 
constitutionally prohibit Snepp from publishing unclassified information, the 
CIA had a right to insist on prepublication review of anything its employees 
might publish “to ensure in advance, and by proper procedures, that 
information detrimental to national interest is not published.”572 The Court 
suggested that the government could have required Snepp to submit to 
prepublication review even in the absence of a signed contract.573 The Court 
explained that unclassified material that looks innocuous might, in fact, be 
harmful in the eyes of experienced CIA officials, because it could lead to the 
exposure of classified information or sources.574 It held that the agreement was 
a “reasonable means” of protecting the government’s compelling interest in 
protecting not only information important to our national security but also the 
“appearance of confidentiality” essential for collecting foreign intelligence.575 
The Court granted the CIA’s request for an injunction, requiring Snepp to 
submit all of his future writings for prepublication review, and imposed a 
constructive trust on all of Snepp’s past and future profits from the sale of his 
book.576 
 
567 Id. at 508. 
568 Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the 
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 339. 
569 Id. 
570 Snepp, 444 U.S at 510. 
571 Medow, supra note 4, at 779. 
572 Snepp, 444 U.S. at 513 n.8. The Court noted that prepublication review is a 
reasonable means of achieving the CIA Director’s statutory mandate to “protec[t] 
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.” Id. at 509 n.3 (alteration in 
original) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976)). 
573 Id. at 509 n.3 (“Moreover, this Court’s cases make clear that – even in the absence of 
an express agreement – the CIA could have acted to protect substantial government interests 
by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be 
protected by the First Amendment.”). 
574 Id. at 512. 
575 Id. at 509 n.3 (emphasis added). 
576 Id. at 515-16. 
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As discussed above, Snepp has been the subject of widespread scholarly 
criticism.577 The Court did not grapple with a series of difficult questions 
raised by the enforcement of Snepp’s contract.578 To begin, it is unclear that 
the CIA had a statutory basis upon which to base its request for injunctive 
relief. Indeed, attempts to pass legislation that would criminalize the 
unauthorized dissemination of classified information have failed over and over 
again; the United States does not have an Official Secrets Act like Britain does. 
Accordingly, Snepp essentially gives the CIA and the executive branch even 
broader authority to censor its employees than an Official Secrets Act would 
provide; not only does it punish those who disclose classified information, but 
it requires all employees to endure a system of prior restraints even when they 
seek to disclose only unclassified information.579 When it stated in broad 
language that the agency had authority to protect the identity of sources, the 
Court failed to examine whether Congress understood that it was authorizing 
the CIA to impose an administrative censorship regime.580 The decision thus 
stands in marked contrast to the Pentagon Papers case, where a majority of 
Justices rejected the government’s claim for injunctive relief because Congress 
had not authorized it.581 Worst of all, the Snepp opinion says “nothing about 
the first amendment; nor does it consider the possibility that Snepp’s 
publication might have value in terms of freedom of expression.”582 The Court 
also entirely ignored the implications of permitting government employees to 
contract away their First Amendment rights.583 
All of the procedural irregularities of the case, as well as its complete 
disregard of precedent and First Amendment issues, would support the Court’s 
decision to overrule it. At the very least, Snepp should be limited to the civil 
context. Although the Court indicated that the contracts requiring a prior 
restraint met constitutional scrutiny, it did not address what standard the 
government must meet to render criminal punishment for the publication of 
classified information.584 The distinction between civil sanctions and criminal 
punishment is extraordinarily important. 
3. Criminal Cases 
Because the government has either dismissed or obtained guilty pleas in 
most of its leaker prosecutions to date, there is only one appellate decision 
addressing whether government insiders have any First Amendment right to 
 
577 See supra note 564 and accompanying text. 
578 Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 186, at 374. 
579 Id. at 373-75 (“The Court’s opinion gave no sign that a prior restraint mechanism 
could conceivably pose any problems in terms of traditional first amendment analysis.”). 
580 Id. at 375. 
581 Id. 
582 Id. 
583 Id. at 373-75. 
584 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). 
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leak information to the press.585 As indicated previously, some lower courts 
have accepted the government’s argument that leak prosecutions do not 
implicate the First Amendment at all.586 Other courts have recognized that First 
Amendment rights are at stake but have concluded that the prosecutions before 
them comported with constitutional requirements.587 
The leading leaker case is United States v. Morison,588 which concerned a 
naval intelligence officer who gave satellite photographs of Soviet naval 
preparations to the British publisher of a periodical about naval operations 
internationally.589 In addition to rejecting Morison’s statutory arguments that 
the Espionage Act applied only in traditional espionage cases,590 the Fourth 
Circuit also rejected his arguments that the First Amendment provides special 
protection to disclosures to the press.591 The court easily distinguished the 
Pentagon Papers case as a case involving a prior restraint against the press, not 
a prosecution of a source.592 In response to arguments that prosecutions of 
sources could undermine the ability of the press to perform its function, the 
majority opinion relied on Branzburg v. Hayes for the proposition that the First 
Amendment does not provide the press or its sources with immunity from 
otherwise valid criminal laws.593 The court also relied on Snepp – although 
admittedly these cases are not precisely on point – in rejecting Morison’s First 
Amendment defense.594 
Notably, the two concurring opinions in Morison recognized that the 
charges against Morison implicated the First Amendment. Judge Wilkinson 
recognized the government’s tendency to withhold information from the public 
and the important role leaks play in fostering democratic accountability.595 At 
the same time, he expressed concern for the judiciary’s capacity for second-
guessing the executive and the ability of “one disgruntled employee” to derail 
 
585 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988). 
586 See supra Part II.A.1. 
587 See supra Part II.A.1.  
588 Morison, 844 F.2d 1057. 
589 Id. 
590 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Espionage Act and related statutes). 
591 Morison, 844 F.2d at 1068. 
592 Id. at 1068; see also id. at 1081 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“No member of the press 
is being searched, subpoenaed, or excluded, as in a typical right of access case.”). 
593 Id. at 1068 (majority opinion) (“We do not think that the First Amendment offers 
asylum under those circumstances, if proven, merely because the transmittal was to a 
representative of the press.” (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972))). 
594 Id. at 1069. 
595 Id. at 1081 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“There exists the tendency, even in a 
constitutional democracy, for government to withhold reports of disquieting developments 
and to manage news in a fashion most favorable to itself. Public debate, however, is 
diminished without access to unfiltered facts.”). 
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a government program.596 Furthermore, he was skeptical that the government 
would ever prosecute someone who revealed wrongdoing given the “political 
firestorm” that would ensue.597 In a separate concurrence, Judge Phillips 
agreed that the First Amendment issues in the case were “real and 
substantial.”598 Together, the concurring opinions appear to leave open the 
possibility of a First Amendment defense in a future case. 
IV. MAKING DISTINCTIONS 
One possible response to the uptick in leak prosecutions is to trust 
prosecutorial discretion. After all, the government is still not prosecuting the 
vast majority of leaks. It is unlikely to prosecute leakers who reveal genuine 
instances of wrongdoing because a jury is unlikely to deliver a guilty verdict in 
such cases. Indeed, this has been the argument some have made in response to 
arguments regarding the First Amendment rights of government outsiders.599 
But, as the Supreme Court has said time and time again, First Amendment 
rights cannot be left to the whims of prosecutorial discretion.600 Furthermore, 
the prosecutions the government has brought hardly give solace that 
prosecutors will exercise their discretion carefully. During its brief “war on 
leakers,” the government has already demonstrated that it might exercise its 
discretion to drop a prosecution only after it has already ruined the life of its 
target. Consider the prosecution of former NSA executive Thomas Drake, who 
originally faced ten felony charges but ultimately pled guilty to a minor 
misdemeanor.601 In response to the government’s request for a severe sentence 
to “send a message” to other government workers, Judge Richard D. Bennett 
exclaimed that it was “unconscionable” for the government to drag Drake and 
his family through “four years of hell,” only to drop all charges except a 
misdemeanor count on the eve of trial.602 As the government recognized at 
trial, Drake will never work for the federal government again and is now 
employed as a clerk at an Apple store.603 The government’s decision to charge 
 
596 Id. at 1083. 
597 Id. at 1084. 
598 Id. at 1085 (Phillips, J., concurring). 
599 See SCHOENFELD, supra note 6, at 270 (arguing that the government is unlikely to 
prosecute harmless disclosures or those that reveal wrongdoing). 
600 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (“[T]he First 
Amendment protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse 
oblige.”). 
601 Ex-Official at NSA Gets Year of Probation, WASH. POST, July 16, 2011, at A5. 
602 Transcript of Sentencing Proceeding at 16-17, 28-29, 42, United States v. Drake, No. 
1:10-CR-181-RDB (D. Md. July 15, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/FEL2-QFGH. 
603 Id. at 35 (“[Defense counsel]: . . . . And as Your Honor pointed out, he had lost his 
job and government service, a senior executive position, as [the prosecutor] has pointed out, 
he was a college professor at a university level, and in order to support his family he had to 
find a job at the Apple Store in retail making an hourly wage.”). 
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Bradley Manning with aiding the enemy also demonstrates prosecutorial 
zealousness in this area.604 
As I explain in the prior Section, the argument that government insiders 
have no First Amendment right to disseminate information without 
authorization is based on a misunderstanding of First Amendment doctrine. 
The question remains, however, what sort of First Amendment rights these 
government insiders do have. As difficult as it is to answer this question, it is 
essential that we do so, not only to protect individuals from overzealous 
criminal prosecutions, but also to change the culture within the government so 
that those who are willing to reveal wrongdoing are encouraged to do so. 
Given that the Court has determined that the Pickering framework applies to 
government employee speech claims, and my argument that Garcetti would 
not stand as a bar to a First Amendment claim in most cases, it is tempting to 
conclude that the same framework should apply in this context. This Section 
rejects that approach. Using a balancing test to evaluate the First Amendment 
claims of government insiders would be problematic for a number of reasons. 
The first is that the test was not developed in the context of a criminal 
prosecution and is out of step with the rest of the Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding the constitutionality of laws that criminalize speech. The other 
reason is that a balancing test is unworkable in this context. 
Instead, it is essential to distinguish treason and espionage from other types 
of leaks. Treason and espionage are not “speech” under the First Amendment, 
but these categories must be carefully defined, just like every category of 
unprotected speech, so that they apply only in cases where the defendants 
intended to communicate with a foreign power (or “enemy,” in the case of 
treason). By carefully considering what is disclosed, why it was disclosed, and 
to whom it was disclosed, it is possible to discern the leaker’s intended 
audience and make the necessary distinctions among leaks. Although the First 
Amendment permits the government, functioning as an employer, to restrict 
speech of government insiders more easily than it can restrict the speech of 
government outsiders, this power should be restricted to the imposition of 
employment-related civil and administrative sanctions. The Article concludes 
that government should be entitled to pursue criminal sanctions on government 
insiders – and outsiders – who are not traitors or spies only when their 
disclosures pose a direct and irreparable threat to national security that is not 
outweighed by the public interest in the information. 
A. Civil Versus Criminal Sanctions 
If, as I argue, leakers do not operate entirely outside the protections of the 
First Amendment, the question remains what rights they do have. It is tempting 
to argue simply that the Pickering balancing test should apply; indeed, some 
 
604 David S. Cloud, Wikileaks Probe Brings New Charges; The Army Files 22 More 
Counts Against a Suspected Leaker, and May Charge Others, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, at 
AA6. 
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scholars have suggested just that.605 The problem with this argument is that the 
Pickering balancing test arose and has been applied exclusively in the context 
of challenges to civil sanctions and adverse employment actions, not criminal 
charges.606 This makes all the difference in the world. Although, generally 
speaking, First Amendment rights do not vary based on whether the 
government seeks to impose a civil or criminal punishment, in the context of 
government employment, the government should have more power to impose 
employment-related sanctions on its employees than it should have to impose 
criminal sanctions. 
In the context of national security leaks, scholars have long commented on 
the potential unfairness of allowing the government to impose criminal 
penalties for leaks based on the same standard used for civil sanctions,607 but 
only recently have scholars begun to focus on whether First Amendment 
analysis is penalty sensitive.608 As a general matter, it is certainly true that the 
Court has never suggested that the First Amendment applies with any less 
force when the government uses civil rather than criminal sanctions to restrict 
or compel speech. In other words, it usually does not really matter what kind of 
punishment an individual receives when determining the scope of his First 
Amendment rights.609 Indeed, in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court 
analogized private causes of action for defamation to criminal charges under 
the Sedition Act of 1798 and observed that if anything, the lack of the panoply 
of procedural protections that attach to any criminal charges – but not in civil 
cases – may render civil claims even more threatening to First Amendment 
interests.610 But within the defamation context, the Court has distinguished 
among compensatory, presumed, and punitive damages and prescribed 
different levels of fault for the recovery of each.611 As a result, the state is not 
 
605 See, e.g., Goldston et al., supra note 14, at 438-39 (arguing that applying Pickering to 
national security employees could lead to “a qualified employee right to release information 
relating to national security”). 
606 Kitrosser, supra note 13, at 420. 
607 See, e.g., MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, TOP SECRET: NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW 85 (1977); Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 186, at 
356; Emerson, supra note 461, at 95-96; Nimmer, supra note 428, at 331-32 & n.99.  
608 Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to 
the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 997 (2012); Kitrosser, supra note 13, at 441 
(“[C]ourts should consider varying the precise nature of the government’s burden with the 
severity of the penalty sought in the criminal or civil context.”). 
609 Coenen, supra note 608, at 994. 
610 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964) (observing that safeguards 
“such as the requirements of an indictment[,] . . . proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” and 
double-jeopardy do not apply in civil case). 
611 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (requiring actual 
malice for presumed and punitive damages in private figure/public concern case). 
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limited in its ability to hold someone liable for defamation, but as the severity 
of the civil sanction increases, so does the level of fault.612 
In cases involving the government’s various “managerial domains,” such as 
prisons, the military, schools, and government employment, the Court 
permitted the government to restrict speech in ways that it usually could not, 
by focusing on the “special circumstances” of these environments.613 Thus, in 
the context of student speech rights, the Court has recognized that schools have 
more leeway to punish student speech with school-related sanctions like 
suspension or expulsion, but it has never held that students could be criminally 
or even civilly punished under these lesser standards.614 Similarly, the Court 
has permitted searches conducted by school officials on a lower level of 
scrutiny – reasonableness – than the Fourth Amendment would require if those 
same searches were performed at the students’ homes or by law enforcement 
officials.615 None of the Court’s government-employee jurisprudence involves 
the imposition of criminal sanctions based on the Garcetti-Pickering-Connick 
framework. 
One can understand why the Court has held that the First Amendment gives 
the government as employer greater power to restrict the speech of its 
employees than it is entitled to restrict the speech of ordinary citizens. In its 
capacity as an employer, the government has a strong interest in having greater 
hiring and firing control over its employees, just as a private employer would. 
It does not follow that the government is entitled to control the speech of its 
employees through criminal sanctions. Indeed, it just cannot be the case that 
the government can impose criminal sanctions on its employees as long as it 
meets the relatively low standards of the Garcetti-Pickering-Connick 
framework. After all, this would mean that the government could throw in jail 
anyone who speaks out of turn in the course of his job duties616 or speaks on a 
matter of private concern.617 
 
612 See Coenen, supra note 608, at 1007. 
613 Many scholars have addressed the Supreme Court’s tendency to abandon its usual 
First Amendment principles and analysis in the context of speech restrictions in various 
government institutions. See, e.g., C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not 
Preferred: The Military and Other “Special Contexts,” 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779 (1988); Gia 
Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government Institutions and Programs, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1691 (2009); Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A 
Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1635 (2007); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of 
Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008); Frederick Schauer, Toward an 
Institutional View of the First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005). 
614 See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 
1027, 1038-56 (2008). 
615 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). 
616 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). 
617 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983). 
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Furthermore, as a public policy matter, one might wonder whether the 
government even needs criminal sanctions to control the dissemination of 
information effectively. After all, the threat of dismissal and the loss of a 
security clearance should be sufficient deterrents to most government insiders 
who consider revealing national security information without authorization.618 
Criminal sanctions would seem to be unnecessary overkill. If criminal laws 
have even greater deterrent value, they might over-deter leaks, and 
overdeterrence is a significant problem when the public relies so heavily on 
leaks to inform public debate. In addition, the truly massive number of leaks 
and the limited prosecutorial resources that could realistically be devoted to 
prosecuting leaks necessarily lead to concerns about selective prosecution.619 
Permitting criminal sanctions for leaks only in extraordinary circumstances 
would also reduce the threat to the media. As we have seen with the recent 
spate of leak prosecutions, the government is likely to subpoena reporters and 
news organizations to obtain the identity of a leaker. In addition, these 
reporters and media outlets potentially face criminal charges of their own for 
inchoate crimes like conspiracy and aiding and abetting.620 
B. The Problem with Balancing Tests 
Another reason not to use the Pickering balancing test in the context of 
criminal prosecutions is that it would offer relatively uncertain and weak 
protection for constitutional rights. Furthermore, requiring courts to weigh the 
value of the leak’s contribution to the public discourse against the harmfulness 
of the leak is unworkable. 
One hallmark of a balancing test is the lack of certainty that it provides; a 
potential leaker would have a difficult time predicting at the outset whether his 
leak would be protected.621 That much is true for any balancing test, and 
especially for any public employee seeking protection under Pickering. 
 
618 See Emerson, supra note 461, at 97.  
619 See id. at 96 (“[T]he amount of information which slips through the government’s 
fingers is so enormous, the system of leaks so pervasive, and the possibility of stemming the 
tide so out of reach, that application of criminal sanctions for divulging information would 
hardly be workable. Prosecutions would be highly selective, thereby unfair, and subject to 
serious abuse.”). 
620 See id. 
621 See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning 
of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 212 (observing that self-censorship 
results when individuals refrain “from uttering what was in fact true ‘because of doubt 
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so’” (quoting N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964))); Lee, supra note 4, at 1489; Melville B. 
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: The First Amendment Applied to Libel 
and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 939 (1968). Categorical rules that 
provide no protection whatsoever for leaked information would of course provide the 
benefit of certainty. Lee, supra note 4, at 1489. 
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Although the public school teacher in Pickering prevailed, the Court has been 
increasingly deferential to employee assertions in subsequent cases. 
In the national security context, courts are likely to be even more deferential 
given their general reluctance to second guess the executive branch on national 
security issues.622 Furthermore, any ad hoc balancing test will be hostage to the 
public values and anxiety of the time.623 For example, in times of terrorist 
activity, the public – the jury – is less likely to be sympathetic to a government 
insider who reveals an arguably illegal government program that is aimed at 
reducing terrorism. In Dennis v. United States,624 for example, the Court 
applied an ad hoc balancing test and ended up affirming the defendants’ 
convictions for forming the Communist party because it was believed that the 
party posed a threat to the security of the nation.625 
An additional problem with applying Pickering is that the test is not well 
designed to balance the value of the information against the harmfulness of the 
information. Instead, courts tend to focus on whether the disclosure 
undermines the effective functioning of the government. In light of Snepp, 
courts are likely to credit the government’s assertion that leaks of any sort – 
even if they do not concern classified information and even if they are not 
particularly newsworthy – undermine the proper functioning of the 
government. In the Court’s view, proper functioning depends upon not only the 
need for the secrecy of sensitive national security information but also “the 
appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our 
foreign intelligence service.”626 Furthermore, even if a court is willing to 
balance the value of the disclosed information against the harmfulness of 
disclosure, it is not clear how a court would conduct that balance. 
In the context of civil sanctions, applying Pickering would be preferable to 
the current approach,627 but for all the reasons above, a balancing test remains 
deeply problematic. That said, when applied properly, the test should be useful 
for leakers in some limited instances. For example, government insiders should 
be permitted to argue that the information at issue was improperly classified 
 
622 Lee, supra note 4, at 1489 (“[B]alancing is unlikely to accomplish much because 
courts are likely to defer to the expertise of intelligence agencies on matters such as the 
harmfulness of a leak.”); see, e.g., Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) 
(“[U]nless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been 
reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security 
affairs.”); SAGAR, supra note 85, at 55-65. 
623 Methven, supra note 466, at 91. 
624 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
625 Id. at 516-17 (“[Petitioners’] conspiracy to organize the Communist Party and to 
teach and advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and 
violence created a ‘clear and present danger’ of an attempt to overthrow the Government by 
force and violence.”). 
626 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 n.3 (1980) (per curiam) (emphasis added); 
see also CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) (citing this language from Snepp favorably). 
627 See Kitrosser, supra note 13. 
  
2014] LEAKER TRAITOR WHISTLEBLOWER SPY 539 
 
and/or already in the public domain. Furthermore, the government should not 
be entitled to punish disclosers who have an objectively reasonable belief that 
they have revealed the violation of a law, rule, or regulation, an instance of 
gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. The person who leaks 
to the press should be protected as long as that person can demonstrate that it 
would have been futile to follow internal reporting procedures. When these 
conditions are met, the value of the speech, and the speaker’s interest in 
speaking, outweigh the government’s interest in silencing the speaker. 
C. Standard for Criminal Sanctions 
If the Bradley Manning prosecution is any indication, the government is 
likely to pursue constitutional or military treason charges against a leaker 
again, particularly if the leaker chooses to disclose information to the public 
through a foreign, new media entity like WikiLeaks. Despite the government’s 
arguments to the contrary, a meaningful distinction exists between treason and 
espionage on the one hand, and leaking to the public on the other. It is time for 
both our statutes and First Amendment doctrine to reflect this distinction. 
Ideally, Congress should rewrite the Espionage Act and related statutes to 
make a clear distinction between disclosures that are intended to reach the 
enemy and those that are intended to inform the American public. Given that 
statutory reform is not likely to occur in the near future, it is essential for 
courts to rethink the First Amendment implications of leak prosecutions. 
Although treason and espionage are not constitutionally protected, these 
categories need to be carefully defined. Other leaks should not be criminally 
actionable unless they pose a direct and grave danger to the nation’s security 
that is not outweighed by the public’s interest in the information. 
1. Distinguishing Treason and Espionage 
The government is plainly correct that information published in the New 
York Times is just as likely to fall into our enemies’ hands as if a spy hand 
delivered the secrets directly to them. But as a matter of public policy and First 
Amendment doctrine, there is an essential distinction between treason and 
espionage, and information disclosed to the public at large. 
Although treason is distinct from espionage, the two crimes overlap because 
they both involve communication directed to a foreign power. Treason is a 
more limited crime because it requires that the information be aimed at an 
“enemy,” while espionage can occur even when our secrets are disclosed to our 
allies. The other significant difference between treason and espionage is that 
treason requires adherence to the enemy. 
Information disclosed directly and solely to a foreign power does not enrich 
the public debate in any way; information disclosed to the public often does. 
Private disclosures are unlikely to serve the public interest, but are more likely 
to serve the interests of the leaker and the entity receiving the disclosure. 
Public disclosures, on the other hand, may potentially benefit every foreign 
  
540 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:449 
 
adversary. As discussed in Part I.B.4, the publication of information to the 
general public is crucially different from disclosures to the press. When 
disclosures are made to the press, the government knows what the enemies 
know. In the case of traditional espionage, the government does not know what 
secrets have been compromised.628 
Of course, this distinction is more easily made in theory than in fact because 
traitors and spies certainly can use even traditional media to pass information 
to the enemy and other nations. In the digital age, the best and most practical 
way to distinguish between traitors and spies and those attempting to 
communicate with the public is to focus on the intent of the leaker and the 
identity of the recipient of the disclosures. 
To avoid a conflict with the First Amendment, the crime of treason must be 
limited to those instances when the defendant has a specific intent to aid the 
enemy. In cases where the defendant is serving as an agent or employee of a 
foreign nation, the inquiry will be easy. In other cases, it will be essential to 
look at extrinsic evidence to determine whether this specific intent exists. Not 
only is it impossible to get inside someone’s mind, but it is also too easy for 
defendants to assert at trial that their primary goal was to inform the American 
public. Most leak cases so far have not gone to trial, but in those that have – 
Morison and Manning – the courts did consider extrinsic evidence regarding 
the purpose for the disclosures. Although determining intent can be tricky, 
these cases demonstrate that it can be done. Furthermore, in other contexts – 
especially employment discrimination – courts have proven to be well 
equipped to determine the primary motivation for defendants’ actions. 
Evidence that the leaker had “bad” motivations – like a desire to get revenge 
on superiors, or achieve some level of notoriety – should be taken into account 
just as bad motivations are taken into account in defamation cases. In 
defamation cases, desire to harm an individual is not by itself evidence of bad 
intent, but it can be considered in sorting out the true intent of the actor.629 
Similarly, in leak cases, a “bad” motive standing alone should not strip 
government insiders of their constitutional protections, but instead should be 
relevant in determining the leaker’s intent. 
In addition to defendants’ own explanations for their actions, courts should 
consider what was disclosed and to whom. By looking at what is disclosed, the 
factfinder can make some conclusions regarding the intent of the leaker. 
Disclosures of potentially illegal government activities, like those involved in 
the Snowden leaks, will generally support arguments that the leaks were made 
to inform the American public and not aid the enemy. Indiscriminate 
information dumps, like Manning’s, raise a red flag regarding the leaker’s 
intent, although such acts by themselves will not be determinative.630 In 
 
628 See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
629 Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667-68 (1989). 
630 In comparison, Snowden does not appear to have disseminated documents 
indiscriminately. He contends he had “all sorts of documents” he did not turn over; instead, 
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considering the context of the disclosures, a court should factor in the public 
value of the information. Information that is not particularly illuminating for 
public debate is less likely to be intended for public consumption. 
A leaker’s choice of forum – “to whom” the disclosures were made – should 
be considered as one of the most helpful factors in determining whether the 
leaker was acting with the intent of communicating with the public. The 
problem in the digital age is that it is difficult, if not next to impossible, to 
determine which publications should be regarded as members of the press 
operating with the intention to communicate with the general public, or at least 
a relevant subset of the public. Indeed, this is very similar to the inquiry that is 
plaguing courts and legislatures grappling with whether to recognize a 
reporters’ privilege.631 This may require courts to inquire whether the entity 
engages in “journalism” and to conduct a careful inquiry into the audience the 
leaker intended to reach through his communications. Bradley Manning made 
a persuasive argument that disclosing information to WikiLeaks was not much 
different from disclosing the information to a more traditional news outlet 
because, in many ways, at the time of his disclosures, WikiLeaks served as an 
important watchdog function throughout the world and, in fact, had won 
awards for its reporting.632 
In some cases it will not be as difficult to determine whether the leaker 
hopes to stir public debate. The Snowden leaks are a perfect example. 
Although commentators and public officials continue to call him a traitor 
because he escaped to Hong Kong and then Russia,633 his decision to enlist the 
help of Glenn Greenwald at the Guardian and Barton Gellman at the 
Washington Post is strong evidence of intent to inform the public about 
controversial government surveillance activities.634 The benefits of revealing 
information through major newspapers are obvious. In addition to reaching the 
broadest possible audience and avoiding online obscurity, disclosing 
information through traditional media takes advantage of journalists’ expert 
ability to provide a broader context and meaning to complex documents.635 
 
he contends, he “evaluated every single document I disclosed to ensure that each was 
legitimately in the public interest.” Glenn Greenwald et al., supra note 222. 
631 I discuss this problem at length elsewhere. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen 
Journalism and Reporters’ Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515 (2006). 
632 For a lengthier discussion of the problems distinguishing WikiLeaks from the 
traditional media, see Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Publication of National Security 
Information in the Digital Age, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 119 (2011); Benkler, supra 
note 24. 
633 Will Englund, Snowden Stayed at Russian Consulate, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2013, at 
A3. If evidence emerges that Snowden shared information with foreign countries directly, 
his claims about his intent to inform the American public will certainly be suspect. At this 
time, however, the government does not appear to have any evidence that this is the case. 
634 Greenwald et al., supra note 222 (quoting Snowden as saying “[m]y sole motive is to 
inform the public”).  
635 See Rusbridger, supra note 109, at 31. 
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Disclosing the information to more than one news organization, as both Daniel 
Ellsberg and Snowden did, does little to undermine this objective evidence of 
the leaker’s intent. Multiple disclosures guards against the chances that any 
one news outlet will be unable or unwilling to publish due to government 
pressure, threats of criminal prosecution, or court injunction.636 
In addition, evidence that a government insider tried to disclose information 
to the traditional media is relevant to the intent inquiry, although, by itself, it 
should not defeat, or prove, treason or espionage charges.637 In the Manning 
case, the defense argued that Manning had first tried to pass along the 
information to the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Politico, but he 
gave the information to WikiLeaks only after he felt a Washington Post 
reporter did not take him seriously, no one at the New York Times returned his 
calls, and bad weather hampered his efforts to deliver documents to Politico.638 
Indeed, courts should not assume that a government insider who reveals 
information directly (for example, through a personal blog) lacks the requisite 
intent to communicate with the American public. Indeed, some whistleblowers 
have felt that they had no other choice than to make their disclosures 
themselves. For example, in 2004, Lockheed Martin employee Michael 
DeKort uploaded a video to YouTube outlining various safety and security 
deficiencies of ships his employer was making for the Coast Guard.639 In the 
video, DeKort stated, “I have exhausted every avenue I can think of.”640 
DeKort had bought his concerns to the CEO and Board of Directors of 
Lockheed Martin, as well as the Inspector General for the Department of 
Homeland Security and congressmen.641 DeKort said that the company 
rebuffed his concerns because the project was over budget and behind 
schedule.642 In addition, DeKort claimed that the Inspector General (IG) had 
investigated his concerns for six months but then told DeKort that the IG could 
not do anything to address them due to “lack of cooperation from the U.S. 
Coast Guard,”643 though the IG denied that.644 When asked why he had not 
 
636 Id. 
637 After all, a government insider could try to plant information in the traditional media 
as a means of reaching a foreign government. 
638 Ed Pilkington, Manning Says He First Tried to Leak to Washington Post and New 
York Times, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/28/ 
manning-washington-post-new-york-times, archived at http://perma.cc/HGN2-FB96. 
639 Michael DeKort, YOUTUBE (Aug. 3, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qd3V 
V8Za04g. 
640 Id. 
641 Griff Witte, On YouTube, Charges of Security Flaws, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2006, at 
D1. 
642 Id. 
643 See DeKort, supra note 639. 
644 See Witte, supra note 641. 
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taken his concerns to the press, DeKort said that the institutional media was 
not interested in publishing his allegations because they did not believe him.645 
Down the road, there will be cases where government insiders disclose 
national security information through a media entity that is publically 
accessible yet affiliated with – or at least sympathetic to – our nation’s 
enemies. In such cases, it will be essential to examine closely both the nature 
of the publication to which the leaks were made as well as the government 
insider’s reasons for sharing information with that particular information 
distributor in order to determine whether the disclosures were made to aid our 
enemies, or to inform the American public. 
2. All Other Leaks 
Leaks that do not fall within the categories of treason or espionage 
constitute “speech” under the First Amendment. Furthermore, the Court’s 
jurisprudence giving the government as employer greater leeway to sanction 
the speech of its employees is in the context of employment-related sanctions. 
When it comes to criminal sanctions, the government should not be permitted 
to punish its employees criminally unless the government makes the same 
showing it must make for government outsiders. 
This conclusion begs the question: What standard the government must 
meet in the context of government outsiders? Unfortunately, there is no clear 
answer. I argue elsewhere that the same high standard for prior restraints – 
grave and direct harm to national security – should apply in any criminal 
prosecution of government outsiders.646 Although this was the standard the 
Supreme Court set for prior restraints in the Pentagon Papers case, and even 
though the Court specifically left open the possibility of subsequent criminal 
charges based on a lesser showing, the distinction between prior restraints and 
subsequent criminal punishment is not significant enough to justify a 
distinction between the two.647 As the Pentagon Papers case demonstrated, 
requiring direct and grave harm to national security is essential in order to 
prevent the government from overreaching. True, it can be difficult at times to 
determine whether a disclosure actually poses a direct risk of a serious harm to 
national security, but when there is uncertainty, the benefit of the doubt should 
tip in favor of protecting First Amendment rights. In most cases, the 
government will not be able to meet this burden. 
In cases where the government can demonstrate a direct and grave harm to 
national security interests, it should also be required to demonstrate that the 
 
645 60 Minutes: The Troubled Waters of “Deepwater” (CBS television broadcast May 
17, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/DP44-BPN2 (stating that the press said DeKort’s 
allegations – including his claim that Lockheed Martin had ordered radios that were not 
waterproof – seemed “a little too fantastic”). 
646 See Papandrea, supra note 3, at 298. 
647 Id. at 280-81. 
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public interest in the information did not outweigh the harm.648 The question of 
the public’s interest does not come into play unless and until the government 
has demonstrated harm. The Court did not discuss the role of a public interest 
inquiry in the Pentagon Papers case, but that is no doubt because the 
government had not demonstrated the requisite level of harm. Balancing the 
value of the information against its harm is a tricky and complicated task. It 
will occur, however, only in cases in which the government has shown grave 
harm, and, in such instances, will protect defendants only when the disclosures 
reveal some sort of government wrongdoing. 
Applying the same high standard in criminal prosecutions involving 
government insiders and outsiders will make it more difficult for the 
government. With respect to government insiders, however, the government 
will maintain the ability to impose civil sanctions based on a much lower 
standard. These sanctions – such as the loss of employment – are by no means 
trivial and will have a significant deterrent effect on potential leaks. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article contends that the First Amendment rights of government 
insiders are substantial. Although treason and espionage are not “speech” 
under the First Amendment, these categories must be carefully defined to 
apply only in cases where the defendant intended to communicate with a 
foreign entity. By carefully considering what was disclosed, why it was 
disclosed, and to whom it was disclosed, it is possible to discern the leaker’s 
intent and distinguish among treason, espionage, whistleblowing, and other 
leaks. 
By recognizing that even national security employees have some First 
Amendment protection to reveal classified information in support of their 
reports of wrongdoing, courts would not merely save some individual 
employees from adverse employment actions and prosecution, but would also 
potentially change the internal cultural norms of the national security 
workplace.649 With that change, we can come closer to achieving the 
appropriate balance between secrecy and transparency. 
 
648 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 185, 204 (2007) (“[T]o justify the criminal punishment of the press for 
publishing classified information, the government must prove that the publisher knew that 
(a) it was publishing classified information, (b) . . . which would result in likely, imminent, 
and serious harm to the national security, and (c) . . . would not meaningfully contribute to 
public debate.”). 
649 Lobel, supra note 202, at 48; see also Daniel Ellsberg, Secrecy and National Security 
Whistleblowing, 77 SOC. RES. 773 (2010). 
